3 ideas
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Dummett aimed to characterise realism in terms not of the mind-independence of the entities but of the validity of bivalence for sentences referring to them. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Realism [1982]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 21 'Lang' | |
A reaction: Hence he called himself a 'philosopher of language', rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Philosophers of language are more likely to end up as anti-realists, I suspect. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
6040 | There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius] |
Full Idea: Aenesidemus does not allow either happiness or pleasure or prudence or any other goal held by anyone on the basis of philosophical doctrine as the goal of life; rather, he says that there just is no such thing as a goal which is recognised by all people. | |
From: report of Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags) [c.60 BCE], Bk 8) by 'Photius Bibliotheca' - Aenesidimus (frags) 170b | |
A reaction: This is probably the dominant modern (post-Darwinian, existentialist) view. Personally I am sympathetic to the Aristotelian view that (to some extent) appropriate goals for life can be inferred from a fairly stable human nature. |