Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'The Nature of Universals and Propositions' and 'Personal Identity and Memory'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

8511	Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
	Full Idea: In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify.
	From: report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1
	A reaction: Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence?

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self

1389	If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4)
	A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma.

1390	Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
	Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible?

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

19216	Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
	Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
	From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
	A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?