Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'De Essentia' and 'Letters to Leibniz'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
     Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
     From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
     A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Plantinga assumes that being identical with that snowball names a property which is that snowball's haecceity.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (De Essentia [1979]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §52
     A reaction: Only a philosopher would suggest such a bizarre way of establishing the unique individuality of a given snowball. You could hardly keep track of the snowball with just that criterion. How do you decide whether something has Plantinga's property?
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
     Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
     From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
     A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?