Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Much Ado About Nothing' and 'Intellectual Autobiography'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy

8658	For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently [Shakespeare]
	Full Idea: For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently.
	From: William Shakespeare (Much Ado About Nothing [1600], V.i)
	A reaction: You can't argue with that. I do think that people who have studied philosophy at length are more likely to be 'philosophical' when faced with human misery, but only up to a point.

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

18901	Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
	Full Idea: A fact is an existential characteristic 'of' the domain; it is not something 'in' the domain. To search for truth-making facts in the world is indeed futile.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Existence')
	A reaction: Attacking Austin on truth. Helpful. It is hard to see how a physical object has a mysterious power to 'make' a truth. No energy-transfer seems involved in the making. Animals think true thoughts; I suspect that concerns their mental maps of the world.

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic

18904	'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
	Full Idea: Sommers took the 'predicable' terms of any language to come in logically charged pairs. Examples might be red/nonred, massive/massless, tied/untied, in the house/not in the house. The idea that terms can be negated was essential for such pairing.
	From: report of Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 2
	A reaction: If, as Rumfitt says, we learn affirmation and negation as a single linguistic operation, this would fit well with it, though Rumfitt doubtless (as a fan of classical logic) prefers to negation sentences.

18895	Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
	Full Idea: What would a 'laws of thought' logic that cast light on natural language deductive thinking be like? Such a logic must be variable-free, conforming to normal syntax, and its modes of reasoning must be transparent, to make them virtually instantaneous.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'How We')
	A reaction: This is the main motivation for Fred Sommers's creation of modern term logic. Even if you are up to your neck in modern symbolic logic (which I'm not), you have to find this idea appealing. You can't leave it to the psychologists.

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic

18897	Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
	Full Idea: Because predicate logic contrues identities dyadically, its account of inferences involving identity propositions needs laws or axioms of identity, explicitly asserting that the dyadic realtion in 'x=y' possesses symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Syllogistic')

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

18893	Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
	Full Idea: Modern predicate logic's methods of justification, which involve translation into an artificial quantificational idiom, offer no clues to how the average person, knowing no logic and adhering to the vernacular, is so logically adept.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], Intro)
	A reaction: Of course, people are very logically adept when the argument is simple (because, I guess, they can test it against the world), but not at all good when the reasoning becomes more complex. We do, though, reason in ordinary natural language.

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not

18903	Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
	Full Idea: If there is one idea that is the keystone of the edifice that constitutes Sommers's united philosophy it is that terms are the linguistic entities subject to negation in the most basic sense. It is a very old idea, tending to be rejected in modern times.
	From: report of Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 2
	A reaction: Negation in modern logic is an operator applied to sentences, typically writing '¬Fa', which denies that F is predicated of a, with Fa being an atomic sentence. Do we say 'not(Stan is happy)', or 'not-Stan is happy', or 'Stan is not-happy'? Third one?

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic

18894	Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
	Full Idea: We organise our concepts of predicability on a hierarchical tree. At the top are terms like 'interesting', 'exists', 'talked about', which are predicable of anything. At the bottom are names, and in between are predicables of some things and not others.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Category')
	A reaction: The heirarchy seem be arranged simply by the scope of the predicate. 'Tallest' is predicable of anything in principle, but only of a few things in practice. Is 'John Doe' a name? What is 'cosmic' predicable of? Challenging!

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

18900	Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
	Full Idea: Unfortunately for the fate of realist philosophy, modern logic's treatment of 'exists' is resolutely inhospitable to facts as referents of phrases of the form 'the existence or non-existence of φ'.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Realism')
	A reaction: Predicate logic has to talk about objects, and then attribute predicates to them. It tends to treat a fact as 'Fa' - this object has this predicate, but that's not really how we understand facts.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

23647	Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
	Full Idea: Individuals and objects have a real essence, or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow: but this essence our faculties do not comprehend. They are therefore incapable of definition.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: Aha - he's one of us! I prefer the phrase 'essential nature' of an object, which is understood, I think, by everyone. I especially like the last bit, directed at those who mistakenly think that Aristotle identified the essence with the definition.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

11958	Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
	Full Idea: Reid pointed out how easily conceivable mathematical and geometric impossibilities are.
	From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], IV.III) by George Molnar - Powers 11.3
	A reaction: The defence would be that you have to really really conceive them, and the only way the impossible can be conceived is by blurring it at the crucial point, or by claiming to conceive more than you actually can

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

23646	Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
	Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.

18898	In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
	Full Idea: In modern predicate logic, definite reference by proper names is the primary and sole form of reference.
	From: Fred Sommers (Intellectual Autobiography [2005], 'Reference')
	A reaction: Hence we have to translate definite descriptions into (logical) names, or else paraphrase them out of existence. The domain only contains 'objects', so only names can uniquely pick them out.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference

23645	A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
	Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
	From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
	A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).