Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Essentials of Pragmatism' and 'Against the Ethicists (one book)'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
22752 Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.22)
     A reaction: [Sextus quotes this from 'the sapient Epicurus'] I think this may be a message across the centuries to Hegel, who attempted this impossible feat. My picture of philosophy is a continual shift of the preconceptions, to explore thoroughly.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
14794 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to know the Truth, you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief unassailable beyond doubt.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
     A reaction: This is not the same as saying that belief beyond doubt IS truth. He is merely offering a strategy for scientists to side-step the sort of scepticism raised by Descartes and radical empiricists.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The present writer framed the theory that a 'conception', that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
14793 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
     Full Idea: If one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
     A reaction: Strictly, I would have thought you could only affirm or deny a complete proposition, rather than a concept. What should I do with the concept of a 'unicorn'? Note that all theories, such as empiricism or pragmatism, begin with an account of our concepts.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
     Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
     From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
     A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
22754 Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35)
     A reaction: This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22755 Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69)
     A reaction: This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
22756 If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: If the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to purse wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.81)
     A reaction: He is investigating whether desires can be desirable, and if so which ones. Roots of this are in Plato's 'Gorgias' on drinking water. Similar to 'if compassion is the highest good then we need lots of suffering'. Desire must be a means, not an end.