Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Carving Content at the Joints' and 'On 'The Beginning of Philosophy''

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
19456 Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Philosophy does not presuppose anything. It is precisely in this fact of non-presupposition that its beginning lies - a beginning by virtue of which it is set apart from all the other sciences.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (On 'The Beginning of Philosophy' [1841], p.135)
     A reaction: Most modern philosophers seem to laugh at such an idea, because everything is theory-laden, culture-laden, language-laden etc. As an aspiration I love it, and think good philosophers get quite close to the goal (which, I admit, is not fully attainable).
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
     Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
     Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
     A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10805 A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo]
     Full Idea: A sentence invites recarving iff it will then do better justice to the internal structure of its content and/or its implication relations.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Carving Content at the Joints [2002], §11)
     A reaction: This invites human intervention in a logical process (by choosing which recarvings to do, instead of allowing all equivalences to generate them). He seems to think we should abstract in order to reveal logical form.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).