49 ideas
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Philosophical problems are problems about how what is actual is possible, given that what is actual appears, because of some faulty argument, to be impossible. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: [She is discussing universals when she makes this comment] A very appealing remark, given that most people come into philosophy because of a mixture of wonder and puzzlement. It is a rather Wittgensteinian view, though, that we must cure our own ills. |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: In 'She did it for the sake of her country' no one thinks that the expression 'the sake' refers to an individual thing, a sake. But given that, how can we work out what the ontological commitments of a theory actually are? | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: For these sorts of reasons it rapidly became obvious that ordinary language analysis wasn't going to reveal much, but it is also a problem for a project like Quine's, which infers an ontology from the terms of a scientific theory. |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The fallacy of composition makes the erroneous assumption that every property of the things that constitute a thing is a property of the thing as well. But every large object is constituted by small parts, and every red object by colourless parts. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: There are nice questions here like 'If you add lots of smallness together, why don't you get extreme smallness?' Colours always make bad examples in such cases (see Idea 5456). Distinctions are needed here (e.g. Idea 7007). |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees. |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: There are four kinds of reduction: the identifying of entities of two theories by means of bridge or correlation laws; the elimination of entities in favour of the other theory; reducing by bridge laws and property identities; and merely reducing talk. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3 n5) | |
A reaction: [She gives references] The idea of 'bridge laws' I regard with caution. If bridge laws are ceteris paribus, they are not much help, and if they are strict, or necessary, then there must be an underlying reason for that, which is probably elimination. |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: In statements attributing relational properties ('Felix is my favourite cat'), it seems clear that the property truly attributed to the substance is not essential to it. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A fairly obvious point, but an important one when mapping out (cautiously) what we actually mean by 'property'. However, maybe the relational property is essential: the ceiling is ('is' of predication!) above the room. |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If a relation holds between two properties as a result of their intrinsic natures, then it appears the relation between the properties is not needed to do the structuring of reality; the properties themselves suffice to fix the structure. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.1) | |
A reaction: [the first bit quotes Jubien 2007] He cites a group of scientific essentialists as spokesmen for this view. Sounds right to me. No on seems able to pin down what a relation is - which may be because there is no such entity. |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The relation of being taller than is an external relation, since it relates two independent material substances, but the relation of instantiation or exemplification is internal, in that it relates a substance with a property. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: An interesting revival of internal relations. To be plausible it would need clear notions of 'property' and 'substance'. We are getting a long way from physics, and I sense Ockham stropping his Razor. How do you individuate a 'relation'? |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: An object's being two inches long seems to guarantee an infinite number of other properties, such as being less than three inches long. If we must understand the second property to understand the first, then there seems to be a vicious infinite regress. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: She dismisses this by saying that we don't need to know an infinity of numbers in order to count. I would say that we just need to distinguish between intrinsic and relational properties. You needn't know all a thing's relations to know the thing. |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Tropes are abstract entities, at least in the sense that more than one can be in the same place at the same time (e.g. redness and roundness). But they are not universals, because they have unique and particular locations. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I'm uneasy about the reification involved in this kind of talk. Does a coin possess a thing called 'roundness', which then has to be individuated, identified and located? I am drawn to the two extreme views, and suspicious of compromise. |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Trope Nominalism says properties are classes or sets of exactly similar or resembling tropes, where tropes are what we might called 'property-tokens' or 'particularized properties'. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: We still seem to have the problem of 'resembling' here, and we certainly have the perennial problem of why any given particular should be placed in any particular set. See Idea 7959. |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Trope 'Nominalism' is not a version of nominalism, because tropes are abstract particulars, rather than concrete particulars. Of course, a trope account of the relations between particulars and their properties has ramifications for concrete particulars. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 7971. At this point the boundary between nominalist and realist theories seems to blur. Possibly that is bad news for tropes. Not many dilemmas can be solved by simply blurring the boundary. |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The problem is how a group of resembling tropes can be of the same type, that is, that they can resemble one another in the same way. This problem is not settled simply by positing tropes. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a fundamental fact that there is no resemblance unless the respect of resemblance is specified. Two identical objects could still said to be different because of their locations. Is resemblance natural or conventional? Consider atoms. |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Of all the nominalist solutions, Trope Nominalism is the only one that tries to solve the problem at issue by introducing entities; all the others try to get by with concrete particulars and sets of them. This might invite Ockham's Razor. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: We could reply that tropes are necessities. The issue seems to be a key one, which is whether our fundamental onotology should include properties (in some form or other). I am inclined to exclude them (Ideas 3322, 3906, 4029). |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Scientific practice seems aimed precisely at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.3) | |
A reaction: Good. Friends of powers should look at this nice paper by Jacobs. There is a good degree of support for this view from pronouncements of modern scientists. If scientists don't support it, they should. Otherwise they are trapped in the superficial. |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: The source of powers is not the laws of nature; it is the powerful nature of the ordinary properties of concrete particulars. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This pithily summarises my own view. People who think the powers of the world derive from the laws either have an implicit religious framework, or they are giving no thought at all to the ontological status of the laws. |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerical sameness is explained by a theory of identity, but what explains qualitative sameness? | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: The distinction is between type and token identity. Tokens are particulars, and types are sets, so her question comes down to the one of what entitles something to be a member of a set? Nothing, if sets are totally conventional, but they aren't. |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The 'one over many' problem is to explain how universals can unify their instances if they are wholly other than them. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: If universals are self-predicating (beauty is beautiful) then they have a massive amount in common, despite one being general. You then have the regress problem of explaining the beauty of the beautiful. Baffling regress, or baffling participation. |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: All real forms of Nominalism should hold that the only objects relevant to the explanation of generality are concrete particulars, words (i.e. word-tokens, not word-types), and perhaps sets. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16) | |
A reaction: The addition of sets seems controversial (see Idea 7970). The context is her rejection of the use of tropes in nominalist theories. I would doubt whether a theory still counted as nominalist if it admitted sets (e.g. Quine). |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain the fact that we know when and in what way new objects resemble old ones, and that we know when and in what ways new objects do not resemble old ones. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: It is not clear what sort of theory would be needed to 'explain' such a thing. Unless there is an explanation of resemblance waiting in the wings (beyond asserting that resemblance is a universal), then this is not a strong objection. |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The so-called 'laws of thinghood' govern particulars, saying that one thing cannot be wholly present at different places at the same time, and two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Is this an empirical observation, or a tautology? Or might it even be a priori synthetic? What happens when two water drops or clouds merge? Or an amoeba fissions? In what sense is an image in two places at once? Se also Idea 2351. |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: We can usefully refer to 'individuation conditions', to distinguish objects of that kind from objects not of that kind, and to 'identity conditions', to distinguish objects within that kind from one another. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: So we individuate types or sets, and identify tokens or particulars. Sounds good. Should be in every philosopher's toolkit, and on every introductory philosophy course. |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Substances have a kind of unity that mere collocations of properties do not have, namely an instrinsic unity. So substances cannot be collocations - bundles - of properties. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A team is a unity. Compare a similar thought, Idea 1395, about personal identity. How can something which is a pure unity have more than one property? What distinguishes substances? Why can't a substance have a certain property? |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The bundle theory of substance requires unconditional commitment to the truth of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: that things that are alike with respect to all of their properties are identical. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Since the identity of indiscernibles is very dubious (see Ideas 1365, 4476, 5746, 7928), this is bad news for the bundle theory. I suspect that all of these problems arise because no one seems to have a clear concept of a property. |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Commitment to the view that only what can be an object of possible sensory experience can exist eliminates the possibility of distinguishing between substance and attribute, leaving only one alternative, namely the bundle view. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Phenomenalism strikes me as a paradigm case of confusing ontology with epistemology. Presumably physicists (even empiricist ones) are committed to the 'interior' of quarks and electrons, but no one expects to experience them. |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The bundle theory makes all true statements ascribing properties to substances uninformative, by making them logical truths. The property of being a feline animal is literally a constituent of a cat. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The solution would seem to a distinction between accidental and essential properties. Compare 'that plane is red' with 'that plane has wings'. 'Of course it does - it's a plane'. We might still survive without a plane-substance. |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Substances are capable of persisting through change, where this involves change in properties; but the bundle theory has the consequence that substances cannot survive change. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Her example is an apple remaining an apple when it turns brown. It doesn't look, though, as if there is a precise moment when the apple-substance ceases. The end of an apple seems to be more a matter of a loss of crucial properties. |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Maybe a substance is not itself a bundle of properties, but a sum or sequence of bundles of properties, a bundle of bundles of properties (which 'perdures' rather than 'endures'). | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: There remains the problem of deciding when the bundle has drifted too far away from the original to perdure correctly. A caterpillar can turn into a butterfly (which is pretty bizarre!), but not into a cathedral. Why? She says this idea denies change. |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: Because a statue and the lump of matter that constitute it have different persistence conditions, they are not identical. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Maybe being a statue is a relational property? All the relational properties of a thing will have different persistence conditions. Suppose I see a face in a bowl of sugar, and you don't? |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: The three main theories of substance are the bundle theory (Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Ayer), the bare substratum theory (Locke and Bergmann), and the essentialist theory. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Macdonald defends the essentialist theory. The essentialist view immediately appeals to me. Properties must be OF something, and the something must have the power to produce properties. So there. |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: A rival to the bundle theory says that, for each substance, there is a constituent of it that is not a property but is both essential and unique to it, this constituent being referred to as a 'bare particular' or 'substratum'. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound promising. It is unclear what existence devoid of all properties could be like. How could it 'have' its properties if it was devoid of features (it seems to need property-hooks)? It is an ontological black hole. How do you prove it? |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: If there is a substratum or bare particular within a substance, this gives an explanation of the unity of substances, and it is something which can survive intact when a substance changes. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: [v. compressed wording] Many problems here. The one that strikes me is that when things change they sometimes lose their unity and identity, and that seems to be decided entirely from observation of properties, not from assessing the substratum. |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: There seems to be no way of identifying a substratum as the bearer of qualities without qualifiying it as bare (having the property of being bare?), ..and they cannot be used to individuate things, because they are necessarily indiscernible. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The defence would probably be a priori, claiming an axiomatic necessity for substrata in our thinking about the world, along with a denial that bareness is a property (any more than not being a contemporary of Napoleon is a property). |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition. |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: There are three distinct versions of Leibniz's Law, all traced to remarks made by Leibniz: the Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing), the Indiscernibility of Identicals (same thing, same properties), and the Substitution Principle. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The best view seems to be to treat the second one as Leibniz's Law (and uncontroversially true), and the first one as being an interesting but dubious claim. |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: One common argument to the conclusion that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is false is that it is not necessarily true. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2 n32) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a good argument. If you test the Principle with an example ('this butler is the murderer') then total identity does not seem to necessitate identity, though it strongly implies it (the butler may have a twin etc). |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: To be possible is just to be one of the many manifestations of some power, and to be impossible is to be a manifestation of no power. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2.1) | |
A reaction: [This remark occurs in a discussion of theistic Aristotelianism] I like this. If we say that something is possible, the correct question is to ask what power could bring it about. |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view. |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world). | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow? |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others. |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account. |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. Just what the doctor ordered. The only caveat is that if we say that reality is built up from fundamental powers, then might those powers change their character without losing their identity (e.g. gravity getting weaker)? |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are. | |
From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3 | |
A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me. |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different. |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If we want our semantics for modality to give us insight into the truthmakers for modality, then possible worlds semantics is inadequate. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4) | |
A reaction: [See the other ideas of Jacobs (and Jubien) for this] It is an interesting question whether a semantics for a logic is meant to give us insight into how things really are, or whether it just builds nice models. Satisfaction, or truth? |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
Full Idea: What matters to continuity is not just the beginning and end states of the process by which a thing persists, perhaps through change, but the process itself. | |
From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being a really important insight. Compare Idea 4931. If this is the key to understanding mind and personal identity, it means that the concept of a 'process' must be a central issue in ontology. How do you individuate a process? |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade. |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous). |