51 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Until the rise of what we call the scientific method in the seventeenth century, logic was regarded largely as one aspect of rhetoric - a study of how one person't argument could convince another. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This may well give the main reason why the Greeks invented logic in the first place. Aristotle wrote a book on rhetoric, and that was where the money was. Leibniz is clearly a key figure in the change of attitude. |
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The incremental progress which I envisage for philosophy lacks the drama after which some philosophers still hanker, and that hankering is itself a symptom of the intellectual immaturity that helps hold philosophy back. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: This could stand as a motto for the whole current profession of analytical philosophy. It means that if anyone attempts to be dramatic they can make their own way out. They'll find Kripke out there, smoking behind the dustbins. |
12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: No metaphysical account which renders it impossible to give a plausible epistemological theory is to be countenanced. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.1) | |
A reaction: It is hard to object to this principle, though we certainly don't want to go verificationist, and thus rule out speculations about metaphysics which are beyond any possible knowledge. Some have tried to prove that something must exist (e.g. Jacquette). |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Even if talk of truth as correspondence to the facts is metaphorical, it is a bad metaphor for analytic truth in a way that it is not for synthetic truth. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A very simple and rather powerful point. Maybe the word 'truth' should be withheld from such cases. You might say that accepted analytic truths are 'conventional'. If that is wrong, then they correspond to natural facts at a high level of abstraction. |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Most people find it hard to find any conclusion that fits the following premises: 'No councillors are bankers', and 'All bankers are athletes'. There is a valid conclusion ('Some athletes are not councillors') but it takes quite an effort to find it. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that syllogistic logic is by no means automatic and straightforward. There is a mechanical procedure, but a lot of intuition and common sense is also needed. |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Where Aristotle had 19 different inference rules (his valid syllogisms), modern propositional logic carries out deductions using just one rule of inference: modus ponens. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: At first glance it sounds as if Aristotle's guidelines might be more useful than the modern one, since he tells you something definite and what implies what, where modus ponens just seems to define the word 'implies'. |
12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: We use the symbol 'ι' (Greek 'iota') to form definite descriptions, reading (ιx)F(x) as 'the x which is such that F(x)', or simply as 'the F'. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Compare the lambda operator in modal logic, which picks out predicates from similar formulae. |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Since predicate logic merely extends propositional logic, all the axioms of propositional logic are axioms of predicate logic. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: See Idea 7798 for the axioms. |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
Full Idea: In many respects, situation theory is an extension of classical logic that takes account of context. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: John Barwise is cited as the parent of this movement. Many examples show that logical form is very hard to pin down, because word-meaning depends on context (e.g. 'several crumbs' differs from 'several mountains'). |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Montague's intensional logic was the first really successful attempt to develop a mathematical framework that incorporates the notion of meaning. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Previous logics, led by Tarski, had flourished by sharply dividing meaning from syntax, and concentrating on the latter. |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The period from 1900 to about 1960 could be described as the golden age of 'pure' logic, and 1950 to 1985 the golden age of 'applied' logic (e.g. applied to everyday reasoning, and to theories of language). | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: Why do we always find that we have just missed the Golden Age? However this supports the uneasy feeling that the golden age for all advances in human knowledge is just coming to an end. Biology, including the brain, is the last frontier. |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
Full Idea: Implication involves some form of link or causality between the antecedent and the consequent of an if-then; normally it says that the conclusion is a consequence of the premise (where conditionals are just defined by 'true' and 'false'). | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This distinction is a key one when discussing 'If-then' sentences. Some are merely formal conditionals, but others make real claims about where you can get to from where you are. |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
Full Idea: "Safety goggles must be worn in the building" is clear enough, but "dogs must always be carried on the escalator" doesn't require us to head off in search of a dog. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of how the requirements of logical form will often take us beyond the strict and literal meaning of a sentence, into context, tone, allusion and subjective aspects. |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The typical semantic account of validity for propositional connectives like 'and' presupposes that meaning is given by truth-tables. On the natural deduction view, the meaning of 'and' is given by its introduction and elimination rules. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.4) |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The arrow paradox starts with the assumption that space and time are atomic; the tortoise starts with the opposite assumption that space and time are infinitely divisible. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Aquinas similarly covers all options (the cosmos has a beginning, or no beginning). The nature of movement in a space which involves quantum leaps remains metaphysically puzzling. Where is a particle at half of the Planck time? |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The debate between realism and anti-realism has become notorious in the rest of philosophy for its obscurity, convolution, and lack of progress. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
A reaction: I find this reassuring, because fairly early on I decided that this problem was not of great interest, and quietly tiptoed away. I take the central issue to be whether nature has 'joints', to which the answer appears to be 'yes'. End of story. |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as a mountain it would be a vague object, but it is logically impossible for an object to be vague, so there is no such thing as a mountain. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I don't take this to be a daft view. No one is denying the existence of the solid rock that is involved, but allowing such a vague object may be a slippery slope to the acceptance of almost anything as an 'object'. |
12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: It is very plausible that the sorites paradoxes arose from the application of a semantic apparatus appropriate only for sharp predicates to languages containing vague predicates (rather than from deficiency of meaning, or from incoherence). | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.3) | |
A reaction: Sounds wrong. Of course, logic has been designed for sharp predicates, and natural languages are awash with vagueness. But the problems of vagueness bothered lawyers long before logicians like Russell began to worry about it. |
12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: For each instance of identity or failure of identity, there must be facts in virtue of which that instance obtains. ..Enough has been said to lend this doctrine some plausibility. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.5) | |
A reaction: Penelope Mackie picks this out from Forbes as a key principle. It sounds to be in danger of circularity, unless the 'facts' can be cited without referring to, or implicitly making use of, identities - which seems unlikely. |
12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: If we imagine a possible world in which two clocks in a room make one clock from half the parts of each, the judgement 'these two actual clocks could have been a single clock' does not seem wholly false. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.4) | |
A reaction: You would, of course, have sufficient parts left over to make a second clock, so they look like a destroyed clock, so I don't think I find Forbes's intuition on this one very persuasive. |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
A reaction: Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic. |
11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Forbes argues that, unless we posit individual essences, we cannot guarantee that identities across possible worlds will be appropriately grounded in other properties. | |
From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.4 | |
A reaction: There is a confrontation between Wiggins, who says identity is primitive, and Forbes, who says identity must be grounded in other properties. I think I side with Forbes. |
12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: An individual essence of an object x is a set of properties I which satisfies the following conditions: i. every property P in I is an essential property of x; ii. it is not possible that some object y distinct from x has every member of I. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I am coming to the view that stable natural kinds (like electrons or gold) do not have individual essences, but complex kinds (like tigers or tables) do. The view is based on the idea that explanatory power is what individuates an essence. |
12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: A non-trivial individual essence is properties other than a) those following from a de dicto truth, b) properties of existence and self-identity (or their cognates), c) properties derived from necessities in some other category. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed Forbes] Rather than adding all these qualificational clauses to our concept, we could just tighten up on the notion of a property, saying it is something which is causally efficacious, and hence explanatory. |
12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The essential properties of a thing will typically depend upon what category of thing it is, and perhaps also on some more particular facts about the thing itself. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I see no way of dispensing with the second requirement, in the cases of complex entities like animals. If all samples are the same, then of course we can define a sample's essence through its kind, but not if samples differ in any way. |
12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: An essential property of an object x is a property without possessing which x could not exist. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: This is certainly open to question. See Joan Kung's account of Aristotle on essence. I am necessarily more than eight years old (now), and couldn't exist without that property, but is the property part of my essence? |
12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Artefacts can be ascribed fuzzy essences. ...We might say that it is essential to an artefact to have 'most' of its parts. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.6) | |
A reaction: I think I prefer to accept the idea that essences are unstable things, in all cases. For all we know, electrons might subtly change their general character, or cease to be uniform, tomorrow. Essences explain, and what needs explaining changes. |
12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity of artefacts at a world, since the very same parts may turn up at different times as the parts of artefacts with different designs and functions. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.2) | |
A reaction: Thus the Ship of Theseus could be dismantled and turned into a barn (as happened with the 'Mayflower'). They could then be reconstituted as the ship, which would then have two beginnings (as Chris Hughes has pointed out). |
12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: In the time of a single world, the same individual can undergo a change of sex, but it is less clear that an individual of one sex could have been, from the outset, an individual of another. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.5) | |
A reaction: I don't find this support for essentiality of origin very persuasive. I struggle with these ideas. Given my sex yesterday, then presumably I couldn't have had a different sex yesterday. Given that pigs can fly, pigs can fly. What am I missing? |
11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Forbes has two principles of identity, which we can call the No Bare Identities Principle (identities hold in virtue of other facts), and the No Extrinsic Determination Principle (that only intrinsic facts of a thing establish identity). | |
From: report of Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 127-8) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 2.7 | |
A reaction: The job of the philosopher is to prise apart the real identities of things from the way in which we conceive of identities. I take these principles to apply to real identities, not conceptual identities. |
12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The difference between de re and de dicto formulae is a difference between formulae which are, and formulae which are not, sensitive to the identities of objects at various worlds. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.1) |
12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: De re necessity does not differ from de dicto necessity in respect of how it arises: it is still a form of conceptual necessity. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4) | |
A reaction: [Forbes proceeds to argue for this claim] Forbes defends a form of essentialism, but takes the necessity to arise from a posteriori truths because of the a priori involvement of other concepts (rather as Kripke argues). |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The epistemology of metaphysical modality requires no dedicated faculty of intuition. It is simply a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking, a kind of thinking tightly integrated with our thinking about the spatio-temporal world. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be spot-on, though it puts the focus increasingly on the faculty of imagination, as arguably an even more extraordinary feature of brains than the much-vaunted normal consciousness. |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
Full Idea: The psychological mechanism that Williamson proposes as the supposedly reliable source of our knowledge of necessities only seems applicable to counterfactuals that are distinctively causal, not metaphysical, in character. | |
From: comment on Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 5 | |
A reaction: My rough impression of Williamson's account is that it is correct but unilluminating. We have to assess necessities by counterfactual thinking, because nothing else is available (apart from evaluating the coherence of the findings). |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
Full Idea: The epistemology of modality often focuses on (and pours scorn on) imagination or conceivability as a test of possibility, while ignoring the role of the imagination in the assessment of mundane counterfactuals. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Good point. I've been guilty of this easy scorn myself. Williamson gives our modal capacities an evolutionary context. What is needed is well-informed imagination, rather than wild fantasy. |
12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: There is no means by which we might distinguish a possible world from what is true at it. ...Whereas our ability to separate a place, or a time, from its occupier is crucial to realism about places and times, as is a distance relation. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: He is objecting to Lewis's modal realism. I'm not fully convinced. It depends whether we are discussing real ontology or conceptual space. In the latter I see no difference between times and possible worlds. In ontology, a 'time' is weird. |
12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The main objection to realism about worlds is from epistemology. Knowledge of properties of objects requires experience of these objects, which must be within the range of our sensory faculties, but only concrete actual objects achieve that. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my dislike of the whole possible worlds framework, ontologically speaking. I seem to be an actualist. I take possibilities to be inferences to the best explanation from the powers we know of in the actual world. We experience potentiality. |
12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Someone impressed by the parallel between tense and modal operators ...might suggest that just as we can speak of places and times forming their own manifolds or spaces, so we can say that worlds are the points of logical space. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I particularly like the notion of worlds being "points of logical space", and am inclined to remove it from this context and embrace it as the correct way to understand possible worlds. We must understand logical or conceptual space. |
12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: An elucidation of transworld identity can be regarded as an elucidation of the boundaries of possibility for ordinary things. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I presume that if we don't search for some such criterion, we just have to face the possibility that Aristotle could have been a poached egg in some possible world. To know the bounds of possibility, study the powers of actual objects. |
12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The motivation for investigating individual essences should be obvious, since if every object has such an essence, the problem of elucidating transworld identity can be solved. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 5.1) | |
A reaction: It is important that, if necessary, the identities be 'individual', and not just generic, by sortal, or natural kind. We want to reason about (and explain) truths at the fine-grained level of the individual, not just at the broad level of generalisation. |
12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The outstanding technical objection to counterpart-theoretic semantics concerns its handling of the logic of identity. In quantified S5 (the orthodox semantics) a = b → □(a = b) is valid, but 'a' must not attach to two objects. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 3.5) |
12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness, as opposed to the sort of essentialism that gives non-trivial conditions sufficient for transworld identity. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 6.6) | |
A reaction: 'Haecceitism' is the doctrine that things have primitive identity. A 'haecceity' is a postulated property which actually does the job. The key point of the view is that whatever it is is 'primitive', and not complex, or analysable. I don't believe it. |
12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: The natural response to an unreasonable hypothesis of possibility for an object x, that in such a state of affairs it would not be x which satisfies the conditions, is evidence that we do possess concepts of thisness for individuals. | |
From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4) | |
A reaction: We may have a 'concept' of thisness, but we needn't be committed to the 'existence' of a thisness. There is a fairly universal intuition that cessation of existence of an entity when it starts to change can be a very vague matter. |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
Full Idea: There is extensive 'armchair knowledge' in which experience plays no strictly evidential role, but it may not fit the stereotype of the a priori, because the contribution of experience was more than enabling, such as armchair truths about our environment. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: Once this point is conceded we have no idea where to draw the line. Does 'if it is red it can't be green' derive from experience? I think it might. |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Crude rationalists postulate a special knowledge-generating faculty of rational intuition. Crude empiricists regard intuition as an obscurantist term of folk psychology. Linguistic/conceptual philosophy says it reveals linguistic or conceptual competence. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: Kripke seems to think that it is the basis of logical competence. I would use it as a blank term for any insight in which we have considerable confidence, and yet are unable to articulate its basis; roughly, for rational thought that evades logic. |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
Full Idea: 'Intuition' plays a major role in contemporary analytic philosophy's self-understanding. ...When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they appeal to intuitions. ...Thus intuitions are presented as our evidence in philosophy. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], p.214-5), quoted by Herman Cappelen - Philosophy without Intuitions 01.1 | |
A reaction: Williamson says we must investigate this 'scandal', but Cappelen's book says analytic philosophy does not rely on intuition. |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The Hopi time myth does not appear to have been stopped for a moment by the fact that Whorf himself subsequently wrote that the Hopi language does indeed have words for past, present, and future | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Arguments for relativism based on the Hopi seem now to be thoroughly discredited. Sensible people never believed them in the first place. |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Someone who acquires the word 'gob' just by being reliably told that it is synonymous with 'mouth' knows what 'gob' means without being fully competent to use it. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 4.7) | |
A reaction: Not exactly an argument against meaning-as-use, but a very nice cautionary example to show that 'knowing the meaning' of a word may be a rather limited, and dangerous, achievement. |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
Full Idea: How do people identify subject and verb in the sentences "time flies like an arrow" and "fruit flies like an apple"? | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that even if we have an innate syntax mechanism, it won't work without some semantics, and some experience of the environmental context of utterances. |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
Full Idea: The distinction between sentences and the abstract propositions that they express is one of the key ideas of logic. A logical argument consists of propositions, assembled together in a systematic fashion. | |
From: Keith Devlin (Goodbye Descartes [1997], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: He may claim that arguments consist of abstract propositions, but they always get expressed in sentences. However, the whole idea of logical form implies the existence of propositions - there is something which a messy sentence 'really' says. |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
Full Idea: Given empirical evidence for the approximate intertranslatability of all human languages, and a universal innate basis of human cognition, we may wonder how 'other' any human culture really is. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 8.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a fairly accurate account of the situation. In recent centuries people seem to have been over-impressed by superficial differences in cultural behaviour, but we increasingly see the underlying identity. |