23 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The incremental progress which I envisage for philosophy lacks the drama after which some philosophers still hanker, and that hankering is itself a symptom of the intellectual immaturity that helps hold philosophy back. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: This could stand as a motto for the whole current profession of analytical philosophy. It means that if anyone attempts to be dramatic they can make their own way out. They'll find Kripke out there, smoking behind the dustbins. |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Even if talk of truth as correspondence to the facts is metaphorical, it is a bad metaphor for analytic truth in a way that it is not for synthetic truth. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A very simple and rather powerful point. Maybe the word 'truth' should be withheld from such cases. You might say that accepted analytic truths are 'conventional'. If that is wrong, then they correspond to natural facts at a high level of abstraction. |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Pure, unexplained supervenience is never a solution to a problem but a sign that there is something fundamental we don't know. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The Psychophysical Nexus [2000], §III) | |
A reaction: This seems right. It is not a theory or an explanation, merely the observation of a correlation which will require explanation. Why are they correlated? |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The debate between realism and anti-realism has become notorious in the rest of philosophy for its obscurity, convolution, and lack of progress. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
A reaction: I find this reassuring, because fairly early on I decided that this problem was not of great interest, and quietly tiptoed away. I take the central issue to be whether nature has 'joints', to which the answer appears to be 'yes'. End of story. |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as a mountain it would be a vague object, but it is logically impossible for an object to be vague, so there is no such thing as a mountain. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I don't take this to be a daft view. No one is denying the existence of the solid rock that is involved, but allowing such a vague object may be a slippery slope to the acceptance of almost anything as an 'object'. |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
A reaction: Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic. |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The epistemology of metaphysical modality requires no dedicated faculty of intuition. It is simply a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking, a kind of thinking tightly integrated with our thinking about the spatio-temporal world. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be spot-on, though it puts the focus increasingly on the faculty of imagination, as arguably an even more extraordinary feature of brains than the much-vaunted normal consciousness. |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
Full Idea: The psychological mechanism that Williamson proposes as the supposedly reliable source of our knowledge of necessities only seems applicable to counterfactuals that are distinctively causal, not metaphysical, in character. | |
From: comment on Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 5 | |
A reaction: My rough impression of Williamson's account is that it is correct but unilluminating. We have to assess necessities by counterfactual thinking, because nothing else is available (apart from evaluating the coherence of the findings). |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The epistemology of modality often focuses on (and pours scorn on) imagination or conceivability as a test of possibility, while ignoring the role of the imagination in the assessment of mundane counterfactuals. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Good point. I've been guilty of this easy scorn myself. Williamson gives our modal capacities an evolutionary context. What is needed is well-informed imagination, rather than wild fantasy. |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
Full Idea: There is extensive 'armchair knowledge' in which experience plays no strictly evidential role, but it may not fit the stereotype of the a priori, because the contribution of experience was more than enabling, such as armchair truths about our environment. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: Once this point is conceded we have no idea where to draw the line. Does 'if it is red it can't be green' derive from experience? I think it might. |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Crude rationalists postulate a special knowledge-generating faculty of rational intuition. Crude empiricists regard intuition as an obscurantist term of folk psychology. Linguistic/conceptual philosophy says it reveals linguistic or conceptual competence. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kripke seems to think that it is the basis of logical competence. I would use it as a blank term for any insight in which we have considerable confidence, and yet are unable to articulate its basis; roughly, for rational thought that evades logic. |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
Full Idea: 'Intuition' plays a major role in contemporary analytic philosophy's self-understanding. ...When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they appeal to intuitions. ...Thus intuitions are presented as our evidence in philosophy. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], p.214-5), quoted by Herman Cappelen - Philosophy without Intuitions 01.1 | |
A reaction: Williamson says we must investigate this 'scandal', but Cappelen's book says analytic philosophy does not rely on intuition. |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Someone who acquires the word 'gob' just by being reliably told that it is synonymous with 'mouth' knows what 'gob' means without being fully competent to use it. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 4.7) | |
A reaction: Not exactly an argument against meaning-as-use, but a very nice cautionary example to show that 'knowing the meaning' of a word may be a rather limited, and dangerous, achievement. |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Given empirical evidence for the approximate intertranslatability of all human languages, and a universal innate basis of human cognition, we may wonder how 'other' any human culture really is. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 8.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a fairly accurate account of the situation. In recent centuries people seem to have been over-impressed by superficial differences in cultural behaviour, but we increasingly see the underlying identity. |
23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
Full Idea: More localised politics helps to generate the disposition of care for the land which is a core feature of environmental politics. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 4) | |
A reaction: I currently live in a time when localised politics is hugely devalued, because centralisation and privatisation are cheaper. It seems obvious that many human needs require a commitment to a particular locality. |
23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
Full Idea: An ideology generally has three components: a judgement (usually critical) of how things are, a picture of the ideology's ideal society, and a strategy for progressing towards the ideal. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: Conservatives tend to think we are already living in the ideal, and they reject most ideologies for being 'idealistic' (which presumably means delusional). I'm a fan of ideals, but combined with cool judgement. |
23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Liberals say that their preferences are their interests, and resist the idea that anyone could know their interests better than they can. …To this degree, ecologism might be regarded as 'non-liberal'. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: There are lots of other cases where liberal citizens may not realise their best interests, such as in the control of traffic, or of drugs. |
23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Marx and his heirs promote a productivist socialism, but utopian socialists such as William Morris offer a less productivist and more decentralised form of socialism. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: Modern history teaches us to be very cautious about the centralised version. Presumably you could be decentralised but still value production highly, even if it is a bit less efficient. |
23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Difference feminists argue that men and women are fundamentally different. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: You can be significantly different without being 'fundamentally' different. Personally I don't see a huge difference, even though history may have greatly exaggerated and dramatised what differences there are. |
23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
Full Idea: Although bare population figures are important for environmental impact, the level of affluence and the technology are also crucial factors. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: It is worth noting that the technology can also have a good impact, though affluence is nearly always bad. |
23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
Full Idea: A central belief of the ideology of ecologism is that aggregate growth must be reduced, and that this is very unlikely to be achieved by efficiency gains alone. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: He argues that efficiency gains invariably lead to increased production. Trickle down economics needs huge growth to deliver a good life for the poorest sector. Ecologism has to be fairly egalitarian about wealth. |
23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
Full Idea: We must acknowledge that a million years is a proper unit of political time. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Colin Tudge] Such thinking is almost impossible, but owners of large aristocratic estates seem to have thought in centuries, because they were confident of continuity. The more we identify with all of humanity, the more this is possible. |
23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |
Full Idea: At current rates we seem to value present concerns as fourteen times more valuable than future concerns. | |
From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: A sobering figure, which sounds about right. This directly influences how much we spend on future concerns. One thought is that future generations may be much more affluent than us! |