3 ideas
| 23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
| Full Idea: Reid says we naturally operate counterpart principles of veracity and credulity in our testimonial exchanges. | |
| From: report of Thomas Reid (An Enquiry [1764], 6.24) by Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice 1.3 n11 | |
| A reaction: What you would expect from someone who believed in common sense. Fricker contrasts this with Tyler Burge's greater confidence, and then criticises both (with Reid too cautious and Burge over-confident). She defends a 'low-level' critical awareness. |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
| A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
| 22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
| Full Idea: Rawls has suggested that we should maximise the general happiness only if we do so in a fair way. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical [1958]) by J.J.C. Smart - Outline of a System of Utilitarianism 6 | |
| A reaction: Rawls is usually seen as an opponent of utilitarianism, but if we allow a few supplementary rules we can improve the theory. After all, it has a meta-rule that 'everybody counts as one'. What other supplementary values can there be? Honesty? |