81 ideas
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: You cannot divide anything (such as the decad) into many parts, because as soon as you separate the first part, you are no longer dividing the original. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.215) |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Dogmatists define proof as "an argument which, by means of agreed premises, reveals by way of deduction a nonevident inference". | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.135) |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Philo (of Megara) says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood,' as for instance the syllogism 'If it is day, I converse,' when in fact it is day and I am conversing. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.110) | |
A reaction: Russell endorses this, and Rumfitt quotes it as the classic case of denying that there is any modal aspect (such as 'logical necessity') involved in logical consequence. He labels it 'material or Philonian consequence'. |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
Full Idea: The theory of descriptions gives a model of internalist intentionality, in that it describes cases where the thinkability of a belief does not depend on the existence of a specific object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.36) | |
A reaction: So what do externalists say about the theory? Surely a reference to 'water' can't entail the existence of water? |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died; so he was either dead when he was alive, or he was twice dead when he was dead. So he didn't die. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.111) | |
A reaction: One of my favourites. Of all the mysteries facing us, the one that boggles me most is how anything can happen in the 'present' moment, if the present is just the overlap point between past and future. |
18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning; even when it doesn't look like that because we seem to be using words to talk about mathematical things. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], p.468), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
A reaction: I would have thought that an algorithm needs some raw material to work with. This leads to the idea that meaning arises from rules of usage. |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that the aesthetic properties of a thing supervene on its physical properties. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16) | |
A reaction: A confusing example, as aesthetic properties only exist if there is an observer. Is 'supervenience' just an empty locution which tries to avoid reduction? |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
Full Idea: A statue is constituted by the marble that makes it up. It is plausible to say that constitution is not the same as identity - since identity is symmetrical and identity is not - but nonetheless constitution is a supervenience relation. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.16) | |
A reaction: So what makes it a statue, as opposed to a piece of marble? It may well be an abstraction which only exists relative to observers. |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
Full Idea: The distinction between 'resultant' properties like weight, and 'emergent' properties like colour, seems intuitive enough, but on examination it is very hard to make precise. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: It is no coincidence that the examples are of primary and secondary qualities. If 'the physical entails the mental' then all mental properties are resultant. |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
Full Idea: Whatever the causal process is, it remains true that if emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; there are some effects which would not have come about if mental things were absent from the world. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: Emergentism looks to me like an incoherent concept, unless it is another word for dualism. |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Properties are causes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: We can't detect properties if they lack causal powers. This may be a deep confusion. Properties are what make causal powers possible, but that isn't what properties are? |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
Full Idea: The traditional concept of substance says substances bear properties which are distinct from them, and substances are capable of independent existence. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.9) | |
A reaction: Put like that, it sounds ridiculous as a physical theory. It is hard to dislodge substance, though, from a priori human metaphysics. |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
Full Idea: The beliefs that are currently guiding your actions do not need to be in your stream of consciousness, which suggests that beliefs do not need to be conscious at all. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.31) | |
A reaction: Too bold, I think. Presumably this would eliminate all the other propositional attitudes from consciousness. There would only be qualia left! |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have claimed that there are two kinds of belief, 'de re' belief and 'de dicto' belief. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.35) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though it may only distinguish two objects of belief, not two types. Internalist and externalist views are implied. |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
Full Idea: There are plenty of cases of knowing how to do something, where that knowledge can also be expressed - without remainder, as it were - in propositional terms (such as knowing how to get to the Albert Hall). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: Presumably all knowing how could be expressed propositionally by God. |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If an argument leads to confessedly absurd conclusions, we should not assent to the absurdity just because of the argument, but avoid the argument because of the absurdity. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.252) | |
A reaction: cf. G.E.Moore. Denying that you have a hand seems to be an absurdity, but I'm not sure if I can give a criterion for absurdity in such a case. One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Honey appears to sceptics to be sweet, but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.20) |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
Full Idea: Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless. Is it really bitter, or really tasteless? | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44) | |
A reaction: A nice reinforcement of a classic Greek question. Good support for the primary/secondary distinction. Common sense, really. |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
Full Idea: The traditional examples used to support the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43) | |
A reaction: Presumably, though, direct realists can move one eye, or having something wrong with a retina. |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
Full Idea: One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: …so sense data are optional? We create sense data by objectifying them, but animals just taste the wine, and are direct realists. Tasting the sourness seems to be a case of abstraction. |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
Full Idea: The solution to the problem of perception is to deny that it is related to real objects (things or sense-data); rather, perception is an intentional state (with a subject, mode and content), a relation to the intentional content. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: Not clear. This definition makes it sound like a propositional attitude. |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
Full Idea: Visual perception seems to differ from some of the other senses; when we become aware of burning toast, we become aware of the smell, ...but we don't see a garden by seeing a 'look' of the garden. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.40) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Do blind people transfer this more direct perception to a different sense (e.g. the one they rely on most)? |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Just as you can't know if a portrait of Socrates is good without seeing the man, so when the intellect gazes on sensations but not the external objects it cannot know whether they are similar. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.75) |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
Full Idea: The richness in information of perceptual experience outruns our modes of description of it, which has led some philosophers to claim that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.45) | |
A reaction: It certainly implies that it can't be entirely conceptual, but it still may be that in humans concepts are always involved. Not when I'm waking up in the morning, though. |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
Full Idea: The Adverbial Theory of perception holds that the predicates which other theories take as picking out the properties of objects are really adverbs of the perceptual verb; ..instead of strange objects, we just have properties of experiences. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42) | |
A reaction: Promising. It fits secondary qualities all right, but what about primary? I 'see bluely', but can I 'see squarely'? |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is the experience of what is useful in each affair that brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.258) |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
Full Idea: It is controversial whether knowledge is a state of mind, or a composite state involving a thought about something, plus its existence. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Pinpoints the internalism/externalism problem. Knowledge is a special type of belief (but maybe belief with external links!). Tricky. I vote for internalism. |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The main basic principle of the sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.12) |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: When we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.47) |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.32) |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The necks of doves appear different in hue according to the differences in the angle of inclination. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.120) |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same oar seems bent when in the water but straight when out of the water. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.119) |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59) |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Actions which seem shameful to us when sober do not seem shameful when drunk. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.109) |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The enjoyment of different things is an indication that we get varying impressions from the underlying objects. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.80) |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Health is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, and sickness is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so we must give credence to the natural perceptions of the sick. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.103) |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The same water which seems very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.101) |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: A man with touch, taste and smell, but no hearing or sight, will assume nothing audible or visible exists, so maybe an apple has qualities which we have no senses to perceive. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.96) |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Even among practices on which all known cultures are agreed, disagreement about them may possibly exist amongst some of the nations which are unknown to us. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.234) |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but among some of the barbarians, such as the Syrians, it is a token of nobility. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.203) |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Induction cannot establish the universal by means of the particular, since limited particulars may omit crucial examples which disprove the universal, and infinite particulars are impossible to know. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.204) |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
Full Idea: The three arguments that have been used to articulate the problem of consciousness are the knowledge argument ('Mary'), the possibility of 'zombies' (creatures like us but lacking phenomenal consciousness), and the explanatory gap (the Hard Question). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: All of these push towards the implausible claim that there could never be a physical explanation of why we experience things. Zombies are impossible, in my opinion. |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Intentionalism (the doctrine that all mental states are intentional) need not be the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.22) | |
A reaction: This points to the requirement for an intentionalist to prove that so-called 'qualia' states are essentially intentional, which is not implausible. |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
Full Idea: Love, hate, and the other object-directed attitudes have as much of a role in explaining behaviour as the propositional attitudes. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.34) | |
A reaction: A good clarification of the range of intentional states. Objects seem to be external, where propositions are clearly internal. |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
Full Idea: There is a phenomenal difference between a short-sighted person wearing glasses and not; they do not judge that the world is different, but the properties of the experience (the qualia) have changed. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.43) | |
A reaction: Could be challenged. If a notice becomes unreadable, that is more than the qualia changing. |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
Full Idea: The intentional object of a pain-state is a part or region of the body, not a pain-object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.24) | |
A reaction: Plausible. Has anyone ever suffered from pain without some sense of what part of the body is actually in pain? |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
Full Idea: Weak intentionalism says all mental states are intentional, but qualia are higher-order properties of these states. ..Strong intentionalists say the phenomenal character of a sensation consists purely in that state's intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.25) | |
A reaction: The weak version sounds better. Asking 'how could a thought have a quality of experience just by being about something?' is a restatement of the traditional problem, which won't go away. The Hard Question. |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
Full Idea: The right thing to say about inverted qualia is that the person's experiences are different from other people's, but their beliefs are the same. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.44) | |
A reaction: Right - which reinforces the idea that all beliefs are the result of judgement, and none come directly from perception. |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
Full Idea: It would be wrong to represent Descartes' view as the idea that bodies are made of one kind of stuff and minds of another; he did not think minds are made of stuff at all, because then they would be divisible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. It could be an indivisible substance. Without a mental substance, Descartes may have to say the mind is an abstraction, perhaps a pattern of Platonic forms. |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
Full Idea: Functionalism holds that it is in the nature of certain mental states to have certain effects; therefore there can be no mental epiphenomena. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: I strongly resist the idea that a thing's identity is its function. Functionalism may not say that. Mind is an abstraction referring to a causal nexus of unknowable components. |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.26) | |
A reaction: If footprints or tree-rings are the model for reductions of intentionality, there doesn't seem much scope in them for giving false information, except by some freak event. |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
Full Idea: According to property dualism, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even though they are properties of one substance. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.10) | |
A reaction: Two properties may be phenomenologically different (transparent and magnetic), but that doesn't put them in different ontological categories. |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
Full Idea: While the non-reductive physicalist believes that mental/physical supervenience must be explained, the emergentist is willing to accept it as a fact of nature. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.18) | |
A reaction: A good reason not to be an emergentist. No philosopher should abandon the principle of sufficient reason. |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
Full Idea: If the mental supervenes on the physical, then whenever a physical cause brings about some effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.17) | |
A reaction: This is why supervenience seems to imply epiphenomenalism. The very concept of supervenience is dubious. |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
Full Idea: Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.19) | |
A reaction: Certainly if the physical is seen as just a pile of atoms, it is hard to see how they could ever think (see idea 1909). |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
Full Idea: If causation concerns events, then we have an identity theory of mental and physical events (particulars) [Davidson]. If causation is by properties, then it is mental and physical properties which are identical [Lewis and Armstrong]. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: Events are tokens, and properties are types. Tricky. Events are dynamic, but properties can be static. |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
Full Idea: Causal overdetermination is when an effect has more than one cause, and each event would have caused the effect if the other one had not done so. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.13) | |
A reaction: Overdetermination is a symptom that an explanation is questionable, but it can occur. Two strong people can join to push over a light hatstand. |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
Full Idea: I claim that the completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.12) | |
A reaction: He does not convince me of this. The mind may be within physics, but why should we say a priori that no exceptions to physical law will ever be discovered. Crane is setting up straw men. |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
Full Idea: In experience we learn propositions, since someone can reason using the sentence 'Red looks like this' (e.g. 'If red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn't'). | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.28) | |
A reaction: The fact that we can create propositions about experiences doesn't prove that experience is inherently propositional. |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If we say "If day exists, lights exists", and then "day exists", and then "light exists", then parts of the judgement never exist together, and so the whole judgement will have no real existence. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], II.109) |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
Full Idea: The Twin Earth argument does not refute internalism, since it depends on the 'Content-Determines-Reference' principle, which internalists can reject. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.37) | |
A reaction: The idea is that content should be understood in a context (e.g. on a particular planet). Indexicals count against a totally narrow view of content (Twins thinking 'I am here'). |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
Full Idea: If a mental state is broad, then the existence of the mental state entails the existence of its object. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: Hence thinking of non-existent things like unicorns is problematic for externalists. However, externalists can think about numbers or Platonic ideals. |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
Full Idea: Intensional contexts are those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the extensions are conceived. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.4) | |
A reaction: An important distinction for anyone defending an internalist view of concepts or of knowledge |
6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Suppose someone were to say: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful"?! | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], §127), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason | |
A reaction: This reminds us that the concept of supervenience was originally introduced in aesthetics. Beauty is supervenient on physical form. But "Imagine how someone else might look at this butterfly and think it was ugly". |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11) | |
A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre. |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Self-movement must move in some particular direction, but if it pushes it will be behind itself, and if it pulls it will be in front of itself. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.68) | |
A reaction: This is the same as Aquinas's First Way of proving God's existence. |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If bodies, and the places and times when they are said to move, are divided into infinity, motion will not occur, it being impossible to find anything which will initiate the first movement. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.76) |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If objects are reducible to atoms, and each thing passes in an atomic time with its own first atom into an atomic point of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.77) |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Since time does not seem to subsist without motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and likewise rest, time is abolished. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.141) |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: There can't be a time when there was no time, so time is not limited; but unlimited time means past and present are non-existent (so time is limited to the present), or they exist (which means they are present). Time does not exist. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.142) |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Time is clearly divisible (into past, present and future), but it can't be, because a divisible thing is measured by some part of itself (divisions of length), but the two parts must coincide to make the measurement (e.g. present must coincide with past). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.143) |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: How shall we be able to reach a conception of God when we have no agreement about his substance or his form or his place of abode? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.3) |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
Full Idea: The view that 'exists' is never a predicate is not plausible. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
A reaction: He doesn't enlarge. Russell says 'exists' is a quantifier. 'Your very existence offends me - I hope it is confiscated'. |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The existence of God is not pre-evident, for if it was the dogmatists would have agreed about it, whereas their disagreements show it is non-evident, and in need of demonstration. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.6) |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If God had forethought for all, there would be no evil in the world, yet they say the world is full of evil. And if he forethinks some things, why those and not others? | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.9) |