Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Causation' and 'Letters to Wolff'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It is the same to look for perfection in an essence and in the properties that flow from an essence.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Wolff [1715], 1715.05.18)
     A reaction: It is helpful to have Leibniz spelling out his commitment to the traditional view of essence, as that from which the more evident properties flow.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
     Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
     A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
     Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
     From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
     A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
     Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
     A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.