90 ideas
14857 | The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Truth tends to reveal its highest wisdom in the guise of simplicity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 609) |
14854 | Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Whoever thinks more deeply knows that he is always wrong, whatever his acts and judgments. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 518) |
14833 | Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The transition from momentary fear to short-lived exuberance is called the 'comic'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 169) |
19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Slippery slope arguments are not intended as demonstrative arguments, but rather as a challenge to show where a boundary is, and to show that the boundary is not arbitrary. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: [extracted from details of its context] You could respond by saying that a slippery slope levels off, rather than hitting a wall or plunging to perdition. |
14853 | Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The champions of truth are hardest to find, not when it is dangerous to tell it, but rather when it is boring. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 506) |
24075 | Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 483) | |
A reaction: Love this one. Especially in western democracies in the 2020s. If we value truth, we must be fallibilists. |
19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Deontic modality can be divided into sentence-modifying 'ought-to-be' modals, and predicate-modifying 'ought-to-do' modals. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.9.2) | |
A reaction: [She cites Brennan 1993] These two seem to correspond to what is 'good' (ought to be), and what is 'right' (ought to do). Since I like that distinction, I also like this one. |
19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Wedgwood (2007:220) argues that S5 is undesirable because it excludes that necessary truths may have contingent grounds. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.4 n5) | |
A reaction: Cameron defends the possibility of necessity grounded in contingency, against Blackburn's denial of it. It's interesting that we choose the logic on the basis of the metaphysics. Shouldn't there be internal reasons for a logic's correctness? |
19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Subscribers to the Barcan formula must either be committed to the existence of mere possibilia (such as possible unicorns), or deny many unactualised possibilities of existence. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.5) | |
A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the implications of the Barcan formula are ridiculous. Williamson is its champion, but I'm blowed if I can see why. What could a possible unicorn be like? Without them, must we say unicorns are impossible? |
19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We can think of the world as a 'whole' that has everything as its parts, like raisins in a cake, or we can think of the world as a 'container', which is disjoint from everything there is, like a bottle containing water. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Space and time seem to have a special role here, and it is hard to think of any other candidates for being the 'container'. I think I will apply my 'what's it made of' test to ontology, and opt for the world as a 'whole'. |
19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
Full Idea: 'Relational' grounding is between entities, best expressed by the two-place predicate 'x grounds y'. 'Operational' grounding is between sentences, best expressed by the two-place sentence operator read as 'because of' or 'in virtue of'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6) |
19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Humean supervenience excludes modality - the whole modal package - from the supervenience base. The Humean world is, at root, thoroughly non-modal. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This sums up my problem with David Lewis with perfect clarity. He is just excessively empirical. Hume himself also excluded modality from the basic impressions. Locke allows powerful essences (even if they are well hidden). |
19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The crucial feature of the determinates / determinables relation is that to possess the determinable property, an object must possess exactly one of the determinate properties. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.7.2) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a determinable being a function, and the determinate being its output. If 'scarlet' is a determinate of the determinables 'red' or 'coloured', it is not obvious that there is only one possible shade of scarlet. This schema oversimplifies. |
19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
Full Idea: I do not have the ability to play the violin. Nor does my desk. Unlike my desk, however, I possess the ability to learn to play the violin - the ability, that is, to acquire the ability to play the violin. I have an 'iterated ability' to play the violin. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6) | |
A reaction: An important idea, though the examples are more likely to come from human behaviour than from the non-human physical world. |
19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should think in terms of dispositions in terms of the manifestation alone - not as a disposition to ...if..., but as a disposition to ..., full stop. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.7) | |
A reaction: This way of individuating dispositions seems plausible. Some dispositions only have one trigger, but others have many. All sorts of things are inclined to trigger a human smile, but we are just disposed to smile. Some people smile at disasters. |
19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Nomological dispositions such as electric charge seem different from ordinary dispositions. A particle's being electrically charged is not just a possibility of exerting a certain force. Rather, the particle has to exert a force in certain circumstances. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 2.7) | |
A reaction: I can only pull when there is something to pull, but a magnet seems to have a 'field' of attraction which is pullish in character. Does it detect something to pull (like a monad)? Can there be a force which has no object? |
19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Spatiotemporal relations are a prime example of properties that are difficult to understand in dispositional terms. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [Vetter refers to A.Bird 2007 Ch.8 for an attempt] One approach would be to question whether they are 'properties'. I don't think of relations as properties, even if they are predicates. Is space a property of something? |
19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Not every feature of an individual's origin is plausibly considered necessary, so we can distinguish two questions: 'why origin, rather than development?', and 'why these particular features of origin?'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] The point is that exactly where someone was born doesn't seem vital. If it is nothing more than that every contingent object must have an origin, that is not very exciting. |
19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The plausibility of the necessity of origin is a symptom of our general tendency to think of possibility in terms of the 'branching model' - that unactualised possibilities must branch off from actuality, at some point. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.9) | |
A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] It is hard to see how we could flatly deny some possibilities which had absolutely no connection with actuality, and were probably quite unimaginable for us. |
19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Necessity and possibility had a revival with the development of modal logic, treating them as special cases of the existential and universal quantifiers, ranging over an infinity of possible worlds. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The problem seems to be that possible worlds offer a very useful and interesting 'model' of modality, but say nothing at all about its nature. Any more than a weather map will show you what weather is. |
19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Necessities mark the limits of the potentialities that objects have. More precisely, it is necessary that p just in case nothing has, or had, or will have a potentiality to be such that not-p. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [See Vetter's other ideas for her potentiality account of modality] If we wish to build a naturalistic account of modality (and if you don't want that then your untethered metaphysics will drift away in logical space) then this is the way to go. |
19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
Full Idea: When we speak of possibility, we speak of potentiality in abstraction from its possessor; a possibility is a potentiality somewhere or other in the world, no matter where. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.1) | |
A reaction: I note that, as so often, this is psychological abstraction, which is usually sneered at by modern philosophers (e.g. Geach), and yet is employed all the time. This is Vetter's key thesis, which I like. |
19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentiality is, metaphorically speaking, possibility anchored in individual objects; I claim that all possibility is thus anchored in some individual object(s) or other. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This will be fine for specific physical possibilities, but may become tricky for possibilities that are increasingly abstract, or universal, or idealised. I agree with the general approach. Anchor modality in reality (which is physical!). |
19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should think of possibility as potentiality in abstraction from its bearer. So 'it is possible that p' is defined as 'something has an iterated potentiality for it to be the case that p'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.4) | |
A reaction: If possibilities are abstractions from potentialities, I am inclined the treat potentialities as abstractions from dispositions, and dispositions (and properties) as abstractions from powers. Powers are not abstractions - they are the reality. |
23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
Full Idea: Although not all potentialities are dispositions, Vetter claims that all dispositions are potentialities which are had to a sufficiently high degree. | |
From: report of Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015]) by Friend/Kimpton-Nye - Dispositions and Powers 2.4.2 | |
A reaction: This sounds plausible. A potentiality could be faint or negligible, but once it is a serious possibility it becomes a 'disposition'. ...I suppose. But if the meteor is probably going to hit my house, it doesn't mean it has a disposition to do so. |
19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
Full Idea: This book is a plea for recognising potentiality as an explanans in the metaphysics of modality, rather than as something in need of explanation or reduction. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Something has to do the explaining, and it is obviously much better to have some aspect of the real world do the job, rather than remote abstractions such as laws, possible worlds or Forms. Personally I like the potentiality of 'powers'. |
19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The logic for potentiality corresponds to modal system T, the minimum for metaphysics. The S4 axiom ◊◊φ → ◊φ says iterated potentialities collapse, and the S5 ◊φ → □◊φ says potentialities can't be lost. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.9) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems persuasive. I nice example of modern analytic metaphysics, that you have to find a logic that suits your theory. N.Salmon defends system T for all of metaphysics, though most people favour S5. |
19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentialities may get exercised despite having a degree that is too low for them to qualify as dispositions. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.7.4) | |
A reaction: The key reason why her book is called 'Potentialities', rather than 'Dispositions'. She still wants to offer a naturalistic picture which ties potentialities to individual objects, but I am wondering whether potentialities are too abstract for the job. |
19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Water has no potentiality to break. But water has a potentiality to be frozen and turn into ice, which does have a potentiality to break. So water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6) | |
A reaction: Thus potentially has an 'iterated' character to it, and an appropriate modal logic for it will have to allow for those iterations. She suggests a version of System T modal logic. |
19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentiality can now be recognised as the common genus of dispositions and such related properties as abilities. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Vetter defends a metaphysics of modality based on potentialities, rather than on narrower concepts such as dispositions, powers or essences. She can evade the problems which those narrower concepts raise. |
19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentialities are 'potentialities to ....', while possibilities are 'possibilities that ....'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This feels a bit like a stipulation, rather than a precise description of normal usage. That said, it is quite a nice distinction. It sounds as if an event follows a potentiality, and a state of affairs follows a possibility. Active and passive? |
19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: If possible worlds are sets of propositions, we need some way to distinguish those sets of propositions that do from those that do not correspond to genuine possibilities. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The idea of a 'genuine' possibility does not seem to play a role in the conceptual scheme of those who treat possibility entirely in terms of possible worlds. If possibility is primitive, or is a set of worlds, there can be no criterion for 'genuine'. |
19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Is it not possible that there be objects with (natural) properties that no actual thing ever had the potentiality to have, to produce, or constitute? (Call such properties 'super-alien properties'). | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.5) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for her potentiality account of possibility. Her solution is (roughly) to either deny the super-aliens, or have chains of iterated possibility which take this case back to actuality. That sounds OK to me. |
14858 | Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Conviction is the belief that in some point of knowledge one possesses absolute truth. Such a belief presumes, then, that absolute truths exists; likewise, that the perfect methods for arriving at them have been found. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 630) |
14830 | Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'To intuit' does not mean to recognise the existence of a thing to any extent, but rather to hold it to be possible, in that one wishes or fears it. 'Intuition' takes us not one step farther into the land of certainty. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 131) | |
A reaction: I like this remark. I am sympathetic to the view that the actual world has modal properties (in opposition to Sider, for example). To apprehend dispositions is precisely to apprehend possibilities. Intuition is a thousand interwoven inductions. |
19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Patterns of behaviour may be explained by circumstances external to the individual, but dispositional explanations, based on the instrinsic make-up of individuals are typically more reliable and stable. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 3.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is very nice support for the view I have been defending. She doesn't deal in essences, and prefers 'potentialities' (as broader) to 'dispositions'. The point is to explain events by the natures of the ingredients. |
19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Grounding is a kind of explanation - and specifically, the kind of metaphysical explanation that metaphysicians are after. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Depending on how you interpret 'grounding', it is plausible that it is the sort of explanation that physicists and economists are after as well. If the aim is to understand the structure of everything, the target is to know what grounds what. |
20378 | Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Just as the bones, flesh, intestines, and blood vessels are enclosed with skin, which makes the sight of a man bearable, so the stirrings and passions of the soul are covered up by vanity: it is the skin of the soul. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 082) | |
A reaction: What a glorious analogy! None of us should underestimate our vanity. The least vain people you ever meet can reveal their vanity if you challenge them close to home. Try accusing them of vanity! Attack their essential character! (No, don't do that). |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
14820 | People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Socrates and Plato are right: whatever man does, he always acts for the good; that is, in a way that seems to him good (useful) according to the degree of his intellect, the prevailing measure of his rationality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 102) | |
A reaction: I associate this doctrine much more with Socrates than with Plato - but Nietzsche was a great classical scholar. |
14856 | Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It seems that our thinking and judging are to be made the cause of our nature after the fact, but actually our nature causes us to think and judge one way or the other. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 608) |
14842 | Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why are likes and dislikes so contagious that one can scarcely live in proximity to a person of strong sensibilities without being filled like a vessel with pros and cons? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 371) | |
A reaction: I was on the receiving end of this when young, and I think it influenced me to propound stronger views about things than I could ever justify, since my natural disposition is to be cautious about all views. Nice question. Why? |
14835 | Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Artists are by no means people of great passion, but they often pretend to be. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 211) | |
A reaction: Presumably people can gradually become what they consistently pretend to be. |
14807 | The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The history of moral feelings is the history of an error, an error called 'responsibility', which in turn rests on an error called 'freedom of the will'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 039) | |
A reaction: I totally agree with this, though I think the term 'responsible' is useful in ethics, though only in the sense that the lightning was responsible for the thunder. Nietzsche appears to have anticipated Mackie's error theory about morality. |
14823 | Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man's complete lack of responsibility, for his behaviour and for his nature, is the bitterest drop which the man of knowledge must swallow, if he had been in the habit of seeing responsibility and duty as humanity's claim to nobility. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) | |
A reaction: If you were seeing humanity as little transient angels, living a moral life that was an echo of God's, then you needed cutting down to size. But if you ask if there is anything 'noble' in the universe, it will still be the fine deeds of humanity. |
14824 | It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man may no longer praise, no longer blame, for it is nonsensical to praise and blame nature and necessity. Just as he loves a work of art (or a plant) but does not praise it, because it can do nothing about itself, so he must regard human actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) | |
A reaction: But humans can 'do something about themselves'. They can read the works of Nietzsche. He overestimates the importance of the loss of free will, when we grasp that there is no such thing. |
22473 | Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche challenged belief in free will, on the ground that will itself …is non-existent. The will is in truth nothing but a complex of sensations, as of power and resistance, and it is illusion to think of it as a basis for 'moral responsibility'. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.153 | |
A reaction: Modern neuroscience seems to support Nietzsche on this, though I will continue to use the concept of 'will' in philosophy, to mean the main brain events which normally combine in decision-making. That makes the will a process, not a entity. |
14812 | Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have strong powers of imagination to be able to have pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 059) | |
A reaction: Nice to see him say that strong powers of imagination are an 'intellectual' quality, which I think is not properly understood by the more geeky sort of intellectual. |
14810 | Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In the soul of the original ruling clans and castes, the man who has the power to requite goodness with goodness, evil with evil, and really does practice requital by being grateful and vengeful, is called 'good'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 045) | |
A reaction: The idea that evil should indeed repay evil was very much a feature of goodness until the philosophers came in on the act. In those days no one else had any power, so they had no scope for goodness. |
14831 | No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Never has a man done anything that was only for others and without any personal motivation. …How could the ego act without ego? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 133) | |
A reaction: This is only a denial of the purest of 'pure' altruism. It is hard to imagine anyone performing an altruistic action which permanently shamed the reputationof its performer - though it might be possible in a nicely contrived fiction. |
14855 | Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to be loved and respected by the same person. For the man who respects another acknowledges his power; his condition is one of awe. But love acknowledges no power, nothing that separates, differentiates, ranks higher or subordinates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 603) | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'respect', but this looks like nonsense. Do we 'respect' someone because they point a gun at us? I would say love and respect are inseparable. |
14815 | We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: How much pleasure we get from morality! Just think what a river of agreeable tears has flowed at tales of noble, generous actions. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 091) | |
A reaction: How can anyone not adore Nietzsche? The pleasure of a noble deed is the most piercing and the deepest pleasure known to us. It isn't 'just' a pleasure. |
14849 | We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The destiny of men is designed for happy moments (every life has those), but not for happy eras. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 471) | |
A reaction: The vicissitudes of life (my favourite word!) are such that even the most serene and well-adjusted person is going to be perturbed on several days of the week, even if only by the unhappiness of the people around them. |
14818 | First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Force precedes morality; for a time morality itself is force, to which others acquiesce. Later it becomes custom, and then free obedience, and finally almost instinct; then it is coupled to pleasure, like all habitual things, and is now called 'virtue'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 099) | |
A reaction: How few philosophers delve into the history of the concepts they work with, and yet how revealing it can be. Richard Taylor was wonderful on 'duty'. You will never grasp the 'problem of free will' if you don't examine its history. |
20103 | You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: You had to become your own master, and also the master of your own virtues. Previously, your virtues were your master; but they must be nothing more than your tools. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 006) | |
A reaction: What on earth would Aristotle make of that? Nietzsche offers a sort of metatheory for virtues. I take this to be a form of particularism - that you live by your virtues, but occasionally you can discard a virtue if it seems right. Lie, steal... |
14817 | The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We call 'good' the man who does the moral thing as if by nature, after a long history of inheritance - that is, easily, and gladly, whatever it is. …He is called 'good' because he is good 'for' something. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 096) | |
A reaction: I am amazed at the brief and rather disrespectful remarks that Nietzsche makes about Aristotle's ethics, given how close this idea is to the ideal of Aristotle (though the latter who not emphasise 'inheritance'!). |
14809 | All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every society of good men (that is, originally, of powerful men) places gratitude among its first duties. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 044) | |
A reaction: His reason here is that gratitude is a way of displaying the power of the powerful! |
14816 | Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Justice (fairness) originates among approximately equal powers, as Thucydides (in the horrifying conversation between the Athenian and Melian envoys) rightly understood. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 092) | |
A reaction: The moral position of the powerless is a notorious problem for social contract theories of morality. They have nothing to offer in a mere contract. |
20112 | Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The pity that the spectators express consoles the weak and suffering, inasmuch as they see that , despite all their weakness, they still have at least one power: the power to hurt. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 050) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints how the will to power led to the inversion of values. |
14821 | Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Aside from a few philosophers, men have always placed pity rather low in the hierarchy of moral feelings - and rightly so. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 103) | |
A reaction: Presumably this includes Jesus among the 'philosophers'. |
14841 | Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In many people the gift of having good friends is much greater than the gift of being a good friend. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 368) |
14843 | Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Women can very well enter into a friendship with a man, but to maintain it - a little physical antipathy must help out. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 390) |
14811 | In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In Homer, both the Trojan and the Greek are good. Not the man who inflicts harm on us, but the man who is contemptible, is bad. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 045) |
20111 | We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I can imagine a life much more simple...than the present one. ...One would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproach, overzealousness, delighting in things as in a spectacle. One would no longer feel one was more than nature. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 034) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Safranski says this passage is a big turning point for Nietzsche, replacing his earlier idea that art could be salvation. Eternal Recurrence puts a seal on this new view. Nietzsche adds that this life needs to be 'cheerful'. |
14844 | People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Many people, especially women, do not experience boredom, because they have never learned to work properly. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 391) | |
A reaction: It certainly seems right that boredom is a response to expectations and past habits. Life in a medieval village looks like boredom verging on torture for your busy modern urban sophisticate, but I daresay it was quite absorbing. |
14808 | Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If a man eighty thousand years old were conceivable, his character would in fact be absolutely variable. …The brevity of human life misleads us… | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 041) | |
A reaction: This would be one of my many exhibits for claiming Nietzsche as an existentialist. I think he is largely right, and we do detect slow shifts in our characters over long periods of time. They may be as much a response to culture as a personal matter. |
14822 | If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If we accept self-defense as moral, then we must also accept nearly all expressions of so-called immoral egoism. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 104) | |
A reaction: I find this idea rather disconcerting, because I have always thought that the clearest possible 'natural right' was that of self-defence - but this implication (if it be so) had never struck me. Hm. |
14838 | The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The state is a clever institution for protecting individuals from one another. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 235) | |
A reaction: This is Nietzsche allying with Hobbes, and presumably aiming this remark at Hegel. |
14852 | Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Culture absolutely cannot do without passions, vices and acts of malice. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 477) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how you test the truth of that aphorism, given that humanity is perpetually doomed to live with such things. If those qualities disappeared, I suppose we would drift apart. We are 'dependent' beings, as MacIntyre says. |
14846 | If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If the business of politics is to make life tolerable for the greatest number, this greatest number may also determine what they understand by a tolerable life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 438) |
14819 | Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The injustice of slavery, the cruelty in subjugating persons and peoples, cannot be measured by our standards. For the instinct for justice was not so widely developed then. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 101) | |
A reaction: Why do we value the instinct for justic which we have subsequently developed? Why do we think it is important, and battle to preserve it? This is the sort of creepy relativism that Nietzsche drifted into, and for the worse. |
14847 | Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Lawyers argue whether that law which is most thoroughly thought out, or that which is easiest to understand, should prevail in a people. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 459) | |
A reaction: Our system of speed limits is radically simplified, to save money on road signs, and facilitate enforcement. But then its inflexibility brings it into disrepute. |
14814 | Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why does execution offend us more than murder? It is the coldness of the judges, the painful preparation, the use of a man to deter others. For guilt is not being punished, which lies in the educators, parents, environment, in us, not in the murderer. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 070) | |
A reaction: Someone was stabbed to death in Oxford Street yesterday (26 Dec 11), and we all feel horribly that London is responsible for producing this event, even if we try and load all the blame onto one youth with a knife. Oscar Wilde endorsed this idea. |
14836 | People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All things for which we have made sacrifices are in the right. This explains why, just as soon as sacrifices are made, people continue with enthusiasm a war that was begun against their wishes. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 229) |
14845 | Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For heaven's sake, do not pass our Gymnasium education on to girls too! For it often turns witty, inquisitive, fiery youths - into copies of their teachers! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 409) |
14839 | Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Interest in education will gain great strength only at the moment when belief in a God and his loving care is given up. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 242) | |
A reaction: This remark may well sum up the motivation of my entire life. What effect would it have had if I had read it when I was twenty? |
14848 | Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The educational system in large states will always be mediocre at best, for the same reason that the cooking in large kitchens is at best mediocre. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 467) | |
A reaction: I wish he had said what that 'same reason' is. Something to do with too many cooks, I suppose. Nothing seems harder than reaching a wide concensus on how the young should be educated. Like interior design by a committee. |
14834 | Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A teacher is incapable of doing anything of his own for his own good. He always thinks of the good of his pupils, and all new knowledge gladdens him only to the extent that he can teach it. He is a thoroughfare for learning, and has lost seriousness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 200) | |
A reaction: Oh dear. I look in the mirror. Do I only delight in finding all these quotations so that I can stick them in the database and pass them on to someone else? Are they actually impingeing on my life? Could I meet an idea that made me abandon this project? |
14825 | In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In the mind of religious men, all nature is the sum of actions of conscious and intentioned beings, an enormous complex of arbitrary acts. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 111) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the process, I think, which then sees the gods as dictating through laws, and then the laws themselves doing the dictating, then seeing the laws as inhering in nature - and finally realising there aren't any laws! |
19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view, which takes laws to be substantial but grounded in a relation of nomic necessitation external to the properties themselves, is not an attractive option for the dispositionalist. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.8) | |
A reaction: The point is that the dispositionalist sees laws as grounded in the properties. I prefer her other option, of dispositionalism plus a 'shallow' view of laws (which she attributes to Mumford). The laws are as Lewis says, but powers explain them. |
19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Even on the dispositional essentialist view the world might have been governed by different laws, if those laws involved different properties. What is excluded is the possibility of different laws involving the same properties as our actual laws. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.8) | |
A reaction: Important. Critics of dispositional essentialism accuse it of promoting the idea that the laws of nature are necessary, a claim for which we obviously have no evidence. I prefer to say they are necessary given that 'stuff', rather than those properties. |
14826 | Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In present times, man wishes to understand the lawfulness of nature in order to submit to it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 111) | |
A reaction: They don't make philosophers like Nietzsche any more (or at least, in the analytic tradition I am following!). No one who is trying to give an analysis of the laws of nature has any interest in why we are so keen to find them. Stoics 'live by nature'. |
19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Any defender of the symmetry of time will have to provide some explanation of the obstinate appearance that the future is very different from the past. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.8) | |
A reaction: Presumably you have to say that it is all there, but only one end of the time spectrum is revealed to us, namely the past. But how do we get this uniquely lopsided view? Being an ominiscient god is more obvious than being a lopsided human. |
19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Presentists usually deal with the lack of cross-temporal relations by the construction of a surrogate, by way of paraphrasing the objectionable relation ascriptions. 'I admire Socrates' becomes 'I admire the Socrates properties'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.9) | |
A reaction: [compressed. The cites Markosian 2004:63] Why can't I just say 'I admire Socrates, who no longer exists'? The present includes tensed facts, and memories and evidence-based theories. Admiring is not a direct relation between objects. |
14827 | The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods above them as masters and themselves below them as servants, as did the Jews. They saw, as it were, only the reflection of the most successful specimens of their own caste - an ideal, not a contrast. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 114) |
14813 | Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We can determine whether Christianity or Greek philosophy has the greater truth by noting that the awakening sciences have carried on point for point with the philosophy of Epicurus, but have rejected Christianity point for point. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 068) |
14832 | The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: This shattering of oneself, this scorn of one's own nature, is actually a high degree of vanity. The whole morality of the Sermon on the Mount belongs here; in ascetic morality man prays to one part of himself as a god, and has to diabolify the rest. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 137) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the core of Nietzsche's objection to Christian teaching - that it doesn't provide a direction of life for the whole human being. The modern rejection of religions agrees with Nietzsche, especially in disputes over the place of sex. |
14850 | Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christ was the noblest human being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 475) | |
A reaction: That one will come as a surprise to those who only know of Nietzsche's religion that 'God is dead'! |
14837 | Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christ, whom we like to imagine as having the warmest of hearts, furthered men's stupidity, took the side of the intellectually weak, and kept the greatest intellect from being produced: and this was consistent. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 235) | |
A reaction: Thomas Aquinas was a stupendous intellect. The surest way to be swept forward on a wave of popularity is to find some reason why the uneducated are superior to the educated. |
14828 | Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: People who think their daily lives too empty and monotonous easily become religious: this is understandable and forgivable; however, they have no right to demand religiosity from those whose daily life does not pass in emptiness and monotony. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 115) | |
A reaction: Well wicked, that Nietzsche. Richard Dawkins and the hated new atheists are a right bunch of wimps in comparison. |