8 ideas
12695 | Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber] |
Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible. | |
From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1) | |
A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad. |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
Full Idea: How likely is a fair die landing on an even number to land six? My approach is, assume an even number, so three possibilities, one a six, so 'one third'; the truth-functional approach is it's true if it is not-even or six, so 'two-thirds'. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 3) | |
A reaction: The point is that in the truth-functional approach, if the die lands not-even, then the conditional comes out as true, when she says it should be irrelevant. She seems to be right about this. |
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
Full Idea: The mistake philosophers have made, in trying to understand the conditional, is to assume that its function is to make a statement about how the world is (or how other possible worlds are related to it), true or false, as the case may be. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: 'If pigs could fly we would never catch them' may not be about the world, but 'if you press this switch the light comes on' seems to be. Actually even the first one is about the world. I've an inkling that Edgington is wrong about this. Powers! |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
Full Idea: A conditional does not have truth conditions. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1) |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
Full Idea: X believes that if A, B, to the extent that he judges that A & B is nearly as likely as A, or (roughly equivalently) to the extent that he judges A & B to be more likely than A & ¬B. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 5) | |
A reaction: This is a formal statement of her theory of conditionals. |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
Full Idea: It is often necessary to suppose (or assume) that some epistemic possibility is true, and to consider what else would be the case, or would be likely to be the case, given this supposition. The conditional expresses the outcome of such thought processes. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: This is the basic Edgington view. It seems to involve an active thought process, and imagination, rather than being the static semantic relations offered by possible worlds analyses. True conditionals state relationships in the world. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
12705 | Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber] |
Full Idea: In Epicurean atomism (of Cordemoy, for example) there is a world of basic things distinguished by virtue of their extreme hardness. | |
From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 2) | |
A reaction: Garber says that Leibniz espouses 'substantial atomism', which is different from this. Leibniz's atoms have active power, where these atoms just embody total resistance. |