Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Improvement of Understanding' and 'Morality, Action, and Outcome'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

16541	All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: The definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], p.35), quoted by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6
	A reaction: This is exactly what Locke requires of a real essence (though he is pessimistic about ever achieving it). Spinoza is talking of an Aristotelian real definition, which may be complex, and not a lexicographer's short verbal explication.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

23647	Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
	Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

11958	Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
	Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
	From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
	A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

13073	To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: If a circle is defined as a figure in which lines from centre to circumference are equal, such definitions do not explain the essence of a circle, but only a property. The properties of a thing are not understood as long as their essences are not known.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], §95), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.2.1
	A reaction: This is the traditional Aristotelian view of essence, and the example of a circle is nice, though I am not sure what the essence of a circle might be. Presumably ALL the properties of a circle must flow from it.

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

23646	Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
	Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference

23645	A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
	Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect

22465	We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
	Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
	A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.

22466	We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
	Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
	A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.

22467	Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
	Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
	A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism

22470	A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
	Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
	A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue

22468	Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
	Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
	A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

22469	Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
	Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
	A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.