6 ideas
11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
Full Idea: It is a tenet of Russell's theory that all expressions, and especially definite descriptions, whose denotation is dependent upon contingent circumstances must be eliminated. | |
From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], II) |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Pure, unexplained supervenience is never a solution to a problem but a sign that there is something fundamental we don't know. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Psychophysical Nexus [2000], §III) | |
A reaction: This seems right. It is not a theory or an explanation, merely the observation of a correlation which will require explanation. Why are they correlated? |
11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
Full Idea: The doctrine that we can ask whether this is the same individual in another possible world, and that a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call 'Haecceitism'. | |
From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV) | |
A reaction: Penelope Mackie emphasises that this doctrine, that each thing is somehow individuated, is not the same as believing in actual haecceities, specific properties which achieve the individuating. |
9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
Full Idea: That a common 'thisness' may underlie extreme dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great resemblance I call 'haecceitism'. (I prefer the pronunciation Hex'-ee-i-tis-m). | |
From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV) | |
A reaction: [odd pronunciation, if 'haec' is pronounced haeek] The view seems to be very unpopular (e.g. with Lewis, Bird and Mumford). But there is an intuitive sense of whether or not two things are identical when they seem dissimilar. |
11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
Full Idea: If one regards the usual form of quantification into modal and other intensional contexts - modality de re - as legitimate (without special explanations), then one seems committed to some form of haecceitism. | |
From: David Kaplan (How to Russell a Frege-Church [1975], IV) | |
A reaction: That is, modal reference requires fixed identities, irrespective of possible changes in properties. Why could one not refer to objects just as bundles of properties, with some sort of rules about when it ceased to be that particular bundle (keep 60%?)? |
17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
Full Idea: Gilbert Harman introduced the term 'inference to the best explanation', and argued that it is the core notion of epistemology. | |
From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Inference to the Best Explanation [1974]) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p. 01 | |
A reaction: Hard to assess that, but it sounds right. I'm a fan of coherence theories of justification, and also coherence theories of explanation, and there is a neat package there somewhere. |