88 ideas
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
A reaction: I think it is vital to hang on to this big definition, focusing on ontology, and not retreat (like Kant) to the epistemological question of how humans happen to see reality, even if we are stuck with being humans. |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It may well be that after all our attempts at analysis, we have to accept the notions of causality, identity and existence as being primitive and irreducible. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.191) | |
A reaction: They may be irreducible, but it seems possible that the relationships between them might be revealed (as between Platonic Forms). To exist is to have identity and causal powers? |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we think, in a positivistic spirit, that only measurements and observations exist, this is strikingly naïve. The scientists and their instruments can't be composed merely of measurements. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.234) | |
A reaction: A strong rebuff to crude positivism and 'operationalism'. Such mistakes are the usual confusion of epistemology and ontology. |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.219) | |
A reaction: Meaning there are stronger principles of thought which can trump Ockham's Razor. A few more entities won't hurt. Sound right. |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
Full Idea: The theory of descriptions gives a model of internalist intentionality, in that it describes cases where the thinkability of a belief does not depend on the existence of a specific object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.36) | |
A reaction: So what do externalists say about the theory? Surely a reference to 'water' can't entail the existence of water? |
17743 | De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'. | |
From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1 | |
A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'. |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It appears to be impossible to complete an infinite series of tasks, since such a series has, by definition, no last member. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.290) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints the problem. So are there infinite tasks in a paradox of subdivision like the Achilles? |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. Sounds wrong to me. At least maths seems to need the idea of the 'correct' answer. If, however, maths is a huge pattern, there is no correctness, just the pattern. We can be wrong, but maths can't be wrong. Ah, I see…! |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Peano postulates imply an infinity of numbers, but there are probably not infinitely many concrete objects in existence, so natural numbers must be abstract objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
A reaction: Presumably they are abstract objects even if they aren't universals. 'Abstract' is an essential term in our ontological vocabulary to cover such cases. Perhaps possible concrete objects are infinite. |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372) | |
A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there. |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59) | |
A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study? |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view. |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225) | |
A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way. |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233) | |
A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well. |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245) | |
A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events. |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229) | |
A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is. |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that the aesthetic properties of a thing supervene on its physical properties. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16) | |
A reaction: A confusing example, as aesthetic properties only exist if there is an observer. Is 'supervenience' just an empty locution which tries to avoid reduction? |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
Full Idea: A statue is constituted by the marble that makes it up. It is plausible to say that constitution is not the same as identity - since identity is symmetrical and identity is not - but nonetheless constitution is a supervenience relation. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16) | |
A reaction: So what makes it a statue, as opposed to a piece of marble? It may well be an abstraction which only exists relative to observers. |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse? |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant. |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism. |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The trope theorist holds that the blueness of a blue chair really exists as much as the chair, but is not identified with the blueness of anything else, even if it resembles it exactly. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.361) | |
A reaction: You are left with explaining how 'resemblance' works if you cannot spot some 'thing' in common. It is an inviting idea, though, because it avoids the ontological baggage of universals. |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The trope theorist says that a cushion is just a 'bundle' of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.362) | |
A reaction: Certainly if you dispense with the idea of substance (which is clearly bad science even if it is good metaphysics), something like this is what remains of a cushion, though it sounds more epistemological than ontological. Only philosophers care about this |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Tropes seem to be abstract entities because, unlike concrete entities, they are ontologically dependent; ..there are no 'free' tropes, and they must always be bundled with other appropriate tropes to exist. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.367) | |
A reaction: Only a Platonist would think that a universal property could 'exist alone'. I presume Aristotle thought universals were real, though bound up with substances. |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Properties are causes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are? |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
A reaction: This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal? |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Nominalists believe that only particulars exist. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.352) | |
A reaction: A neat definition. Hence they deny universals. I suspect that nominalism is incoherent. Rational thought seems easy to create with universals, impossible with just particulars. Robotics is nominalist, which is why it will fail. |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Not every meaningful predicate expresses an existing property; thus 'is non-self-exemplifying' cannot refer to a property, because the property would contradict the predicate. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.100) | |
A reaction: Needs thought. The example is based on Russell's so-called Barber's Paradox. If it can't be a property, can it be a predicate? |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355) | |
A reaction: This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals. |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: For the conventionalist the world is doomed to merge into an amorphous lump with no real individuality or differentiation, ..but we can hardly make our own identity in the world in the way we are supposed to conventionally create identity for objects. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.113) | |
A reaction: Very nice argument! We need to 'cut nature at the joints' (Plato), and one joint is screamingly obvious - that between observer and world. You could try denying this, but it would be a bizarre view. |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
Full Idea: The traditional concept of substance says substances bear properties which are distinct from them, and substances are capable of independent existence. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.9) | |
A reaction: Put like that, it sounds ridiculous as a physical theory. It is hard to dislodge substance, though, from a priori human metaphysics. |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A statue is a kind of object which cannot survive much change to its shape, unlike a lump of bronze, which cannot survive any change to its material composition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.70) | |
A reaction: Also the statue could survive being hollowed out, changing its material composition. Hence a statue is not just a lump of bronze, but we knew that. |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If we say that up to 5% of a ship's parts can be replaced without the ship ceasing to exist, we could replace 4% and then 4% again, and it would retain its identity, if identity is transitive. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.26) | |
A reaction: One suspected that all attempts at precision with the ship of Theseus were doomed, but this nicely demonstrates it. |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If a ship is renovated without reconstruction of original parts, we happily identify the renovation with the original; if there was a reconstruction without the renovated version, we would identify the reconstruction with the original. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.27) | |
A reaction: This really shakes our belief in identity as a natural rather than mental phenomenon. The existence of clones undermines our normal idea of personal identity. |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The parts of a ship in a warehouse belong to no ship at all, ..and once they are appropriated by another ship they cease to be parts of the original, ..so it seems that the renovated ship (not the reconstruction) is identified with the original. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.31) | |
A reaction: The parts in the warehouse could belong to the original (they might even labelled), but assigning them to a new ship does indeed look like a crucial break in the continuity. |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles (no two objects can possess exactly the same properties) is not the same as Leibniz's Law (what is true of a thing is true of what is identical with that thing). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.62) | |
A reaction: Two things can't be the same because we can't discern the difference, which may be our inadequacy. But if they actually have identical properties, it is hard to see how they could be different. A universe with just two perfect spheres is couterexample. |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Reasoning itself depends upon a grasp of possibilities, because a valid argument is one in which it is not possible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.11) | |
A reaction: A very valuable corrective to my pessimistic view of philosophers' attempts to understand metaphysical necessity. But if we can only grasp natural necessity, then all reason is naturalistic. |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It may be possible to eliminate the modal operators (in English, 'is possible' and 'is necessary') in favour of quantifier expressions with variables ranging over possible worlds. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.121) | |
A reaction: Hence 'necessary' becomes 'exists/is true in all possible worlds'. Deep problems, but at least we must show that referring to 'possible' worlds isn't a circular explanation of 'is possible'. |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have claimed that there are two kinds of belief, 'de re' belief and 'de dicto' belief. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.35) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though it may only distinguish two objects of belief, not two types. Internalist and externalist views are implied. |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
Full Idea: The beliefs that are currently guiding your actions do not need to be in your stream of consciousness, which suggests that beliefs do not need to be conscious at all. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.31) | |
A reaction: Too bold, I think. Presumably this would eliminate all the other propositional attitudes from consciousness. There would only be qualia left! |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
Full Idea: There are plenty of cases of knowing how to do something, where that knowledge can also be expressed - without remainder, as it were - in propositional terms (such as knowing how to get to the Albert Hall). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: Presumably all knowing how could be expressed propositionally by God. |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
Full Idea: Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless. Is it really bitter, or really tasteless? | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44) | |
A reaction: A nice reinforcement of a classic Greek question. Good support for the primary/secondary distinction. Common sense, really. |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
Full Idea: The traditional examples used to support the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43) | |
A reaction: Presumably, though, direct realists can move one eye, or having something wrong with a retina. |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
Full Idea: One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: …so sense data are optional? We create sense data by objectifying them, but animals just taste the wine, and are direct realists. Tasting the sourness seems to be a case of abstraction. |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
Full Idea: Visual perception seems to differ from some of the other senses; when we become aware of burning toast, we become aware of the smell, ...but we don't see a garden by seeing a 'look' of the garden. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.40) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Do blind people transfer this more direct perception to a different sense (e.g. the one they rely on most)? |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
Full Idea: The solution to the problem of perception is to deny that it is related to real objects (things or sense-data); rather, perception is an intentional state (with a subject, mode and content), a relation to the intentional content. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: Not clear. This definition makes it sound like a propositional attitude. |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
Full Idea: The richness in information of perceptual experience outruns our modes of description of it, which has led some philosophers to claim that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.45) | |
A reaction: It certainly implies that it can't be entirely conceptual, but it still may be that in humans concepts are always involved. Not when I'm waking up in the morning, though. |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
Full Idea: The Adverbial Theory of perception holds that the predicates which other theories take as picking out the properties of objects are really adverbs of the perceptual verb; ..instead of strange objects, we just have properties of experiences. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: Promising. It fits secondary qualities all right, but what about primary? I 'see bluely', but can I 'see squarely'? |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
Full Idea: It is controversial whether knowledge is a state of mind, or a composite state involving a thought about something, plus its existence. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Pinpoints the internalism/externalism problem. Knowledge is a special type of belief (but maybe belief with external links!). Tricky. I vote for internalism. |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Although unfalsifiability is probably a defect in scientific hypothesis, because it is deprived of empirical content, it seems rather to be a virtue in a metaphysical hypothesis. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.241) | |
A reaction: Presumably nothing could ever be found to count against a necessary truth. A nice point. 'Find me an instance where 2+2 is not 4'. |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There are some entities which exist in time and space (such as persons or social groups) of which the behaviour seems to be subject to rational rather than merely causal explanation. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
A reaction: This begs of the question of whether 'rational' can be reduced to causal. We can't manage causal explanations of the very complex, so we use broad-brush second-best explanations? |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
Full Idea: The three arguments that have been used to articulate the problem of consciousness are the knowledge argument ('Mary'), the possibility of 'zombies' (creatures like us but lacking phenomenal consciousness), and the explanatory gap (the Hard Question). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: All of these push towards the implausible claim that there could never be a physical explanation of why we experience things. Zombies are impossible, in my opinion. |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Intentionalism (the doctrine that all mental states are intentional) need not be the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.22) | |
A reaction: This points to the requirement for an intentionalist to prove that so-called 'qualia' states are essentially intentional, which is not implausible. |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Love, hate, and the other object-directed attitudes have as much of a role in explaining behaviour as the propositional attitudes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.34) | |
A reaction: A good clarification of the range of intentional states. Objects seem to be external, where propositions are clearly internal. |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenal difference between a short-sighted person wearing glasses and not; they do not judge that the world is different, but the properties of the experience (the qualia) have changed. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43) | |
A reaction: Could be challenged. If a notice becomes unreadable, that is more than the qualia changing. |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
Full Idea: The intentional object of a pain-state is a part or region of the body, not a pain-object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.24) | |
A reaction: Plausible. Has anyone ever suffered from pain without some sense of what part of the body is actually in pain? |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
Full Idea: Weak intentionalism says all mental states are intentional, but qualia are higher-order properties of these states. ..Strong intentionalists say the phenomenal character of a sensation consists purely in that state's intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.25) | |
A reaction: The weak version sounds better. Asking 'how could a thought have a quality of experience just by being about something?' is a restatement of the traditional problem, which won't go away. The Hard Question. |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
Full Idea: The right thing to say about inverted qualia is that the person's experiences are different from other people's, but their beliefs are the same. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44) | |
A reaction: Right - which reinforces the idea that all beliefs are the result of judgement, and none come directly from perception. |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
Full Idea: It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms. |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
Full Idea: Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components. |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: If footprints or tree-rings are the model for reductions of intentionality, there doesn't seem much scope in them for giving false information, except by some freak event. |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
Full Idea: According to property dualism, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even though they are properties of one substance. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: Two properties may be phenomenologically different (transparent and magnetic), but that doesn't put them in different ontological categories. |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
Full Idea: While the non-reductive physicalist believes that mental/physical supervenience must be explained, the emergentist is willing to accept it as a fact of nature. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: A good reason not to be an emergentist. No philosopher should abandon the principle of sufficient reason. |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
Full Idea: If the mental supervenes on the physical, then whenever a physical cause brings about some effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: This is why supervenience seems to imply epiphenomenalism. The very concept of supervenience is dubious. |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
Full Idea: Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.19) | |
A reaction: Certainly if the physical is seen as just a pile of atoms, it is hard to see how they could ever think (see idea 1909). |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
Full Idea: If causation concerns events, then we have an identity theory of mental and physical events (particulars) [Davidson]. If causation is by properties, then it is mental and physical properties which are identical [Lewis and Armstrong]. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: Events are tokens, and properties are types. Tricky. Events are dynamic, but properties can be static. |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
Full Idea: Causal overdetermination is when an effect has more than one cause, and each event would have caused the effect if the other one had not done so. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.13) | |
A reaction: Overdetermination is a symptom that an explanation is questionable, but it can occur. Two strong people can join to push over a light hatstand. |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
Full Idea: I claim that the completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.12) | |
A reaction: He does not convince me of this. The mind may be within physics, but why should we say a priori that no exceptions to physical law will ever be discovered. Crane is setting up straw men. |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
Full Idea: In experience we learn propositions, since someone can reason using the sentence 'Red looks like this' (e.g. 'If red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn't'). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: The fact that we can create propositions about experiences doesn't prove that experience is inherently propositional. |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
Full Idea: The Twin Earth argument does not refute internalism, since it depends on the 'Content-Determines-Reference' principle, which internalists can reject. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.37) | |
A reaction: The idea is that content should be understood in a context (e.g. on a particular planet). Indexicals count against a totally narrow view of content (Twins thinking 'I am here'). |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
Full Idea: If a mental state is broad, then the existence of the mental state entails the existence of its object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: Hence thinking of non-existent things like unicorns is problematic for externalists. However, externalists can think about numbers or Platonic ideals. |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
Full Idea: Intensional contexts are those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the extensions are conceived. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.4) | |
A reaction: An important distinction for anyone defending an internalist view of concepts or of knowledge |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The centre of mass of the solar system seems to lack causal powers, and so is an abstract object, even though it has a location and movement. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
A reaction: Nice example, with rich ramifications. Abstraction is deeply tied into our understanding of the physical world, and our concept of identity. |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Concrete objects possess causal powers and relations, but abstract objects are incapable of having causal powers or relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
A reaction: Is this an observation or a definition? One might claim that an abstraction (such as a political ideal) can acquire causal power through a conscious mnd. |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11) | |
A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre. |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
Full Idea: You can't include in your concept of causation a clause stipulating that the cause occurred earlier than the effect, because that would rule out backward causation by definition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.176) | |
A reaction: It may, though, be the case that backward causes can't occur, and time is essential to causes. The problem is our inability to know this for sure. |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.173) | |
A reaction: This is slippery ground because both 'facts' and 'events' have uncertain ontological status, and seem partly conventional rather than natural. Events might be natural surges or transformations of energy? |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems proper to say that events of themselves possess no causal powers; only persisting objects (individual substances) possess causal powers. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.211) | |
A reaction: This requires events to be reduced to substances, which invites Aristotle's question of where the movement comes from. In physcis, 'energy' is the key concept. |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179) | |
A reaction: Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions. |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Causation relations between events may an instance of a causal law, with laws either interpreted as constant conjunctions (Hume), or as necessitation among universals (Armstrong). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.190) | |
A reaction: Hume's version is a thin idea of a law, but we can dream about the metaphysical status of laws, even if we don't know much about them. Lowe says a cause without a law is perfectly intelligible. |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One thing Hume has taught us is that the necessity which causation involves is at most 'natural' or 'physical' necessity, not metaphysical necessity. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.182) | |
A reaction: Given Hume's epistemological scepticism, I don't think he would claim to have shown such a thing. See G.Strawson's book. Metaphysical necessity of causation is possible, but unknowable. |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: For Lowe law statements are in a sense about what 'ought' to be the case. The 'ought' is not an explicitly moral or anthropomorphic one but instead tells us what is the natural behaviour of kind members. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 8.6 | |
A reaction: This is the 'normative' view of laws (as opposed to the intentional, dispositional, or regularity accounts). They cite Lowe 1989 Ch.8. The obvious immediate problem is things which evolved for one purpose and end up being used for another. |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Counterfactual analyses of event causation don't seem to work, because 'if Napoleon hadn't been born he wouldn't have died' is true, but doesn't mean his birth caused his death. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.161) | |
A reaction: Nice counterexample, which looks pretty conclusive. Birth makes death possible; it creates the necessary conditions within which it can be caused. |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If motion just is change of distance between two objects, it does not involve any kind of intrinsic change in the objects in question. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.242) | |
A reaction: It sound respectably relativistic, but I doubt the definition. x is moving relative to y, then y attains x's velocity, so x ceases to move? Maybe. |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space at all, but just 'limits' of certain kinds, and as such 'abstract' entities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.254) | |
A reaction: This is fairly crucial when dealing with Zeno's paradoxes. How many points in a line? How long to get through a point? |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If space does not exist at all, but is only relations between objects, what could one possibly mean by saying that there is a place which is unoccupied by any material object? And what determines whether space is bounded? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.264) | |
A reaction: Correct. People who assert that space is only relational have been misled by what we can know about space, not what it is. |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
Full Idea: The view that 'exists' is never a predicate is not plausible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: He doesn't enlarge. Russell says 'exists' is a quantifier. 'Your very existence offends me - I hope it is confiscated'. |