Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Modal Realism at Work: Properties' and 'Librium de interpretatione editio secunda'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

4038	Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
	Full Idea: Lewis agrees that properties cannot be sets of their actual instances, but claims they can be sets of their possible instances. This would distinguish coextensive properties like being cordate and renate, since they might be separated.
	From: report of David Lewis (Modal Realism at Work: Properties [1986]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §10
	A reaction: Sounds wrong. Two properties could be obviously different even if they could never be separated. In this world a creature might briefly survive without kidneys.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity

14665	We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
	Full Idea: Let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality 'Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'. Therefore this Platonity is one man's alone - Plato's.
	From: Boethius (Librium de interpretatione editio secunda [c.516], PL64 462d), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - Actualism and Possible Worlds 5
	A reaction: Plantinga uses this idea to reinstate the old notion of a haecceity, to bestow unshakable identity on things. My interest in the quotation is that the most shocking confusions about properties arose long before the invention of set theory.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

23647	Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
	Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

11958	Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
	Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
	From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
	A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

23646	Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
	Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference

23645	A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
	Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).