9 ideas
| 23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
| A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition. |
| 11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are. | |
| From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3 | |
| A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can |
| 16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can be in me of which I am entirely unaware. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4 | |
| A reaction: This I take to be a place where Descartes is utterly and catastrophically wrong. Until you grasp the utter falseness of this thought, the possibility of you (dear reader) understanding human beings is zero. Here 'I' obviously means his mind. |
| 23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
| Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade. |
| 23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
| A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous). |
| 3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: According to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 108) |
| 1868 | The world was made as much for animals as for man [Celsus] |
| Full Idea: The world was made as much for the irrational animals as for men. | |
| From: Celsus (On the True Doctrine (Against Christians) [c.178], §V) | |
| A reaction: A good remark. It seems to be a classic distortion of European Christianity that the world is made for us, and that animals only exist to fill our sandwiches. |
| 3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: My inability to grasp an infinite chain of successive causes without a first cause does not entail that there must be a first cause, just as my inability to grasp infinite divisibility of finite things does not make that impossible. | |
| From: René Descartes (Reply to First Objections [1641], 106) |
| 1867 | Christians presented Jesus as a new kind of logos to oppose that of the philosophers [Celsus] |
| Full Idea: Christians put forth this Jesus not only as the son of God, but as the very Logos - not the pure and holy Logos known to the philosophers, but a new kind of Logos. | |
| From: Celsus (On the True Doctrine (Against Christians) [c.178], III) |