Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness', 'The Making of a Philosopher' and 'Emile: treatise on education'

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6 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind

2957	Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
	Full Idea: Nagel argues (because of brain bisection experiments) that we should jettison our commonsense assumption that the unity of consciousness is an all-or-nothing affair.
	From: report of Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971]) by Michael Lockwood - Mind, Brain and the Quantum p.84
	A reaction: It seems wrong to call it 'commonsense'. It is an assumption that precedes any judgement, but if you rapidly grasp that your mind is in your brain, it becomes common sense that you can cut lumps out of your mind.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind

4691	If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
	Full Idea: If there were nothing more to our mind than our conscious awareness, then we would be unable to see anything or to process speech.
	From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 6)
	A reaction: A vital point. Traditional dualism has left us a simplistic exaggeration of the role of consciousness, and the misapprehension that most of what we do is conscious - which it clearly isn't, once you think about it.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

3285	We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
	Full Idea: As a result of the evidence of split-brains, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, …but we may be unable to abandon the idea, no matter what we discover.
	From: Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971], p.164)
	A reaction: I'm not sure what grounds you can have for a claim that we can't abandon our current view of selves, even when the new reality will be utterly different. Rather conservative? I would expect future concepts to roughly match future reality.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention

4690	If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]
	Full Idea: The importance of Grice's analysis of speaker meaning is that it offers the prospect of analysing the whole phenomenon of linguistic meaning in terms of propositional attitudes… thus turning semantics into a department of the philosophy of mind.
	From: Colin McGinn (The Making of a Philosopher [2002], Ch. 5)
	A reaction: Although meaning being truth conditions is the most cited theory, the reduction of semantics to an aspect of mind also seems almost orthodox now. But how do the symbols 'represent' the attitudes?

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self

20759	Feelings are prior to intelligence; we should be content to live with our simplest feelings [Rousseau]
	Full Idea: To exist is to feel, our feeling is undoubtedly earlier than our intelligence, and we had feelings before we had ideas. …Let us be simpler and less pretentious; let us be content with the first feelings we experience in ourselves.
	From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Emile: treatise on education [1762], p.210), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 6 'Moods'
	A reaction: Beginning of the sentimental movement, and precursor to romanticism, but here seen as the basis for the existentialist concept of authenticity. Wallowing in emotions doesn't appeal to me, but you have to make space for them. Rousseau loved walking.

24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship

19854	We all owe labour in return for our keep, and every idle citizen is a thief [Rousseau]
	Full Idea: In a society where a man has to live at others' expense, he owes in labour the price of his keep; and that is without exception. Work, then, is an indispensable social obligation. Rich or poor, powerful or weak, every idle citizen is a thief.
	From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Emile: treatise on education [1762], Bk III)
	A reaction: Presumably rich landowners who live on rents can justify their position by good husbandry, at a higher level than tilling the soil. But Bertie Wooster won't last long in Rousseau's new world. This is a big challenge to the welfare state.