Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Presupposition' and 'Intention'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
19053 Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett]
     Full Idea: A better proposal for a formal logic closer to natural language would be one that had a negation-operator only for (simple) predicates.
     From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27)
     A reaction: Dummett observes that classical formal logic was never intended to be close to natural language. Term logic does have that aim, but the meta-question is whether that end is desirable, and why.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
19052 Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett]
     Full Idea: Natural language does not possess a sentential negation-operator.
     From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27)
     A reaction: This is a criticism of Strawson, who criticises logic for not following natural language, but does it himself with negation. In the question of how language and logic connect, this idea seems important. Term Logic aims to get closer to natural language.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
     Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
     From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
     A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20041 Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
     Full Idea: Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.
     From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds'
     A reaction: This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative.