Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Persons, Character and Morality' and 'Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal)'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
6602 Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Philosophy and the intellectual sciences stand like statues, worshipped and celebrated, but not moved or advanced.
     From: Francis Bacon (Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal) [1620], Vol.4.14), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5
     A reaction: Still the view of most scientists, I suspect. Personally I disagree, because I think philosophy has made enormous advances, in accurate analysis of arguments. The trouble is there is so much of it that it is hard to discern, and we don't live long enough.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
16724 The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon]
     Full Idea: It is certain that the senses deceive, but they also testify to their own errors.
     From: Francis Bacon (Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal) [1620], p.32), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.1
     A reaction: Nice. This is the empiricist view, rather than the rationalist line that reason sorts out the mess created by the senses. Most people know things if you just show them.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
6603 Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon]
     Full Idea: The secrets of nature reveal themselves more readily under the vexations of art than when they go their own way.
     From: Francis Bacon (Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal) [1620], Vol.4.95), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5
     A reaction: This is a splendid slogan for the dawn of the age of science, and pinpoints the reason why we have advanced so much further than the Greeks. You can, of course, overdo the 'vexations of art'. It also justifies the critical approach to philosophy.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
23279 It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: I want to emphasise the basic importance of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character, as opposed to dissolving a changing person into a series of 'selves'.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
     A reaction: [compressed] He mentions Derek Parfit for the rival view. Williams has the Aristotelian view, that a person has an essential nature, which endures through change, and explains that change. But that needs some non-essential character traits.
23280 Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason to find inadequate their account of the individual.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], II)
     A reaction: This is also why the Kantian account of virtue is inadequate, in comparison with the Aristotelian view.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
23278 For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs.
     From: Bernard Williams (Persons, Character and Morality [1976], I)
     A reaction: Which is morally better, that I water your bed of flowers, or that it rains? Which is morally better, that I water them from love, or because you threaten me with a whip?