7 ideas
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284) | |
A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps). |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally. | |
From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79) | |
A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations. |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |
A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |
8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |
Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth. | |
From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82) | |
A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity. |