28 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: Maybe a sentence is not a candidate for truth until it is used to make a statement. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
| 15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Fine is fishing around in the area between the necessary, the a priori, truthmakers, and truth-conditions. He appears to be attempting a singlehanded reconstruction of the concepts of metaphysics. Is he major, or very marginal? |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: Our beliefs must claim a correspondence with facts, and then the verbal expression of the belief must correspond to the belief itself. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.4) |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: The Semantic Theory of truth requires that sentences are truth-bearers (rather than statements, or propositions). | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: We do not seem to have any use in ordinary discourse for phrases like 'true in English', 'false in German'. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], II.1) |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: If sentences can have truth-values only when they occur as asserted, it would be impossible to have a truth-functional basis to logic. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.6) |
| 15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Just as we recognise different levels of reality, so we should recognise different levels of existence. Each object will exist at the lowest level at which it can enjoy its characteristic form of life. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
| A reaction: I'm struggling with this claim, despite my sympathy for much of Fine's picture. I'm not sure that the so-called 'levels' of reality have different degrees of reality. |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: The standard cases of events are physical changes which happen sufficiently fast to be observed as changes, and which are of sufficient interest to us to be noticed or commented on. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.7) |
| 15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: At the bottom are tensed or temporal facts, subject to the vicissitudes of time and hence of the world. Then come the timeless though worldly facts, subject to the world but not to time. Top are transcendental facts, subject to neither world nor time. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
| A reaction: For all of Fine's awesome grasp of logic and semantics, when he divides reality up as boldly as this I start to side a bit with the sceptics about modern metaphysics (like Ladyman and Ross). I daresay Fine acknowledges that it is 'speculative'. |
| 15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07) | |
| A reaction: Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it. |
| 15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is natural to suggest that to be a man is to have certain kind of temporal-modal profile. ...but it seems natural that being a man accounts for the profile, ...so one should not appeal to an object's modal features in stating what the object is. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a correct and very helpful point, as I am tempted to think that the modal dispositions of a thing are intrinsic to its identity. If we accept 'powers', must they be modal in character? Fine backs a sortal approach. That's ideology. |
| 23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
| Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
| A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition. |
| 15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The identity of an object - what it is - is not a worldly matter; essence will precede existence in that the identity of an object may be fixed by its unworldly features even before any question of its existence or other worldly features is considered. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear how this cashes out. If I remove the 'worldly features' of an object, what is there left which establishes identity? Fine carefully avoids talk of 'a priori' knowledge of identity. |
| 15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is the core essential features of the object that will be independent of how things turn out, and they will be independent in the sense of holding regardless of circumstances, not whatever the circumstances. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 09) | |
| A reaction: The distinction at the end seems to be that 'regardless' pays no attention to circumstances, whereas 'whatever' pays attention to all circumstances. In other words, essence has no relationship to how things are. Plausible. Nice to see 'core'. |
| 15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: The existential identity of an object with itself needs analysis into two components, one the neutral identity of the object with itself, and the other its existence. The existence of the object appears to be merely a gratuitous addition to its identity. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
| A reaction: This is at least a step towards clarification of the notion, which might be seen as just a way of asserting that something 'has an identity'. Fine likes the modern Fregean way of expressing this, as an equality relation. |
| 15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: If there were impossible objects, ones that do not possibly exist, we would have no difficulty in understanding what it is for such objects to be identical or distinct than in the case of possible objects. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 08) | |
| A reaction: Thus, a 'circular square' seems to be the same as a 'square circle'. Fine is arguing for identity to be independent of any questions of existence. |
| 15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We distinguish between the necessary truths proper, those that hold whatever the circumstances, and the transcendent truths, those that hold regardless of the circumstances. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Fine's project seems to be dividing the necessities which derive from essence from the necessities which tended to be branded in essentialist discussions as 'trivial'. |
| 15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is of the nature of Socrates to be a man; and from this it appears to follow that necessarily he is a man. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 04) | |
| A reaction: I'm always puzzled by this line of thought, because it is only the intrinsic nature of beings like Socrates which decides in the first place what a 'man' is. How can something help to create a category, and then necessarily belong to that category? |
| 11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
| Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are. | |
| From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3 | |
| A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can |
| 15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: An alternative conception of a possible world says it is constituted, not by the totality of facts, or of how things might be, but by the totality of circumstances, or how things might turn out. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
| A reaction: The general idea is to make a possible world more limited than in Idea 15068. It only contains properties arising from 'engagement with the world', and won't include timeless sentences. It is a bunch of possibilities, not of actualities? |
| 15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: We are accustomed think of the actual world as the totality of facts, and so we think of any possible world as being like the actual world in settling the truth-value of every single proposition. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 02) | |
| A reaction: Hence it is normal to refer to a possible world as a 'maximal' set of of propositions (sentences, etc). See Idea 15069 for his proposed alternative view. |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: It is only when beliefs are given some symbolic expression that they acquire the precision and stability that enables us to entertain them. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.5) |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| Full Idea: Without language we would be restricted to particular beliefs about the here and now. | |
| From: D.J. O'Connor (The Correspondence Theory of Truth [1975], Ch.8) |
| 23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
| Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade. |
| 23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
| A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous). |
| 15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It is said that there is no room in the A-theorists' ontology for a realm of timeless existents. Just as there is a tendency to think that every sentence is tensed, so there is a tendency to think that every object must enjoy a tensed form of existence. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
| A reaction: Fine is arguing for certain things to exist or be true independently of time (such as arithmetic, or essential identities). I struggle with the notion of timeless existence. |
| 15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Most A-theorists have been inclined to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 01) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because they reject the notion of 'tenseless' truths. But sentences like 'two and two make four' seem not to be very tensy. |
| 15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: B-theorists regard tensed sentences as incomplete expressions, implicitly containing an unfilled argument-place for the time at which they are to be evaluated. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 01) | |
| A reaction: To distinguish past from future it looks as if you would need two argument-places, not one. Then there are 'used to be' and 'had been' to evaluate. |