Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Law, Pragmatism and Democracy' and 'Mathematical Intuition'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: The existence of very general principles in mathematics are universally regarded as obvious, where on an empiricist view one would expect them to be bold hypotheses, about which a prudent scientist would maintain reserve.
     From: Charles Parsons (Mathematical Intuition [1980], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics
     A reaction: This is mainly aimed at Quine's and Putnam's indispensability (to science) argument about mathematics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is competition for support of the people, guided by self-interest on all sides [Posner]
     Full Idea: Democratic politics is a competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the people, also assumed to be self-interested, and none too interested or well informed about politics.
     From: Richard Posner (Law, Pragmatism and Democracy [2003], p.144), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 05
     A reaction: This articulates the 'competitive' view of democracy, as simply a technique for establishing legitimacy. Posner is also an economist, and they also assume that everyone is wholly self-interested, which may be why they are so frequently wrong.