40 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The incremental progress which I envisage for philosophy lacks the drama after which some philosophers still hanker, and that hankering is itself a symptom of the intellectual immaturity that helps hold philosophy back. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: This could stand as a motto for the whole current profession of analytical philosophy. It means that if anyone attempts to be dramatic they can make their own way out. They'll find Kripke out there, smoking behind the dustbins. |
501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Even if talk of truth as correspondence to the facts is metaphorical, it is a bad metaphor for analytic truth in a way that it is not for synthetic truth. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A very simple and rather powerful point. Maybe the word 'truth' should be withheld from such cases. You might say that accepted analytic truths are 'conventional'. If that is wrong, then they correspond to natural facts at a high level of abstraction. |
21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1 | |
A reaction: I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo. |
21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Husserl maintained that because most logicians have not studied the connection between logic and the world, logic did not achieve its status of purity. Even more, their logic implicitly presupposed a world. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1 | |
A reaction: The point here is that the bracketing of phenomenology, to reach an understanding with no presuppositions, is impossible if you don't realise what your are presupposing. I think the logic/world relationship is badly neglected, thanks to Frege. |
21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the science of the relations between any object whatever (relation of whole to part, relation of equality, property, unity etc.). In this sense, pure mathematics is seen by Husserl as formal ontology. | |
From: report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.2 | |
A reaction: I would expect most modern analytic philosophers to agree with this. Modern mathematics (e.g. category theory) seems to have moved beyond this stage, but I still like this idea. |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The debate between realism and anti-realism has become notorious in the rest of philosophy for its obscurity, convolution, and lack of progress. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
A reaction: I find this reassuring, because fairly early on I decided that this problem was not of great interest, and quietly tiptoed away. I take the central issue to be whether nature has 'joints', to which the answer appears to be 'yes'. End of story. |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as a mountain it would be a vague object, but it is logically impossible for an object to be vague, so there is no such thing as a mountain. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I don't take this to be a daft view. No one is denying the existence of the solid rock that is involved, but allowing such a vague object may be a slippery slope to the acceptance of almost anything as an 'object'. |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
A reaction: Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic. |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The epistemology of metaphysical modality requires no dedicated faculty of intuition. It is simply a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking, a kind of thinking tightly integrated with our thinking about the spatio-temporal world. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be spot-on, though it puts the focus increasingly on the faculty of imagination, as arguably an even more extraordinary feature of brains than the much-vaunted normal consciousness. |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
Full Idea: The psychological mechanism that Williamson proposes as the supposedly reliable source of our knowledge of necessities only seems applicable to counterfactuals that are distinctively causal, not metaphysical, in character. | |
From: comment on Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 5 | |
A reaction: My rough impression of Williamson's account is that it is correct but unilluminating. We have to assess necessities by counterfactual thinking, because nothing else is available (apart from evaluating the coherence of the findings). |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The epistemology of modality often focuses on (and pours scorn on) imagination or conceivability as a test of possibility, while ignoring the role of the imagination in the assessment of mundane counterfactuals. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Good point. I've been guilty of this easy scorn myself. Williamson gives our modal capacities an evolutionary context. What is needed is well-informed imagination, rather than wild fantasy. |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
Full Idea: There is extensive 'armchair knowledge' in which experience plays no strictly evidential role, but it may not fit the stereotype of the a priori, because the contribution of experience was more than enabling, such as armchair truths about our environment. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: Once this point is conceded we have no idea where to draw the line. Does 'if it is red it can't be green' derive from experience? I think it might. |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Crude rationalists postulate a special knowledge-generating faculty of rational intuition. Crude empiricists regard intuition as an obscurantist term of folk psychology. Linguistic/conceptual philosophy says it reveals linguistic or conceptual competence. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kripke seems to think that it is the basis of logical competence. I would use it as a blank term for any insight in which we have considerable confidence, and yet are unable to articulate its basis; roughly, for rational thought that evades logic. |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
Full Idea: 'Intuition' plays a major role in contemporary analytic philosophy's self-understanding. ...When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they appeal to intuitions. ...Thus intuitions are presented as our evidence in philosophy. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], p.214-5), quoted by Herman Cappelen - Philosophy without Intuitions 01.1 | |
A reaction: Williamson says we must investigate this 'scandal', but Cappelen's book says analytic philosophy does not rely on intuition. |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Someone who acquires the word 'gob' just by being reliably told that it is synonymous with 'mouth' knows what 'gob' means without being fully competent to use it. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 4.7) | |
A reaction: Not exactly an argument against meaning-as-use, but a very nice cautionary example to show that 'knowing the meaning' of a word may be a rather limited, and dangerous, achievement. |
514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Given empirical evidence for the approximate intertranslatability of all human languages, and a universal innate basis of human cognition, we may wonder how 'other' any human culture really is. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 8.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a fairly accurate account of the situation. In recent centuries people seem to have been over-impressed by superficial differences in cultural behaviour, but we increasingly see the underlying identity. |
1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |