18 ideas
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Certain advances in philosophical standards have been made within analytic philosophy, and there would be a serious loss of integrity involved in abandoning them in the way required to participate in current continental philosophy. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151) | |
A reaction: The reply might be to concede the point, but say that the precision and rigour achieved are precisely what debar analytical philosophy from thinking about the really interesting problems. One might as well switch to maths and have done with it. |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Fuzzy logic is based on a continuum of degrees of truth, but it is committed to the idea that it is half-true that one identical twin is tall and the other twin is not, even though they are the same height. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.154) | |
A reaction: Maybe to be shocked by a contradiction is missing the point of fuzzy logic? Half full is the same as half empty. The logic does not say the twins are different, because it is half-true that they are both tall, and half-true that they both aren't. |
8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
Full Idea: The relationship between an object and its singleton is puzzling. Our intuitive conception of a set is a collection of objects - what are we to make of a collection of a single object? | |
From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 4.1) | |
A reaction: The ontological problem seems to be the same as that of the empty set, and indeed the claim that a pair of entities is three things. For logicians the empty set is as real as a pet dog, but not for me. |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
Full Idea: As soon as I started learning formal logic, that struck me as exactly the language that I wanted to think in. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001]) | |
A reaction: It takes all sorts… It is interesting that formal logic might be seen as having the capacity to live up to such an aspiration. I don't think the dream of an ideal formal language is dead, though it will never encompass all of reality. Poetic truth. |
8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
Full Idea: It is better not to include in the definition of abstract entities that they ontologically depend on their concrete correlates. Note: ..but they may depend on the totality of concreta; maybe 'the supervenience of the abstract' is part of ordinary thought. | |
From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [the quoted phrase is from Gideon Rosen] It certainly seems unlikely that the concept of the perfect hexagon depends on a perfect hexagon having existed. Human minds have intervened between the concrete and the abstract. |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
Full Idea: If one is very close to a conceptual boundary, then one's judgement will be too unreliable to constitute knowledge, and therefore one will be ignorant. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.156) | |
A reaction: This is the epistemological rather than ontological interpretation of vagueness. It sounds very persuasive, but I am reluctant to accept that reality is full of very precise boundaries which we cannot quite discriminate. |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?). | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153) | |
A reaction: This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't. |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
Full Idea: If one takes a spectrum of colours from yellow to red, it might be that given a series of colour samples along that spectrum, each sample is indiscriminable by the naked eye from the next one, though samples at either end are blatantly different. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151) | |
A reaction: This seems like a nice variant of the Sorites paradox (Idea 6008). One could demonstrate it with just three samples, where A and C seemed different from each other, but other comparisons didn't. |
8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
Full Idea: The vocabulary of geometry is sufficient to identify the circle, but could not be used to identify any circular paint patch. The reason must be that the circle lacks certain properties that can distinguish paint patches from one another. | |
From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be support for the traditional view, that abstractions are created by omitting some of the properties of physical objects. I take them to be fictional creations, reified by language, and not actual hidden entities that have been observed. |
8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
Full Idea: In current discussions, abstract entities are usually distinguished as 1) in principle imperceptible, 2) incapable of causal interaction, 3) not located in space-time. The first is often explained by the second, which is in turn explained by the third. | |
From: Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Szabó concludes by offering 3 as the sole criterion of abstraction. As Lewis points out, the Way of Negation for defining abstracta doesn't tell us very much. Courage may be non-spatiotemporal, but what about Alexander the Great's courage? |
22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29) | |
A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps. |
22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats. |
22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47) | |
A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community. |
22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42) | |
A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society |
22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40) | |
A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible. |
22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state. |
22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41) | |
A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property. |
23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. | |
From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community. |