6 ideas
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200) | |
A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine. |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209) | |
A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless. |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes'). |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
22455 | Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: It is a fundamental criticism of many ethical theories that their accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do justice to the facts of regret...: basically because they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted upon. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965], p.175), quoted by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.39 | |
A reaction: [p.175 in Problems of the Self] Williams seems to have initiated this idea. It doesn't matter much for Kantians and Utilitarians (any more than a wrong answer in maths), but it matters if character is the focus. The virtuous have regrets. |
22453 | Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Williams insisted that the feelings we have in situations of moral conflict show that the 'structure' of moral judgements is unlike that of assertions expressing beliefs. | |
From: report of Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.36 | |
A reaction: Foot presents this as a key reason for the non-cognitivist view of ethics, and her paper attacks it. I don't usually react to moral disagreement with the same vigour I have when I think a belief is untrue. It may just be uncertainty, though. |