6 ideas
23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
Full Idea: If we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say that it is by free choice that he acts irrationally. | |
From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], p.511), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 7.4 | |
A reaction: A very nice riposte. Clearly people can rationally choose to act irrationally, e.g. at a wild party. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume). | |
From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000]) | |
A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction. |
23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Sidgwick said self-interest is not self-evidently rational. Unless we invoke a religious idea of the soul, human personality is no more than a succession of continuities in memory and behaviour. In that case, why should anyone favour their future self? | |
From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 2 | |
A reaction: This sounds like Locke's account of the self, as psychological continuity. We can say that our continuous self is a fiction, the hero of our own narrative. Personally I think of the self as a sustained set of brains structures which change very little. |
4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
Full Idea: It is a self-evident principle that the good of one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the Universe, than the good of any other, ..and as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part. | |
From: Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874], III.XIII.3) | |
A reaction: Showing that even a very empirical theory like utilitarianism has an a priori basis. Of course, the principle is false. What about animals, the senile, criminals, androids? What bestows 'importance'? |
20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Sidgwick's complex version of utilitarianism urges that institutions should be set in place to maximise utility, but that individual actions people undertake might not appear to be justifiable on utilitarian terms. | |
From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 1 Refs | |
A reaction: This seems to be a specifically political version of utilitarianism, but isn't cited much by political philosophers who discuss utilitarianism. |