Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'Knowledge'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
14713 Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
     Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent.
     From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics
     A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
14712 A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
     Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
     From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
     A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
19724 Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, (iii) obtained by a reliable process.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Knowledge [1929]), quoted by Juan Comesaņa - Reliabilism 2
     A reaction: Remarkable to be addressing the Gettier problem at that date, but Russell had flirted with the problem. Ramsey says the production of the belief must be reliable, rather than the justification for the belief. Note that he wants certainty.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
     Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
     From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
     A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?