52 ideas
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
Full Idea: The theory of descriptions gives a model of internalist intentionality, in that it describes cases where the thinkability of a belief does not depend on the existence of a specific object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.36) | |
A reaction: So what do externalists say about the theory? Surely a reference to 'water' can't entail the existence of water? |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that the aesthetic properties of a thing supervene on its physical properties. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16) | |
A reaction: A confusing example, as aesthetic properties only exist if there is an observer. Is 'supervenience' just an empty locution which tries to avoid reduction? |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
Full Idea: A statue is constituted by the marble that makes it up. It is plausible to say that constitution is not the same as identity - since identity is symmetrical and identity is not - but nonetheless constitution is a supervenience relation. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16) | |
A reaction: So what makes it a statue, as opposed to a piece of marble? It may well be an abstraction which only exists relative to observers. |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant. |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism. |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Properties are causes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are? |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
Full Idea: The traditional concept of substance says substances bear properties which are distinct from them, and substances are capable of independent existence. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.9) | |
A reaction: Put like that, it sounds ridiculous as a physical theory. It is hard to dislodge substance, though, from a priori human metaphysics. |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
Full Idea: The beliefs that are currently guiding your actions do not need to be in your stream of consciousness, which suggests that beliefs do not need to be conscious at all. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.31) | |
A reaction: Too bold, I think. Presumably this would eliminate all the other propositional attitudes from consciousness. There would only be qualia left! |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have claimed that there are two kinds of belief, 'de re' belief and 'de dicto' belief. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.35) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though it may only distinguish two objects of belief, not two types. Internalist and externalist views are implied. |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
Full Idea: There are plenty of cases of knowing how to do something, where that knowledge can also be expressed - without remainder, as it were - in propositional terms (such as knowing how to get to the Albert Hall). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: Presumably all knowing how could be expressed propositionally by God. |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
Full Idea: Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless. Is it really bitter, or really tasteless? | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44) | |
A reaction: A nice reinforcement of a classic Greek question. Good support for the primary/secondary distinction. Common sense, really. |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
Full Idea: The traditional examples used to support the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43) | |
A reaction: Presumably, though, direct realists can move one eye, or having something wrong with a retina. |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
Full Idea: One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: …so sense data are optional? We create sense data by objectifying them, but animals just taste the wine, and are direct realists. Tasting the sourness seems to be a case of abstraction. |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
Full Idea: The solution to the problem of perception is to deny that it is related to real objects (things or sense-data); rather, perception is an intentional state (with a subject, mode and content), a relation to the intentional content. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: Not clear. This definition makes it sound like a propositional attitude. |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
Full Idea: Visual perception seems to differ from some of the other senses; when we become aware of burning toast, we become aware of the smell, ...but we don't see a garden by seeing a 'look' of the garden. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.40) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Do blind people transfer this more direct perception to a different sense (e.g. the one they rely on most)? |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
Full Idea: The richness in information of perceptual experience outruns our modes of description of it, which has led some philosophers to claim that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.45) | |
A reaction: It certainly implies that it can't be entirely conceptual, but it still may be that in humans concepts are always involved. Not when I'm waking up in the morning, though. |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
Full Idea: The Adverbial Theory of perception holds that the predicates which other theories take as picking out the properties of objects are really adverbs of the perceptual verb; ..instead of strange objects, we just have properties of experiences. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: Promising. It fits secondary qualities all right, but what about primary? I 'see bluely', but can I 'see squarely'? |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
Full Idea: It is controversial whether knowledge is a state of mind, or a composite state involving a thought about something, plus its existence. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Pinpoints the internalism/externalism problem. Knowledge is a special type of belief (but maybe belief with external links!). Tricky. I vote for internalism. |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
Full Idea: The three arguments that have been used to articulate the problem of consciousness are the knowledge argument ('Mary'), the possibility of 'zombies' (creatures like us but lacking phenomenal consciousness), and the explanatory gap (the Hard Question). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: All of these push towards the implausible claim that there could never be a physical explanation of why we experience things. Zombies are impossible, in my opinion. |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Intentionalism (the doctrine that all mental states are intentional) need not be the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.22) | |
A reaction: This points to the requirement for an intentionalist to prove that so-called 'qualia' states are essentially intentional, which is not implausible. |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Love, hate, and the other object-directed attitudes have as much of a role in explaining behaviour as the propositional attitudes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.34) | |
A reaction: A good clarification of the range of intentional states. Objects seem to be external, where propositions are clearly internal. |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenal difference between a short-sighted person wearing glasses and not; they do not judge that the world is different, but the properties of the experience (the qualia) have changed. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43) | |
A reaction: Could be challenged. If a notice becomes unreadable, that is more than the qualia changing. |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
Full Idea: The intentional object of a pain-state is a part or region of the body, not a pain-object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.24) | |
A reaction: Plausible. Has anyone ever suffered from pain without some sense of what part of the body is actually in pain? |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
Full Idea: Weak intentionalism says all mental states are intentional, but qualia are higher-order properties of these states. ..Strong intentionalists say the phenomenal character of a sensation consists purely in that state's intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.25) | |
A reaction: The weak version sounds better. Asking 'how could a thought have a quality of experience just by being about something?' is a restatement of the traditional problem, which won't go away. The Hard Question. |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
Full Idea: The right thing to say about inverted qualia is that the person's experiences are different from other people's, but their beliefs are the same. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44) | |
A reaction: Right - which reinforces the idea that all beliefs are the result of judgement, and none come directly from perception. |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
Full Idea: It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms. |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
Full Idea: Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components. |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: If footprints or tree-rings are the model for reductions of intentionality, there doesn't seem much scope in them for giving false information, except by some freak event. |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
Full Idea: According to property dualism, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even though they are properties of one substance. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: Two properties may be phenomenologically different (transparent and magnetic), but that doesn't put them in different ontological categories. |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
Full Idea: While the non-reductive physicalist believes that mental/physical supervenience must be explained, the emergentist is willing to accept it as a fact of nature. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: A good reason not to be an emergentist. No philosopher should abandon the principle of sufficient reason. |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
Full Idea: If the mental supervenes on the physical, then whenever a physical cause brings about some effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: This is why supervenience seems to imply epiphenomenalism. The very concept of supervenience is dubious. |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
Full Idea: Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.19) | |
A reaction: Certainly if the physical is seen as just a pile of atoms, it is hard to see how they could ever think (see idea 1909). |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
Full Idea: If causation concerns events, then we have an identity theory of mental and physical events (particulars) [Davidson]. If causation is by properties, then it is mental and physical properties which are identical [Lewis and Armstrong]. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: Events are tokens, and properties are types. Tricky. Events are dynamic, but properties can be static. |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
Full Idea: Causal overdetermination is when an effect has more than one cause, and each event would have caused the effect if the other one had not done so. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.13) | |
A reaction: Overdetermination is a symptom that an explanation is questionable, but it can occur. Two strong people can join to push over a light hatstand. |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
Full Idea: I claim that the completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.12) | |
A reaction: He does not convince me of this. The mind may be within physics, but why should we say a priori that no exceptions to physical law will ever be discovered. Crane is setting up straw men. |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
Full Idea: In experience we learn propositions, since someone can reason using the sentence 'Red looks like this' (e.g. 'If red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn't'). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: The fact that we can create propositions about experiences doesn't prove that experience is inherently propositional. |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
Full Idea: The Twin Earth argument does not refute internalism, since it depends on the 'Content-Determines-Reference' principle, which internalists can reject. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.37) | |
A reaction: The idea is that content should be understood in a context (e.g. on a particular planet). Indexicals count against a totally narrow view of content (Twins thinking 'I am here'). |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
Full Idea: If a mental state is broad, then the existence of the mental state entails the existence of its object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: Hence thinking of non-existent things like unicorns is problematic for externalists. However, externalists can think about numbers or Platonic ideals. |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It has been widely supposed that externalism, which holds that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are partly determined by factors of which the person may be ignorant, cannot be reconciled with first-person authority. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.197) | |
A reaction: It is certainly a bit puzzling if you go around saying 'Actually, people don't know their own thoughts'. Davidson aims to defend first-person authority. The full story is developed in Tyler Burge's views on 'anti-individualism'. |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
Full Idea: It will explain a speaker's actions far better if we interpret him as he intended to be interpreted, than if we suppose he means and thinks what someone else might mean and think who used the same words 'correctly'. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.199) | |
A reaction: This comes down to the fact that our actions have to be motivated by internal meanings. If I defer to experts on the essence of gold, I still buy gold according to how I myself understand it. So meaning has two components? |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
Full Idea: Intensional contexts are those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the extensions are conceived. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.4) | |
A reaction: An important distinction for anyone defending an internalist view of concepts or of knowledge |
6237 | Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
A reaction: The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health. |
6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III) | |
A reaction: A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings. |
6233 | A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
A reaction: Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings. |
6236 | People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: How much the social pleasures are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects; the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy are more intense and clear than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst and hunger. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
A reaction: He presumably refers to smiles and laughter, but they could be misleading as they are partly a means of social communication. You should ask people whether they would prefer a nice conversation or a good pork chop. Nice point, though. |
6235 | Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III) | |
A reaction: Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism. |
6232 | Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury] |
Full Idea: We know there is a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that his right one is by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every creature a certain interest or good; there must also be a natural end. | |
From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
A reaction: This is an early modern statement of Aristotelian teleology, just at the point where it was falling out of fashion. The underlying concept is that of right function. I agree with Shaftesbury, but you can't stop someone damaging their health. |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: While I agree that the usual cause of the use of the word determines what it means, I do not see why sameness of microstructure is necessarily the relevant similarity that determines my reference of the word 'water'. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.198) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for essentialists who build their views on semantic considerations. But the stability of what causes 'water' thoughts is the microstructure of water. However, that is an explantion of meaning, not a definition of it. |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11) | |
A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre. |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird |
5642 | For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Shaftesbury argued that no morality could be founded in religious obedience, or piety. On the contrary, a man is motivated to such obedience only because conscience tells him that the divine being is worthy of it. | |
From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.8 | |
A reaction: This seems to me a good argument. The only alternative is that we are brought to God by a conscience which was planted in us by God, but then how would you know you were being obedient to the right hypnotist? |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
Full Idea: The view that 'exists' is never a predicate is not plausible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: He doesn't enlarge. Russell says 'exists' is a quantifier. 'Your very existence offends me - I hope it is confiscated'. |