Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'The Blue and Brown Notebooks' and 'On the Happy Life'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca]
     Full Idea: I do not call any man wise who is subservient to anything.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §11)
     A reaction: At the very least, a wise man should be subservient to a wiser man.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn]
     Full Idea: 'I' is used as a subject in 'I am in pain', ....and used as an object in 'I am bleeding'.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (The Blue and Brown Notebooks [1936], pp. 66-7) by Colin McGinn - Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals 4
     A reaction: How about 'my wound is painful'? Does that have the logical form of a conversation? This idea is incorrect. Shoemaker (1968) suggests that the subjective use is immune to error, unlike the object use.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation will have little air of paradox for readers familiar with Wittgenstein's latter-day remarks on meaning.
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (The Blue and Brown Notebooks [1936], II.§16 n) by Willard Quine - Word and Object II.§16 n
     A reaction: This may be right, and I am inclined to link the names of Wittgenstein and Quine among those who led philosophy up a relativistic and sceptical cul-de-sac for many years. You can think too hard, you know.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The highest good is harmony of spirit.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §08)
     A reaction: This idea is straight from Plato's Republic.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca]
     Full Idea: You ask what I seek from virtue? Virtue herself. For she has nothing better, she is herself her own reward.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §09)
     A reaction: Presumably this is the source of the popular saying that 'virtue is its own reward'. The trouble is that this doesn't seem a very persuasive thing to say to a sceptic who doubts whether being virtuous is worth the trouble.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca]
     Full Idea: In the case of virtue excess should not be feared, since in virtue resides moderation.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §13)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that all of the virtues are unified in the one achievement of the virtuous state. It leaves the notion of 'virtue' a bit thin in content, though.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Why, to your shame, are you so careless that you do not know your handful of slaves by sight?
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca]
     Full Idea: What doubt can there be that the wise man has greater scope for displaying his powers if he is rich than if he is poor, since in the case of poverty only one kind of virtue exists - refusal to be bowed down and crushed.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §22)
     A reaction: It is against this view that I see Jesus proposing poverty as central to virtue. But then he has the surprising view (to Seneca) that humility is a virtue. What Nietzsche calls the slaves' inversion of values.
Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house?
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17)
If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Wealth is not a good; for it it was, it would make men good.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §24)
     A reaction: An immediately attractive argument, but should we assume that anything which is good will enhance our personal goodness? If goodness is a habit, then continual pursuit of wealth is the test case to examine. Seneca is right!
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Human concerns are not so happily arranged that the majority favours the better things.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §02)
     A reaction: On the whole Seneca is unimpressed by democracy, as people are rushed into decisions by the crowd, and live to regret them.