43 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: In a 'teepee' argument, a number of argumentative planks intersupport each other. No plank is sufficiently strong to establish the position, but each lends credibility to the others because there is the appearance of a unified phenomenon. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.5) | |
A reaction: To attack it, they say, you have to identify the separate planks of the argument. It is a moot point whether the teepee might be so imprecise that it is better described as 'coherence'. There is a background support, as well as the planks. |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Proprioception is not focused single-mindedly on the self, but is focused on a number of objects - the component bodily parts that belong to the self. There is no obvious need for a concept of the self, or of indexicality. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 07.2) |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Imagine a being that learns everything about itself by watching itself in mirrors, rather than by proprioception and introspection. Surely it can get wet in a storm, even though allegedly distinctive routes of self-knowledge are not available to it? | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 09.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: The guarantee of immunity from error in prioprioception is only as strong as the guarantee that proprioception only ever represents the proprioceiving agent. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 07.1) | |
A reaction: This is part of an interesting and sustained attack on the idea that self-knowledge is immune from error. They are thinking of science-fictiony situations where I am wired up to experience your leg movement. My experiences usually track me, that's all. |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: According to Folk Functionalism, mental states are theoretically defined by Ramsifying on our folk-psychological theory. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 06.2) |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Because our perceptual states typically represent the world as seen from a perspective, it is sometimes thought that some distinctively indexical kind of content is needed to characterise those states. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.4) | |
A reaction: They are summarising this view precisely so that they can oppose it, and I think they are right. |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Fundamentally, all information is objective information. ...[176] What we want is fully portable information, and information that co-ordinates on the world, rather than on us, is best suited for the task. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely with their thesis. We just pick up information about ourselves, such as who and where we are, which is just like equivalent information about other people. It is isn't a special type of information. |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: When you recall the look of the inside of your house ....where things are relative to one another is what persists in memory, not where they were relative to you when seen. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very telling example, though you could postulate some system which converts perspectival input into objective information. But why bother? We seek objective information, not perspectives. |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Our view on the world is not primarily a view from a perspective. Our beliefs and desires are not organized around us. They are instead organized around the world itself. Our view is a view from everywhere. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) | |
A reaction: Slipping in the claim that our desires are also organised around the world is not quite as persuasive as the claim about beliefs. If you want to draw a freehand straight line, focus on the far end of it. The world will guide your hand. |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: There are no interesting or distinctive explanatory connections between indexicality and agency. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.8) |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: It is bad news if some of our contents are essentially tied to particular contexts. ...If information needs to be assessed relative to some ur-context, later recipients won't know what to do with it. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: There is little agreement among Fregeans about what senses are. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 04.5) | |
A reaction: I don't take this to be sufficient grounds for dismissing Fregean senses. When we look into the workings of the linguistic mind, there seems little prospect of clarity or agreement. |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained. They fail to distinguish between logical or mathematical truths, ..between metaphysical equivalences, ..between coreferentials, ..and between indexicals and non-indexicals. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 05.5) | |
A reaction: [A nice summary, very compressed] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Once the non-constant characters of expressions has been characterised, there is no further need for additional devices like 'first-person concepts' or 'demonstrative concepts'. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be a wonderfully liberating attack on this issue. There is a kind of creepy mysticism that has been allowed to accrue around indexicals, and it's nonsense. |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Fregeans tend to treat as a fundamental tenet that sense determines reference; same sense, same reference. From that it follow trivially that indexicals don't have the same sense: different uses of 'I' have different referents, so sense must differ. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 04.6) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Since it seems implausible that 'I' is profoundly different when two people use it, this seems to be a strong argument against Frege's distinction. But I rather like Frege's distinction, while being sceptical about 'I', so I'm baffled.... |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Whatever can be expressed indexically could be expressed by non-indexical means. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 08.1) | |
A reaction: This is the best summary of the thesis of their book. Indexicality in non-essential. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: In what we label 'Basic Kaplanianism', each of the sentences 'Smith is happy' and 'I am happy', as uttered by Smith, has two levels of meaning. The 'content' is a truth-conditional representation. The 'character' is a function from contexts to contents. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.6) | |
A reaction: They give this as a minimal and plausible account of the situation, without reading huge significance into the indexical. I'm inclined to see the situation in terms of the underlying proposition containing both ingredients. |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: An enormous amount has been written about whether 'all', 'know', 'might', 'delicious', 'good', 'if, then', 'and', 'red', 'just', 'justified', 'probable', 'local', 'ready', and 'left-right' are context-sensitive. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 02.3) | |
A reaction: The clearest way to approach these things is ask what the (informal) domain of quantification is for that particular context. The domain can shift in the course of a sentence. |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Maybe there is a class of beliefs that plays a special role in the explanation of action. We have argued against the existence of such a class (or at least any interesting such class). | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 06.2) | |
A reaction: The main class which has been proposed is the one that involves indexical beliefs. I agree with this idea. |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
Full Idea: The common legal practice is to distinguish three broad categories of excuse: duress, epistemic limitation, and diminished responsibility. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: McMahan cites these with reference to soldiers in wartime, but they have general application. The third one seems particularly open to very wide interpretation. Presumably I can't be excused by just being irresponsible. |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There are two types of right. A Liberty right is merely a permission, meaning it is not wrong to do it. But a Claim right is a right against intervention, meaning no one has a liberty right to prevent it. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There must also be a third type of right, which requires other people to perform actions on your behalf. If you pay for a book in a shop, you must then be given the book. |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
Full Idea: The most serious reason why a war might be unjustified is that it lacks any justifying aim at all. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: It seems that Louis XIV invaded the Netherlands in around 1674 purely to enhance his own glory. That strikes me as worse. I supposed Ghenghis Khan invaded places simply because he enjoyed fighting. |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is false that by posing a threat to another, one necessarily makes oneself liable to defensive action. A police officer who shoots an active murderer does not thereby by make herself liable to defensive action. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is one of his arguments against the moral equality of combatants. It is not morally OK to shoot all the local soldiers when you unjustly invade a territory. Sounds right to me. |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is a necessary condition of liability to defensive attack that one be morally responsible for posing an objectively unjustified threat. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: This implies that one may not actually be doing the threatening (but merely ordering it, or enabling it). McMahan aims to have the same criteria for wartime as for peacetime. He denies Anscombe's claim that merely posing the threat is enough. |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
Full Idea: In mainstream just war theory (Anscombe, Nagel, Walzer) the criterion of liability to attack is simply posing a threat. Since all combatants pose a threat to each other, they are morally liable to attack; because noncombatants do not, they are not liable. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: McMahan says that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets rests mostly on this basis. The problem is that a huge range of unarmed people can also pose various degrees of threat. |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Wars can be unjust despite having a just cause, because they are not actually needed, or they will cause excessive harm, or they also pursue some unjust causes. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The point is that older writers often think that a 'just cause' is sufficient. He is obviously right. |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is possible for a defensive war to be unjust, when the defensive war to which it is a response is a just war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.3) | |
A reaction: An example might be a state resisting an intervention from outside, when the state is in the process of exterminating some unwanted minority. Or perhaps the invaders are crossing the state's territory to achieve some admirable end. |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is simply no satisfactory understanding of proportionality in war that can be applied independently of whether the acts that are evaluated support a just or an unjust cause. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He rejects traditional just war theory, which sees both sides as morally equal in combat, and hence equally subject to the principles of proportional response. But the just can then be harsher, when their just principles should make them milder. |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is a paradox if the unjust are justified in fighting the just in order to protect their own civilians who have been endangered by the starting of an unjust war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [my summary of MacMahan pp.48-49] It suggests that in a war there may be local concepts of justice which are at odds with the general situation - which is the ad bellum/in bello distinction. But this is the justice of fighting, not how it is conducted. |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
Full Idea: We must stop reassuring soldiers that they act permissibly when they fight in an unjust war, provided that they conduct themselve honorably on the battlefield by fighting in accordance with the rules of engagement. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.8) | |
A reaction: This culminates McMahan's arguments against the moral equality of combatants, and against the sharp division of justice of war from justice in war. How rare it is for philosophy to culminate in a policy recommendation! |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Unlike domestic criminal law, the law of war is designed not to protect moral rights but to prevent harm. …This means when unjust combatants attack just combatants they violate their moral rights, yet they act within their legal rights. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.1) | |
A reaction: He says we must bring the law of war much closer to the morality of war. If there is any hope of slowly eliminating war, it may lie in reforms such as these. |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: If most unjust combatants are morally innocent because they are excused, and if it is wrong to intentionally kill morally innocent people, then a contingent form of pacificism may be inescapable. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: A very nice argument against the moral equality of combatants. If I think we are the good guys, and the opposing troops are no morally different from us, how can I possibly kill them? |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It would be naïve to doubt that the widespread acceptance of the moral equality of combatants has facilitated the ability of governments to fight unjust wars. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The point is that their armies are both compliant and seeing their actions as guiltless, which makes them perfect tools for evil. McMahan's ideal is an army which asks sharp questions about the justification of the war, before they fight it. |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how just combatants could become legitimate targets simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks by unjust coombatants. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: It is, however, hard to criticise a soldier who is dragged into fighting for an unjust cause, and then kills just defenders in the course of the fight. Once the bullets fly, normal morality seems to be suspended. Just survive. |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
Full Idea: When soldiers go to war, they undoubtedly assume a certain risk. They voluntarily expose themselves to a significant risk of being attacked. But this is entirely different from consenting to being attacked. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is his response to Walzer's thought that soldiers resemble people who volunteer for a boxing match. The sailors at Pearl Harbour obviously didn't consent to the attack, or accept the Japanese right to kill them. |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
Full Idea: When soldiers are commanded to fight, they cannot reasonably be expected to have the factual knowledge necessary to evaluate the war as just or unjust. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is part of the 'epistemic' justification for a soldier to fight in an unjust war. Sometimes soldiers do have enoough knowledge, especially if they join up late on in a war, when they have studied and observed its progress. |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: If acting as an agent of a political collective justifies the combatants fighting an unjust war, that should also release the leaders from responsibility for their role in the fighting of that war. No one ever explains why this is not so. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.5) | |
A reaction: At the very least there seems to be a problem of the cut off point between innocent soldiers and culpable leaders. Which rank in the army or executive triggers the blame? |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is a certain symmetry here. The permissibility of disobeying a command to fight in an unjust war suggests the permissibility of disobeying a command not to fight in a just war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.7) | |
A reaction: The argument considered here is that since we could never allow soldiers to choose to fight in their own wars, we similarly cannot let them opt out of the official wars. Implying obedience is absolute. Soldiers don't get to 'choose' anything! |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Moral equality means either 1) because just combatants are permitted to fight in a just way, so are the unjust , or 2) because the just are justified, so are the unjust, or 3) because the just are justified, the unjust are therefore permitted. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: [summary] McMahan calls 1) the weak version, and 2) the strong. He suggests that although 3) is unusual, it is what most people believe - that if the good are justified, the bad are permitted to fight back. He rejects them all. |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is said that combatants are compelled to fight; they have no choice. But duress is not a justification; nor does it ground a permission - not even a subjective permission. It is, instead, an excusing condition. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: The 'subjective' permission is believing you are just, even if you aren't. A nice, accurate and true distinction made by McMahan, I think. It is roughly our postwar attitude to the Nazi army. |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
Full Idea: My alternative conception is that one is 'innocent' if one is neither morally responsible for nor guilty of a wrong. Classical theory focused on guilt, but I think we should focus on moral responsibility (which is something less). | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to make the supporters of evil equally liable to attack with its perpetrators. But you can observe perpetration a lot more easily than you can observe support. |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Achieving unconditional surrender can never be a justification for the continuation of war, since there are always conditions that a vanquished adversary, no matter how evil, can be justified in demanding. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: McMahan is particularly discussing Hiroshima, but this also applies to the European war in 1945. Presumably a civilised victor will grant the conditions which the losers would have demanded, and that probably happened in 1945. It's about power. |