Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

11257	The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
	Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
	From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
	A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth

11235	'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
	Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
	A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

11277	Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
	Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
	A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

23647	Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
	Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11248	Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
	Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
	A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

14528	Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
	Full Idea: There are 'transcendental' arguments saying that modal thought is unavoidable - recognition, a priori, of the necessarily truth-preserving character of some forms of inference is a precondition for rational thought in general, and scientific theorizing.
	From: Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann (Introduction to 'Modality' [2010], 1)
	A reaction: So the debate about the status of logical truths and valid inference, are partly debates about whether out thought has to involve modality, or whether it could just be about the actual world. I take possibilities and necssities to be features of nature.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

11958	Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
	Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
	From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
	A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

23646	Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
	Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference

23645	A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
	Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).