10 ideas
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons. |
| 411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
| Full Idea: No man has seen certain truth, and no man will ever know about the gods and other things I mentioned; for if he succeeds in saying what is fully true, he himself is unaware of it; opinion is fixed by fate on all things. | |
| From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B34), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.49.4 |
| 412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
| Full Idea: If God had not created yellow honey, men would say that figs were sweeter. | |
| From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B38), quoted by Herodian - On Peculiar Speech 41.5 |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80) | |
| A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism. |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
| A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
| 1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
| Full Idea: The Eleatic tribe, which had its beginnings from Xenophanes and still earlier, proceed on the grounds that all things so-called are one. | |
| From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - The Sophist 242d |
| 3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Xenophanes taught that the essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man. | |
| From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2.3 |
| 408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
| Full Idea: Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black hair, Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair. | |
| From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B16), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 7.22.1 |
| 407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |
| Full Idea: Mortals believe the gods to be created by birth, and to have raiment, voice and body like mortals'. | |
| From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B14), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.109.2 |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78) | |
| A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument. |