15 ideas
12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5) | |
A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis. |
6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: The soul is not a mere rasa tabula, a naked and passive thing, with no innate furniture of its own, nor any thing in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for then there could not possibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, just and unjust. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Bk IV Ch 6.4) | |
A reaction: He goes on to quote Hobbes saying there is no good in objects themselves. I don't see why we must have an innate moral capacity, provided that we have a capacity to make judgements. |
6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: The sight cannot judge of sounds, nor the hearing of light and colours; wherefore that which judges of all the senses and their several objects, cannot be itself any sense, but something of a superior nature. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.VI.1) | |
A reaction: How nice to find a seventeenth century English writer rebelling against empiricism! |
6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8 | |
A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues). |
12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6) | |
A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems. |
6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: Sense which lies flat and grovelling in the individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the material form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an abstract universal notion. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.III.III.2) | |
A reaction: This still strikes me as being one of the biggest problems with reductive physicalism, that a lump of meat in your head can grasp abstractions (whatever they are) and universal concepts. Personally I am a physicalist, but it is weird. |
23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us. |
23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action. |
23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts' | |
A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason. |
6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: To keep faith and perform covenants is that which natural justice obligeth to absolutely. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.4) | |
A reaction: A nice example of an absolute moral intuition, but one which can clearly be challenged. Covenants (contracts) wouldn't work unless everyone showed intense commitment to keeping them, even beyond the grave, and we all benefit from good contracts. |
22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112) | |
A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why. |
6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.3) | |
A reaction: Clearly villains can pass wicked laws, so there can't be an obligation to obey all laws (even if they are 'positive', which seems to beg the question). Nevertheless this is a good reason why laws cannot be the grounding of morality. |
6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: Omnipotent will cannot make things like or equal one to another, without the natures of likeness and equality. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.I) | |
A reaction: This is one of the many classic 'paradoxes of omnipotence'. The best strategy is to define omnipotence as 'being able to do everything which it is possible to do'. Anything beyond that is inviting paradoxical disaster. |
6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: If the arbitrary will and pleasure of God is the first and only rule of good and justice, it follows that nothing can be so grossly wicked or unjust but if it were commanded by this omnipotent Deity, it must forthwith become holy, just and righteous. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.I.I.5) | |
A reaction: This is the strong (Platonic) answer to the Euthyphro Question (Idea 336). One answer is that God would not command in such a way - but why not? We may say that God and goodness merge into one, but we are interested in ultimate authority. |
6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |
Full Idea: If it were not morally good and just in its own nature before any positive command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget any obligation upon anyone. | |
From: Ralph Cudworth (On Eternal and Immutable Morality [1688], Ch.II.3) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a self-evident truth, and a big problem for anyone who wants to make God the source of morality. You don't have to accept anyone's authority just because they are powerful or clever (though they do bestow a certain natural authority!). |