Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'The Reality of Numbers' and 'Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18344 Truth and falsehood must track what does or doesn't exist [Bigelow]
     Full Idea: If something is true, then it would not be possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which don't, or else certain things had not existed which do.
     From: John Bigelow (The Reality of Numbers [1988], 19)
     A reaction: This is described by Rami as Bigelow's 'famous' formulation of the idea that 'truth supervenes on being' in a general way. An immediate question would be about fictions. Is Malvolio a stupid man, given that he doesn't exist? We must stretch 'exist'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
17993 Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter]
     Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature [2012], 9.3)
     A reaction: Hm. How small can the domain be? Can it embrace the multiverse? Supervenience is a rather weak relationship. How about 'are necessitated/entailed by'? Are the relationships supposed to do the explaining? I would have thought the natures did that.