12 ideas
10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
Full Idea: When we reconstrue quantification in terms of substituted expressions rather than real values, we waive reference. ...but if reference matters, we cannot afford to waive it as a category; and if it does not, we do not need to. | |
From: Willard Quine (Reply to Professor Marcus [1962], p.183) | |
A reaction: An odd dilemma to pose. Presumably the substitution account is an attempt to explain how language actually works, without mentioning dubious direct ontological commitment in the quantifiers. |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition. |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are. | |
From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3 | |
A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can |
3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
Full Idea: The soul is united with the body in just one place, a gland (the pineal) in the centre of the brain. It is placed so that its slightest movement will affect the passions, and it plays the essential role of uniting the two symmetrical sides of the body. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], §31) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: See Idea 4862 for Spinoza's nice response to Descartes' proposal. If Descartes had followed brain research for the last four hundred years, at what point would he have wavered? If every single part of the brain seems to 'interact', dualism looks unlikely. |
4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Descartes sees passions not as opinions, but as functional devices that the Creator has designed for us to help preserve the body-soul substantial union. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8 | |
A reaction: I wonder what Descartes would have made of the theory of evolution? |
4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
Full Idea: Descartes says there are six primary passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness); Spinoza says there are just three (joy, sadness and desire). | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.172 | |
A reaction: A dubious project. However, it is now agreed that there are a few (six?) basic universal facial expressions, to which these passions may correspond. |
23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
Full Idea: Descartes said there are six primitive passions, namely wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. The others are either species of these, or composed of them. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 353) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence' | |
A reaction: [not sure about ref] It's a nice touch to add 'wonder', which doesn't make it onto anyone else's list. |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade. |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous). |
20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Our merely willing to walk has the consequence that our legs move and we walk. | |
From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], 18), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 1 'Volitionism' | |
A reaction: Stout attributes this to Descartes' dualism, as if legs are separate from persons. Stout says the idea of a prior mental act is not usually now considered as part of an action, or even to exist at all. If the volition is intentional, there is a regress. |
16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
Full Idea: We ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs that bring about bodily movement decay. | |
From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], I.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
A reaction: This sounds like a pretty major change in our concept of death, given that we all now agree with Descartes. |
4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §8 | |
A reaction: Presumably strength of will can serve evil ends, so this is a bit confusing. |