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All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'works' and 'Explanation - Opening Address'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
     Full Idea: I shall make use of the admittedly imprecise notions of consilience, simplicity, analogy and fitting into a web of belief, or in short of 'coherence'.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.06)
     A reaction: Coherence sounds like a family of tests, rather than a single unified concept. I still like coherence, though.
We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
     Full Idea: Not mere self-coherence, but comprehensiveness belongs to the notion of coherence.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: Descartes founded analytic geometry on the assumption that there is a one-one order-preserving correspondence between the points on a line and the real numbers.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Descartes thinks it is a pointless relic of scholastic metaphysics to dispute over the boundaries between substances and mere aggregates.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6
     A reaction: This is Pasnau's carefully considered conclusion, with which others may not agree. It presumably captures the attitude of modern science generally to such issues.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Descartes argued (in 'The World') that just as words refer to objects, but they do not resemble them, in the same way, visual images or other sensory inputs relate to objects without depicting them.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes
     A reaction: This strikes me as a rather significant and plausible claim, which might contain the germ of the idea of a language of thought. It is also the basis for the recent view that language is the best route to understanding the mind.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
     Full Idea: The simplest way of fitting the putative observed phenomena of telepathy or clairvoyance into my web of belief is to refuse to take them at face value.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07-8)
     A reaction: Love it. It is very disconcerting for the sceptical naturalist to be faced with adamant claims that the paranormal has occurred, but my response is exactly the same as Smart's. I reject the reports, no matter how passionately they are asserted.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
     Full Idea: You could imagine a person using the angle from a theodolite to decide a suitable spot to cut the height of the flagpole, …but since such circumstances would be very unusual we naturally say the flagpole subtends the angle because of its height.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.14)
     A reaction: [compressed; he mentions Van Fraassen 1980:132-3 for a similar point] As a response this seems a bit lame, if the direction is fixed by what is 'usual'. I think the key point is that the direction of explanation is one way or the other, not both.
Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
     Full Idea: The theory of the expansion of the universe renders the red shift no longer puzzling, whereas he expansion of the universe is hardly rendered less puzzling by facts about the red shift.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.15)
     A reaction: The direction of explanation is, I take it, made obvious by the direction of causation, with questions about what is 'puzzling' as mere side-effects.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
     Full Idea: I want to characterise explanation of some fact as a matter of fitting belief in this fact into a system of beliefs.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02)
     A reaction: Sounds good to me. Simple facts slot straight into daily beliefs, and deep obscure facts are explained when we hook them up to things we have already grasped. Quark theory fits into prior physics of forces, properties etc.
Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
     Full Idea: An explanation may be bad if it fits only into a bad web of belief. It can also be bad if it fits into a (possibly good) web of belief in a bad sort of way.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.09)
     A reaction: Nice. If you think someone has an absurd web of beliefs, then it counts against some belief (for you) if it fits beautifully into the other person's belief system. Judgement of coherence comes in at different levels.
Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
     Full Idea: The Hempelian deductive-nomological model of explanation clearly fits in well with the notion of explanation in terms of coherence. One way of fitting a belief into a system is to show that it is deducible from other beliefs.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.13)
     A reaction: Smart goes on to reject the law-based deductive approach, for familiar reasons, but at least it has something in common with the Smart view of explanation, which is the one I like.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
     Full Idea: One explanation will be a better explanation that another if it also explains a set of phenomena from a different field ('consilience').
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07)
     A reaction: This would count as 'unexpected accommodation', rather than prediction. It is a nice addition to Lipton's comparison of mere accommodation versus prediction as criteria. It sounds like a strong criterion for a persuasive explanation.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
     Full Idea: I class mathematical explanation with scientific explanation. This would be resisted by those who, unlike me, regard the notion of causation as essential to scientific explanation.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02-3)
     A reaction: I aim to champion mathematical explanation, in terms of axioms etc., so I am realising that my instinctive attraction to exclusively causal explanation won't do. What explanation needs is a direction of dependence.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
     Full Idea: The history of science suggests that most often explanation is reduction to the unfamiliar.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.11)
     A reaction: Boyle was keen to reduce things to the familiar, but that was early days for science, and some nasty shocks were coming our way. What would Boyle make of quantum non-locality?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We have inner awareness of our freedom.
     From: René Descartes (works [1643])
     A reaction: This begs a few questions. I may be directly aware that I have not been hypnotised, but no one would accept it as proof.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Descartes himself was well aware of the interaction problem, and corresponded uncomfortably with Princess Elizabeth on the matter; …he pointed out that gravity is causal despite not being a physical object.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William Lycan - Consciousness n1.3
     A reaction: Lycan observes that at least gravity is in space-time, unlike the Cartesian mind. Pierre Gassendi had pointed out the problem to Descartes in the Fifth Objection to the 'Meditations' (see Idea 3400).
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: It is Descartes who ratifies the idea that nature is devoid of thought.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5
     A reaction: His dualism is crucial, along with his ontological argument, because they make all mentality supernatural. Remember, for Descartes animals are mindless machines.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]
     Full Idea: Notoriously, the Cartesian idea that matter is purely geometrical will not do, for it leaves no distinction between matter and empty volumes: a filler for these volumes is required.
     From: comment on René Descartes (works [1643]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.3
     A reaction: Descartes thinks of matter as 'extension'. Descartes's error seems so obvious that it is a puzzle why he made it. He may have confused epistemology and ontology - all we can know of matter is its extension in space.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]
     Full Idea: Newtonian celestial mechanics does not explain the advance of the perihelion of Mercury, while Einstein's general theory of relativity does.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.03)
     A reaction: A perfect example of why explanation is the central concept in science, and probably in all epistemological activity. The desire to know is the desire for an explanation. Once the explanation is obvious, we know.