3 ideas
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: The existence of very general principles in mathematics are universally regarded as obvious, where on an empiricist view one would expect them to be bold hypotheses, about which a prudent scientist would maintain reserve. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Mathematical Intuition [1980], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is mainly aimed at Quine's and Putnam's indispensability (to science) argument about mathematics. |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Pure, unexplained supervenience is never a solution to a problem but a sign that there is something fundamental we don't know. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Psychophysical Nexus [2000], §III) | |
A reaction: This seems right. It is not a theory or an explanation, merely the observation of a correlation which will require explanation. Why are they correlated? |
21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: To my contention that, on his principles, 'the existent round square' exists, Meinong replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent, and I have no more to say on this head. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...' [1907], p.93) | |
A reaction: Russell is obviously invoking the famously dubious ontological argument for God's existence. Normally impossible objects are rejected because of contradictions, but there might also be category mistakes. 'The slow square'. |