184 ideas
| 2845 | Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be constantly asking 'what is the use of it?' is unbecoming to those of great soul, and unworthy of free men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1338b01) | |
| A reaction: Love this one! It is not just philosophers who keep hearing this question. Pure mathematics, history, literature, even carpentry if you are not going to be a carpenter. |
| 9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The incremental progress which I envisage for philosophy lacks the drama after which some philosophers still hanker, and that hankering is itself a symptom of the intellectual immaturity that helps hold philosophy back. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This could stand as a motto for the whole current profession of analytical philosophy. It means that if anyone attempts to be dramatic they can make their own way out. They'll find Kripke out there, smoking behind the dustbins. |
| 22521 | Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere is … that a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a18) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle studies things, and aims to reveal their essential natures, so this is part of his method. You still have to grasp the essential natures of the atoms that compose the whole, however. To understand a city, understand people. |
| 1570 | Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a09) | |
| A reaction: This may be a grand claim that we are the only animals that can think rationally, or a more obvious observation that we are the only ones that talk. Aristotle was well aware that logos is a very resonant word. |
| 1574 | Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12) | |
| A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states. |
| 16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Among the inferential virtues commonly cited are mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background beliefs. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hempel, Kuhn, Quine, and Newton-Smith] I take the over-arching term 'coherence' to cover much of this, though a bolder hypothesis offers more than mere coherence. |
| 2801 | Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a30) | |
| A reaction: I claim that the two distinguishing features of humanity are prescience and meta-thought, so I can't really disagree with this. |
| 16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: All pairs of contraries entail a pair of contradictories, since one member of such a pair always entails the negation of the other. P&Q and not-P are contraries, but the first entails P, which is contradictory of not-P. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best') |
| 22529 | Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it. |
| 22571 | 'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36) | |
| A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think. |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Even if talk of truth as correspondence to the facts is metaphorical, it is a bad metaphor for analytic truth in a way that it is not for synthetic truth. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: A very simple and rather powerful point. Maybe the word 'truth' should be withheld from such cases. You might say that accepted analytic truths are 'conventional'. If that is wrong, then they correspond to natural facts at a high level of abstraction. |
| 9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The debate between realism and anti-realism has become notorious in the rest of philosophy for its obscurity, convolution, and lack of progress. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
| A reaction: I find this reassuring, because fairly early on I decided that this problem was not of great interest, and quietly tiptoed away. I take the central issue to be whether nature has 'joints', to which the answer appears to be 'yes'. End of story. |
| 9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes argued that if there is such a thing as a mountain it would be a vague object, but it is logically impossible for an object to be vague, so there is no such thing as a mountain. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: I don't take this to be a daft view. No one is denying the existence of the solid rock that is involved, but allowing such a vague object may be a slippery slope to the acceptance of almost anything as an 'object'. |
| 9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The constraints of common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], After) | |
| A reaction: Wiliamson has described himself (in my hearing) as a 'rottweiller realist', but presumably the problem of vagueness interests a lot of people precisely because it pushes us away from common sense and classical logic. |
| 22525 | The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a hand. For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity (so the hands and feet would no longer be the same). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a20) | |
| A reaction: It may be a mistake to ask which of these is 'prior'. If bricks make a wall, the whole depends on the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. They continue to be possible parts of a wall (unlike severed feet). |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The epistemology of metaphysical modality requires no dedicated faculty of intuition. It is simply a special case of the epistemology of counterfactual thinking, a kind of thinking tightly integrated with our thinking about the spatio-temporal world. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.6) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me to be spot-on, though it puts the focus increasingly on the faculty of imagination, as arguably an even more extraordinary feature of brains than the much-vaunted normal consciousness. |
| 16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The psychological mechanism that Williamson proposes as the supposedly reliable source of our knowledge of necessities only seems applicable to counterfactuals that are distinctively causal, not metaphysical, in character. | |
| From: comment on Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 5 | |
| A reaction: My rough impression of Williamson's account is that it is correct but unilluminating. We have to assess necessities by counterfactual thinking, because nothing else is available (apart from evaluating the coherence of the findings). |
| 9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The epistemology of modality often focuses on (and pours scorn on) imagination or conceivability as a test of possibility, while ignoring the role of the imagination in the assessment of mundane counterfactuals. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: Good point. I've been guilty of this easy scorn myself. Williamson gives our modal capacities an evolutionary context. What is needed is well-informed imagination, rather than wild fantasy. |
| 16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: On the causal model of explanation, understanding is unmysterious and objective; it is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge; knowledge of causes. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
| A reaction: There seems to be some distinction between revealing some causes, and revealing a cause which 'makes the light dawn'. |
| 22587 | Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Reason and understanding are our nature's end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1334b16) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be purpose of philosophy, and we should distinguish understanding from the mere accumulation of knowledge. |
| 9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: There is extensive 'armchair knowledge' in which experience plays no strictly evidential role, but it may not fit the stereotype of the a priori, because the contribution of experience was more than enabling, such as armchair truths about our environment. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: Once this point is conceded we have no idea where to draw the line. Does 'if it is red it can't be green' derive from experience? I think it might. |
| 9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Crude rationalists postulate a special knowledge-generating faculty of rational intuition. Crude empiricists regard intuition as an obscurantist term of folk psychology. Linguistic/conceptual philosophy says it reveals linguistic or conceptual competence. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Kripke seems to think that it is the basis of logical competence. I would use it as a blank term for any insight in which we have considerable confidence, and yet are unable to articulate its basis; roughly, for rational thought that evades logic. |
| 20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: 'Intuition' plays a major role in contemporary analytic philosophy's self-understanding. ...When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they appeal to intuitions. ...Thus intuitions are presented as our evidence in philosophy. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], p.214-5), quoted by Herman Cappelen - Philosophy without Intuitions 01.1 | |
| A reaction: Williamson says we must investigate this 'scandal', but Cappelen's book says analytic philosophy does not rely on intuition. |
| 16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: How can Best Explanation distinguish negative evidence from irrelevant evidence, when the evidence is logically consistent with the hypothesis? | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case') | |
| A reaction: There seems no answer to this other than to assess batches of evidence by their coherence, rather than one at a time. Anomalies can be conclusive, or pure chance. |
| 16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The inferential path to unobservables is often the same as to unobserved observables. In these two sorts of case, the reason for belief can be equally strong, so the suggestion that we infer truth in one case but not the other seems perverse. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
| A reaction: [Van Fraassen 1980 is the target of this] Van F seems to be in the grip of some sort of verificationism, which I always disliked on the grounds that speculation can be highly meaningful. Why embrace something because it 'could' be observed? |
| 16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Inductive inference is a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a plausible fallibilist response to the optimistic view of Aristotle. |
| 16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory considerations are an important guide to inference, …we work out what to infer from our evidence by thinking about what would explain that evidence. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], Pref 2nd ed) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be inferences about the physical world, rather than of pure logic. The thesis sounds a bit thin, since there is no logical sense of 'infer' here, so all it could mean is 'what caused that?'. |
| 16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: We are more impressed by the fact that the special theory of relativity was used to predict the shift in the perihelion of Mercury than we would have been if we knew that the theory was constructed in order to account for that effect. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 10 'The fudging') | |
| A reaction: Lipton has a nice discussion of the relative merits of predicting data and accommodating it. He invites astrologers to predict events, rather than accommodate past ones. |
| 16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Accommodations are often worth less than predictions, because only they have to face the possibility that the best explanation of the fit between the theory and data is that the theoretical system was fudged. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
| A reaction: Lipton illuminatingly explores the discovery by Semmelweiss of the cause of childbed fever. He predicted various explanations, and tested them out in a hospital. It clicks when the prediction occurs. |
| 16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The cost of the hypothetico-deductive method …is that we are left in the dark about the source of the hypotheses themselves. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
| A reaction: How do we distinguish a wild hypothesis from a plausible one? It can only be from patterns in the data, rather than mere accumulations of data. If water causes cholera, or smoking causes cancer, the hypothesis guides the data search. |
| 16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Five attempts to describe induction are 'more of the same', the instantial model, the hypothetico-deductive model, the Bayesian approach …and causal inference. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
| A reaction: This interesting list totally fails to mention the best answer, which is essentialism! If you observe some instances, you only begin to think that there will be more of the same if you think you have discerned the essence. Ravens are black things! |
| 16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: One of the problems of the extrapolation and instantial models of confirmation is that they do not cover vertical inferences, where we infer from what we observe to something at a different level that is often unobservable. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
| A reaction: This is my preferred essentialist view of induction, that we don't just infer that future swans will be white, but also that whiteness is built into the biology of swans. There seems to be predictive induction and explanatory induction. |
| 16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: If an inference is inductive, then by definition it is underdetermined by the evidence and the rules of deduction. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd') |
| 16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing illegitimate about giving arguments for beliefs one already holds. …So inductive justification of induction, while impotent against the skeptic, is legitimate for those who already rely on induction. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity') | |
| A reaction: Not so fast! The first sentence is generally right, but if the 'beliefs one already holds' are beliefs about methods of argument, that is a different case. Compare 'this book is the word of God, because it says so in the book'. Can logic prove logic? |
| 16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: We are considering that there is something in ravens, a gene perhaps, that makes them black, and this cause is part of the essence of ravens. Birds lacking this cause could not interbreed with ravens. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Unsuitable') | |
| A reaction: At last, the essentialist approach to induction! Of course, it is tricky to decide a priori whether there could be albino ravens. It only takes one white (interbreeding) raven to ruin a nice essentialist story. Individuals matter. |
| 16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The reason my shoe is white is not that it lacks some feature essential to ravens that makes them black. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'The Method') | |
| A reaction: Good, but not totally true. If my shoes were made to grow from genes, and then had some raven spliced into them, we might manage it. That is an explanation, but a long way from the best one. Enquiry is explanations, not deductions. |
| 16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory considerations help with the raven paradox since, while the raven hypothesis may provide an explanation for the blackness of a particular raven, neither the original hypothesis nor its contrastive explanation explain why the shoe is white. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
| A reaction: For me, the examination of ravens is a search for the essence of ravenhood, which is why non-ravens don't help. Of course, if you eliminate all culprits except one, you have your culprit, but will your evidence stand up in court? |
| 16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: We cannot transform a non-black non-raven into a raven to see whether we get a simultaneous transformation from non-black to black, in the way we can transform a flame without sodium into a flame with sodium. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
| A reaction: A white shoe would be an example of a non-black non-raven. People mesmerised by the raven paradox are too concerned with investigation being a 'logical' process. Lipton makes a nice point. We need to know the nature of ravens. |
| 16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Without something like a hypothesis about the genes of ravens, we simply do not know what would count as a relevantly similar bird for comparison. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable') | |
| A reaction: Lipton is endorsing the view that explanation should be 'contrastive', as well as aiming to discover the inner nature of ravens. He makes a good case for the contrastive approach. |
| 16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: In English, Bayes's Theorem says that there is a high confirmation when your hypothesis entails an unlikely prediction that turns out to be correct - a very plausible claim. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
| A reaction: Presumably the simple point is that a likely prediction could have been caused by many things, but an unlikely prediction will probably only be caused by that thing. |
| 16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: In p(H|E) = p(E|H)p(H)/p(E), the left side is the 'posterior' probability of H given E, p(E|H) is the 'likelihood' of E given H, and the others are the 'priors' of H and E. Moving from right to left is known as 'conditionalization'. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') |
| 16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory considerations may play an important role in the actual mechanisms by which inquirers 'realize' Bayesian reasoning. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
| A reaction: Lipton's strategy for making peace between IBE and Bayesians. Explanations give likeliness. The background question for Bayesians always seems to be how the initial probabilities are assigned. Pure logic won't do that job. |
| 16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Old evidence seems to provide some confirmation, but Bayesianism does not allow for this, since old evidence will have a prior probability of one, and so have no effect on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') |
| 16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Since the Bayesian account says a hypothesis is confirmed by any of its logical consequences …it seems to inherit the over-permissiveness of the hypothetico-deductive model. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr') | |
| A reaction: This sounds like Hempel's Raven Paradox, where the probability of some logical consequences seems impossible to assess. |
| 16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Explanation is a partial answer to the descriptive problem of induction, …but the justificatory problem is recalcitrant, since it may seem particularly implausible that explanatory considerations should be a reliable guide to truth. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
| A reaction: His claim that explanation is a guide to inference is intended to bridge the gap. One might say that a good explanation has to be true, so just make sure your explanation is 'good', according to a few criteria. |
| 16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: According to the reason model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is to give a reason to believe that the phenomenon occurs. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hempel 1965] Put like that, it doesn't sound very promising. Personally I believe things occur if my wife tells me they do, because I trust her. Lipton says knowing that it occurs is not understanding why it occurs. |
| 16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: On the 'familiarity' model of explanation, unfamiliar phenomena call for explanation, and good explanations somehow make them familiar. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
| A reaction: Lipton notes that his encourages explanation by analogy, but that may not add to understanding. A better version is that an explanation makes a phenomenon less surprising (but that sounds rather relative and subjective). |
| 16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The question about explanation can be put this way: What has to be added to knowledge to yield understanding? | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Underst') | |
| A reaction: In the spirit of Aristotle, I take 'understanding' to be the end of all enquiry, even if it's rather open-ended, relative and vague. Presumably there are lots of true explanations which don't deliver understanding, because baffling ingredients are cited. |
| 16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: One of the points of our obsessive search for explanations is that this is a peculiarly effective way of discovering the structure of the world. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
| A reaction: This remark is a nice corrective to the sceptical view that explanations are entirely subjective, pragmatic, and even conventional. Whether this means that there are 'real' and 'objective' explanations is another matter. |
| 16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: In a 'contrastive' explanation what gets explained is not 'Why this?', but 'Why this rather than that?'. There is a fact and a foil, and one fact may have several foils. Why do leaves turn yellow in November rather than in January? | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
| A reaction: Lipton really likes this, and builds his story around it. Maybe, but it looks to me like an easier step towards a proper explanation. The foils are infinite. Why turn yellow rather than radioactive, insincere, divisible by three, or expensive? |
| 16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The class of possible causes is often too big, …but if we are lucky or clever enough to find or produce a contrast where fact and foil have similar histories, most potential explanations are immediately 'cancelled out', and we have a research programme. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case') | |
| A reaction: He has a nice example of a triumph in 19th century German epidemiology. Once you get a good hypothesis, you can set up comparisons, based on a possible fact and a good foil. Genius is spotting hypothesis and foil. Nice. |
| 16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: According to the 'unification' model of explanation, we come to understand a phenomenon when we see how it fit together with other phenomena into unified whole. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Kitcher 1989] This works quite well for a lot of explanation, but a revolutionary explanation might involve a completely new theory. Lipton says it is rather linguistic, and has no room for a regress of causes, or for singular explanations. |
| 16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Many ordinary explanations include no laws and allow no deduction, yet are not incomplete or mere sketches. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
| A reaction: The simplest sort of explanation simply shows the underlying cause. |
| 16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Deduction models of explanation make it far too easy to explain. You can explain that planets move in an ellipse from the conjunction of the fact that they do, together with any law you please, say a law in economics. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') |
| 16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The hypothetico-deductive model does not account for the negative impact of explanatory failure. We reject hypotheses because they fail to explain contrasts, not because they are logically incompatible with them. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
| A reaction: The general move in modern accounts of investigation is away from an excessive emphasis on logic that used to be favoured. The underpinning of this is that science concerns mechanisms more than equations. |
| 16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: According to the 'necessity' model of explanation, an explanation shows that the phenomenon in question had to occur. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Glymour 1980] Lipton objects that the sort of necessity involved is too uncertain, can't account for the 'why-regress', and doesn't fit everyday explanation, like why we abandoned the football match. |
| 16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: I take it that we may think about causes without thinking especially about explanations, and so we might judge likeliest cause without considering loveliest explanation. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') |
| 16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: According to the causal model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is simply to give information about its causal history, or, where the phenomenon is itself a causal regularity, to give information about the mechanism linking cause and effect. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Lewis's 1986 paper] Simply citing causal regularity seems to me to explain nothing. It happened because it always happens. Mechanism, on the other hand, is just what we are after. |
| 16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical explanations are never causal, and philosophical explanations seldom are. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact') | |
| A reaction: There may still be a 'direction' of explanation in mathematics, as when the nature of the triangle explains the Pythagoras Theorem, but the theorem may not give you the basic nature of triangles. Lipton suggests 'determination' for 'causation'. |
| 16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: It is often easier to say what a factor would explain than it is to say what it would cause. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
| A reaction: Presumably the presence of some factor might explain something, but the factor itself might have mysterious causal powers. A catalyst, for example. We don't need to understand the factor that explains. |
| 22522 | To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we see how things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best theoretical grasp of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a24) | |
| A reaction: Observing the natural origins of a tulip doesn't help much (without microbiology), but he is discussing the nature of cities, and his suggestion seems good. |
| 16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Our most secure basis for causal inference is manipulation, as when flicking the switch causes the light to go on. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
| A reaction: Correct, but Woodward elevates this into an entire theory of causation, which does not convince me. |
| 16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: We understand a phenomenon better when we know not just what caused it, but how the cause operated. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding') | |
| A reaction: This is the key point behind the desire for 'mechanism' in explanation. It strikes me as undeniable. |
| 22524 | The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What each thing is when its coming to be has been complete, this we say is the nature of each - for example, of a human, or of a horse, or of a household. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b32) | |
| A reaction: This works better for animate than for inanimate things. Aristotle is much clearer when we talk of the 'nature' of each thing, rather than its 'essence', because the latter has been blurred. I like 'essential nature'. |
| 16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: If all we wanted was to maximise probability, we would never venture beyond our data. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'friends') |
| 16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: A suspicion is that Inference to the Best Explanation is nothing more than Inference to the Likeliest Cause in fancy dress, and so fails to account for the symptoms of likeliness. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions') | |
| A reaction: In a lot of cases the cause is the explanation. An explanation might be the absence of a cause (as in 'you forgot to switch it on'). Lipton's 'lovely' explanations go further, and reveal a network of causes. |
| 16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The core idea of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. …Inserting one of the standard models of explanation yields disappointing results, because of their backward state. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
| A reaction: Inferences tend to come one at a time, but I see best explanations as the formation of coherent pictures. The tricky bit is when to decide the coherence makes it acceptable. Lipton has that problem too, with his inferences. 'Working explanations'. |
| 16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between the explanation best supported by the evidence, and the explanation that would provide the most understanding: in short, between the 'likeliest' and the 'loveliest' explanation. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
| A reaction: A very nice, very real and very illuminating distinction. Presumably truth must play an important role in both likelihood and loveliness. |
| 16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: According to Inference to the Best Explanation we do not infer the best actual explanation; rather we infer that the best of the available potential explanations is an actual explanation. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
| A reaction: Clearly to say that you should just accept the best available explanation is asking for trouble, if all the available explanations are absurd. But what are the criteria for saying the best one is the actual one? |
| 16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: We should considere Inference to the Loveliest Potential Explanation, …which links the search for truth and the search for understanding in a fundamental way. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') |
| 16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The slogan 'Inference to the Best Explanation' may bring to mind an excessively passive picture of scientific enquiry, …but there is the feedback between hypothesis formation and data acquisition that characterises actual enquiry. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation') | |
| A reaction: Perhaps it should be renamed 'Search for the Best Explanation'. |
| 16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: We are to infer that a difference marks a cause just in case the difference would provide the best explanation of the contrast. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'Improved') | |
| A reaction: Lipton's offers this as his distinctive contribution to Mill's methods of enquiry. His point is that we draw inferences for explanatory reasons. He rests on Mill, and on contrastive explanation. It sounds rightish, but a bit optimistic. |
| 16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory considerations can play a role in the generation of potential explanations as well as in the subsequent selection from among them. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'The two-stage') | |
| A reaction: Lipton offers this to meet an obvious objection to Inference to the Best Explanation - that compiling the possible explanations seems to need guidance. Seems a good reply. |
| 16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Two problems for IBE are that only one explanation can be inferred from any set of data, and that the only data that are relevant to a hypothesis are data the hypothesis explains. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling') | |
| A reaction: I don't see why the theory prohibits a tie for what is 'best', given that you don't have to commit. The second one is partly to do with what observers should do about anomalies, and it is sometimes right to ignore them. |
| 16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Bayesians object to inference to the best explanation, because someone who favoured powerful ('lovely') explanations would end up with an incoherent distribution of states of belief. They would be persuaded by loss-making wagers (a 'dutch book'). | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian') | |
| A reaction: [compressed; he cites Van Fraassen 1989 Ch.7] Lipton's Ch. 7 tries to address this issue. |
| 16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The best theory is almost always boring. …The claim that all planets move in ellipses is interesting, and the claim that some do not is not interesting. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best') | |
| A reaction: This applies to any extraction of a universal 'law' by induction. The best theory just affirms what has been observed. How could generalising about what you haven't observed be 'better'? Answer: because it goes via the essence. |
| 16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: Inference to the best explanation cannot be epistemically effective, since an actual explanation must be true, so one would have to know the truth before one could infer an explanation. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's') | |
| A reaction: Lipton rests on 'contrastive' explanation, so that the one that explains more is more likely to be true. If true, it explains. That seems to me correct, even though it could occasionally go horribly wrong. Approach explanation cautiously. |
| 22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever is composed of a number of things, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, and this is present in animate things on the basis of their entire nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a28) | |
| A reaction: I'm assuming he is referring to animals, rather than plants. I'm not sure if this is a universal truth (e.g. in the case of slime moulds), but it is how I see human beings. The organism could not possibly function (esp. navigate) without central control. |
| 9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Someone who acquires the word 'gob' just by being reliably told that it is synonymous with 'mouth' knows what 'gob' means without being fully competent to use it. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 4.7) | |
| A reaction: Not exactly an argument against meaning-as-use, but a very nice cautionary example to show that 'knowing the meaning' of a word may be a rather limited, and dangerous, achievement. |
| 22570 | Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now, with the development of rhetoric, those who are able public speakers become popular leaders. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1305a12) | |
| A reaction: Demosthenes was an exact contemporary of Aristotle. Nowadays we are conscious of the 'dumbing down' by popular speakers, which is not the same as rhetoric. |
| 22574 | A community can lack self-control [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If lack of self-control exists at the level of a single individual, it also exists at the level of a city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1310a17) | |
| A reaction: A nice extension of the problem of akrasia. Was Britain declaring war in 1914 an act of akrasia? With hindsight it looks that way. Strong emotions about Belgium overcame sensible concern for the young men of Britain. |
| 2837 | Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nothing that is contrary to nature is fine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1325b09) | |
| A reaction: This seems a rather conservative view, since it rules out submarines, mountaineering and heart transplants.. It depends what we count as 'natural'. |
| 2824 | The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The many are the best judges of poetry and music; some judge some parts, some judge others, but their collective judgement is a verdict on all the parts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b08) | |
| A reaction: No one seems to believe this in modern times, but it was a lot easier to spot good art before the invention of the camera, and Duchamp's wretched Fountain. |
| 2846 | Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must regard music as a stimulus to virtue, capable of making a certain kind of character (just as gymnastic training produces a body of a certain type). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a20) | |
| A reaction: He makes a sustained claim for this, but without explicit justification. I am totally convinced that the music of Bach improves us, but I have no idea why. |
| 2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20) | |
| A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women. |
| 22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39) | |
| A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'. |
| 2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism. |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
| A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
| 22557 | Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of a man must be identical to that of a citizen of the best city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1288a38) | |
| A reaction: Earlier he separated virtuous people from the best citizens, but here he reverses it. The interesting part is the role of the city in moulding the virtuous person. |
| 2841 | People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men become sound and good because of three things: these are nature, habit and reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332a38) | |
| A reaction: 'Habit' is the distinctively Aristotelian idea, but the most attractive part of his account is that habit and reason should combine. |
| 2829 | The law is the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The law is the mean. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04) | |
| A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean. |
| 22590 | Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is concerned with enjoying, loving, and hating in the correct way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1340a14) | |
| A reaction: The context is a defence of music as a training of right feelings. |
| 2813 | It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1265a32) | |
| A reaction: That's a relief. Presumably this would achieve the correct mean in terms of indulgence, but all ruined by excesses in other areas. |
| 22553 | Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a virtue relating to communities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a38) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, given that we can also think of justice as between two individuals - in a contract, for example. Betrayal is an injustice. But for Aristotle the focus is on the constitution. |
| 22561 | The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich seem to possess already the things for the sake of which unjust people do injustice, which is why the rich are called both noble and good and notable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1293b38) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem (at least in popular lore) to apply to those who acquired their wealth by unjust means, because by then injustice has become a habit. |
| 2808 | Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is an interest in common and a feeling of friendship between master and slave, wherever they are fitted for this relationship. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1255b12) | |
| A reaction: Very striking. His view that there are natural slaves, who are incapable of the good life, seems to count against this, but I suspect that he is forced to confront the facts in his own city. |
| 2803 | Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is by nature a political animal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a01) | |
| A reaction: It might be clearer if we said 'social animal'. We are certainly gregarious. Anyone who fails to be social is dismissed by Aristotle as not truly human. |
| 2820 | People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men have a desire for live together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1278b20) | |
| A reaction: He says that someone who doesn't want to live in community because they are wholly self-sufficient doesn't count as a normal human. |
| 22586 | Only humans have reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The human being alone has reason. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b04) | |
| A reaction: Only in the last fifty years have we begun to grasp how clever larger animals are, and I would say that they consistently make rational choices, even if they can't articulate them. |
| 22523 | The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b27) | |
| A reaction: I suppose a group of villages might be self-sufficient, provided water supply and defences were secure. In a city it is all within easy reach. Each village can't have a full set of specialists. |
| 2805 | A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is sharing a common view in good and evil, justice and injustice, that makes a household and a state. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a17) | |
| A reaction: This idea comes up against the modern idea of pluralism (e.g. in Isaiah Berlin), which is inevitable in huge states with a lot of migration. |
| 22526 | People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a27) | |
| A reaction: Civil people should try hard to accommodate those who are anti-social. I'm not convinced that there is anyone who is wholly self-sufficient. |
| 22535 | Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We think friendship is the greatest good for cities, since this way people are least likely to engage in faction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1262b07) | |
| A reaction: Earlier philosophers were deeply worried about 'faction', but we now accept the gangs of secretive hoodlums called political parties. I suspect the old view was right, but it's a bit late now. You can't engineer friendships (can you?). |
| 22532 | A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Socrates adopts the hypothesis that it is best for a city to be as far as possible entirely one. …But it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a14) | |
| A reaction: [He is referring to Plato's Republic] He says if a city wholly unifies it becomes like a household, and then a human being, rather than a city. A very interesting commitment to diversity in a city, based on its essential nature. Athens was very diverse. |
| 22584 | A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Communities should have some one thing that is common and the same for all the members, whether they share in it equally or unequally - for example, food, a quantity of territory, or something else of this sort. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a27) | |
| A reaction: In modern societies vast numbers of people own no land at all, and common land has dwindled. Maybe it is roads, buses and trains? |
| 22581 | The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best defining mark of a city is the greatest excess of multitude with a view to self-sufficiency in living that can easily be surveyed as a whole. Let the size of the city, then, be determined in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1326b23) | |
| A reaction: Modern states have presumably far exceeded to self-sufficiency test. The requirement to be 'surveyed' presumably implies that the state can be controlled. Modern technology means almost no limit to such a size. |
| 22548 | A city aims at living well [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The end of the city is living well. …It is for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280b38) | |
| A reaction: So the aim is not glory, conquest, colonisation, great buildings or other works. It is all of the citizens living well in their own way. This is the liberal ideal, from a long time ago. Spinoza is in tune with this. Fulfilling capabilities? |
| 22577 | What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a19) | |
| A reaction: Presumably 'almost' because slaves don't make the cut. But the inclusiveness is hugely important, and I take his second question to be the debate between communitarians and liberals. Communists and libertarians might get a look in. |
| 22579 | The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form [morphé] as those in which each human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate would share. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b33) | |
| A reaction: These are the four traditional Cardinal Virtues of ancient Greek culture. Aristotle defers to them, even though his account of the virtues is much broader. |
| 2431 | Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Observation tells us that every state is an association; and that every state is formed with a view to some good purpose. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252a01) | |
| A reaction: Not so much a historical speculation, I think, as an assertion that it should be obvious what binds a state together, and hence has allowed it to endure. |
| 22578 | The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The happy city is the one that is best and acts nobly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b29) | |
| A reaction: He applies almost identical criteria to the eudaimon individual and the eudaimon city. It is not the possession of virtuous qualities but the performing of fine deeds which matters. I want to be proud of what my country does. |
| 2832 | The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b25) | |
| A reaction: He knows that this cannot be fully achieved. It gets worrying when misfits are pressured into conformity. This sounds like Aristotle's less liberal side - though he accepts diversity. |
| 2821 | The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The names for right constitutions (with their deviations) are monarchy (tyranny), aristocracy (oligarchy), and polity (democracy). | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279b04) | |
| A reaction: I found it hard to pin down the meaning of 'polity', even though he makes it sound like the best constitution. Something like 'teamwork'. |
| 22546 | A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones. For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1279a17) | |
| A reaction: He is very keen on the full equality of all citizens (even if his concept of a citizen is narrow). This must be connected to his eudaimonist account of ethics. Everyone must flourish. I'm struck by his liberal values. |
| 2835 | Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1319b35) | |
| A reaction: An important issue for Aristotle, which we no longer seem to worry about. A constitution should aim, when it is created, to be acceptable enough to be durable. |
| 22580 | The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1324a23) | |
| A reaction: So what would Aristotle make of the modern welfare state, or the idea of a safety net for those who struggle? Should the state help the best life, and not just facilitate it? Education, infrastructure, health, communal activity…. |
| 22558 | Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A constitution is the way that cities order their offices, how they are distributed, what element is in control in the constitution, and what the end of each community is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1289a15) | |
| A reaction: Liberal constitutions tend to avoid stating what the end of the city is, because that is for the free citizens to decide. Nothing is said, it seems, about the territory or the population. |
| 22566 | The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What the rich do to get more does more to destroy the constitution than what the people do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1297a10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because the wealthy have more power. In our society they have more control over the media and public opinions. The law should maintain the constitution, and the poor have no influence on the law. |
| 2973 | We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we wish to investigate the best constitution appropriately, we must first decide what is the most desirable life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323a14) | |
| A reaction: He takes this for granted, and it sounds right, but it is firmly contradicted by modern liberals (e.g. Rawls), who say the good life is for individuals to decide. |
| 22563 | The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those in the middle [in wealth] are least inclined either to avoid rule or to be eager to rule, both of which things are harmful to cities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b12) | |
| A reaction: How nice to hear something good about the poor old middle classes - the hated bourgeoisie of the marxists, looked down on by the snobbish elite. They avoid the black market, and bribery for offices. |
| 2818 | The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are many constitutions, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b28) | |
| A reaction: This is very striking support for the view that Aristotle's account of the virtues in 'Ethics' is merely a description of conventions (Athenian, presumably), rather than an appeal to nature. However, see his account of the soul, and human function. |
| 22545 | A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man. …[1278b02] In one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1276b33) | |
| A reaction: Thus confutes my simple summary of Aristotelian ethics as 'be a good citizen!'. He thinks leaders of communities must be excellent men. You can fulfil a role in the city (soldier, doctor, cleaner) without all-round excellence (see 1276b39). |
| 22544 | A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whoever is authorised to share in deliberative or judicial office …is a citizen of the relevant city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1275b18) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, and perhaps a bit surprising for us. We tend to assume that in a democracy the citizens are those allowed to vote, but he says what matters is being allowed to hold an office. Log cabin to White House. He's right. |
| 9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Given empirical evidence for the approximate intertranslatability of all human languages, and a universal innate basis of human cognition, we may wonder how 'other' any human culture really is. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 8.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a fairly accurate account of the situation. In recent centuries people seem to have been over-impressed by superficial differences in cultural behaviour, but we increasingly see the underlying identity. |
| 22541 | Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is surely better to choose each new king not as now but rather in accord with his own life. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a20) | |
| A reaction: When the British monarch was very powerful, the hereditary system was fairly disastrous. I get a thrill when a highly esteemed citizen is voted president of a country, such as Vaclav Havel in Czechia. British monarchs could be elected. |
| 22542 | People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is reasonable to expect that those who have bought office, that is, when they rule by having spent money, will become habituated to making a profit from it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b01) | |
| A reaction: Probably true, though money-grubbers are even happier if they can achieve office without expenditure. |
| 22552 | The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The rich have a claim because they own a larger share of the land, and the land is something communal, and furthermore because they are for the most part more trustworthy when it comes to treaties. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1283a32) | |
| A reaction: It seems right that the rich give a stability and hence reliability to a society, which the more mobile poor cannot offer. But it is a minor point. |
| 22583 | The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not correct to claim that guardians are to be harsh to those they do not know, since one should not treat anyone in this way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1328a07) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a criticism of Plato. Aristotle thinks people should be nice to one another! The ancient tradition of hospitality to strangers. |
| 2819 | The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1277b27) | |
| A reaction: If a person with wide social powers is to have practical wisdom, that will require extensive knowledge, in a way that local practical wisdom does not. |
| 22572 | Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those holding the controlling offices should possess friendship towards the constitution, great capacity for that office, and the virtue and justice required by that constitution. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a33) | |
| A reaction: We need to remember that all officers in our democracy need to be fully committed to that system of government (which does not always seem to me to be the case). |
| 22543 | In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the city is not small, it is more political and more democratic, if more people participate in the offices. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1273b11) | |
| A reaction: Not sure what 'more political' means. This is not to avoid corruption, but because it is best to have specialists in everything. All of the state functions should be of the highest standard. |
| 22539 | Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the election of officials is concerned, electing from the elected is dangerous. For if some are willing to combine, even if they are a relatively small number, the election will always turn out according to their wish. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a25) | |
| A reaction: The British Prime Minister is elected by the elected members of parliament of the majority party. (Boris Johnson is the current PM…). This idea reflects the great concern that earlier thinkers had about factions in politics. |
| 22560 | Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In cities under democracies that are in accord with law, popular leaders do not arise, but rather it is the best citizens who take the front seats. Where the laws are not in control, however, there popular leaders arise. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1292a07) | |
| A reaction: This remark is, unfortunately, highly relevant to western politics in 2020. He says that flatterers rise to the top in these regimes. |
| 22562 | Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems to be democratic for officials to be chosen by lot. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294b07) | |
| A reaction: This idea has dropped out of modern politics, but is not ridiculous if the official is offered thorough civil service support. Presumably the term of office is fairly short. |
| 2823 | The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that the many, not one of whom taken singly is a sound man, may yet, taken all together, be better than the few, not individually but collectively. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b01) | |
| A reaction: They may also crush everything that is good, if the many are gripped by absurd ideas (which they often are). Computer programmers are a good advert for this idea. |
| 2826 | Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: As a larger amount of water is less easily polluted, so the multitude is less easily corrupted than the few. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a30) | |
| A reaction: This was before the arrival of modern mass media, starting with tabloid newspapers. When many people are corrupted, it is much harder for society to recover its sanity. |
| 22567 | Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unconditionally equal, since, because they are equally free, they think they are unconditionally equal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1301a28) | |
| A reaction: An interesting speculation. In Britain the origins of democracy seem tied to the granting of religious equality and freedom. |
| 22533 | If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where it is not possible for the same people always to rule, because all are in nature equal, it is also just for all to share in ruling. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261a38) | |
| A reaction: This derives from his principle that the naturally superior should always rule the naturally inferior - though it sometimes looks as if ruling is the distinguishing mark of who is 'superior'. Democracy needs to equalise its citizens, where possible. |
| 2817 | It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of an office should solicit it. …One worthy of the office should hold it whether he wishes to or does not wish to. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1271a10) | |
| A reaction: I love this idea, and think it should be immediately implemented in the modern world, at every level of society. All leaders should be pushed to the front. The ambitious should be pulled to the back. |
| 22576 | No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is democratic to have no office be permanent. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b42) | |
| A reaction: Modern exceptions seem to be judges and civil servants. |
| 22549 | In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whether in every people this superiority of the majority to the few excellent people can exist is not clear. In some of them this cannot possibly be so, since the same argument would apply to wild beasts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b18) | |
| A reaction: He also gives reasons why it is plausible to think that the judgement of the majority is superior. It seems crucial that the majority have some education. Education is pointless if it is always overruled by the uneducated. |
| 22575 | Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate democracy is a tyranny. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1312b05) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is rule by a majority which has been corrupted by a populist leader, resulting in things like witch hunts. |
| 22531 | We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Our project is to get a theoretical grasp on which political community is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b28) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a manifesto for liberalism. Presumably a community of free people starts from a superior position, and so the ideal community is the best that can be achieved from that starting point. A utopia of slaves is of no interest. |
| 22564 | Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Community is fitted to friendship, since enemies do not wish to share even a road in common. But a city tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar, which especially holds of those in the middle. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b24) | |
| A reaction: The surprising emphasis on friendship in 'Ethics' turns out to have great importance in 'Politics'. Friendship is the cement of a community, and the constitution must maximise good conditions for friendships. |
| 22585 | Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A city must not be called happy by looking at just a part of it, but by looking at all of the citizens. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1329a22) | |
| A reaction: For example, it is wrong for a state to exult for being on the winning side in a major war, if it has meant misery for much of their own population. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (1520) does not excuse the misery of vagrants. |
| 22565 | The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The political community that is due to those in the middle class is best, and cities can be well governed where the middle class is numerous and strong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1295b34) | |
| A reaction: He specifically connects this to the doctrine of the mean in 'Ethics'. It seems easier for rulers from the middle classes to command universal respect, as the extremes tend to despise one another. What does he mean by 'strong'? |
| 22589 | Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One should in no way think that any citizen belongs to himself alone, but that all of them belong to the city, each being part of the city. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a27) | |
| A reaction: Note that they do not belong entirely to the city. I take this as an expression of his liberalism, which reminds liberals that we are also parts of a community, with a common good, and can't just go our own way. |
| 22534 | People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1261b33) | |
| A reaction: That is, they care about the bit they contributed (I think). On a train, would people with feet on the seats do the same in their own home? Yes, probably! Caring about what is communal must be a cultural consensus. Pride in the NHS. |
| 22538 | Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b23) | |
| A reaction: The reduction of disagreements is not a trivial matter, when designing a constitution for a happy community. 'Good fences make good neighbours'. |
| 22536 | There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The land might be held separately, while the crops grown on it are brought into a communal store, …or the land might he held and farmed communally, while the crops are divided for private use, …or they could both be held communally. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a02) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle says that examples exist of both of the first two cases. I would go for public land and privately divided crops. Capitalists end up with private land and private crops. |
| 22530 | Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to look to the constitution in educating both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be excellent, and its women too. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1260b14) | |
| A reaction: He consistently classes women as inferior, so it is a bit surprising to find that women need to be educated. They are not full citizens, but are part of the community, of which all parts need to be excellent. |
| 21358 | Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A human being who belongs, by nature, not to himself but to another is, by nature, a slave. ...Those whose function happens to be the use of their bodies (when this is the best that can be achieved) are slaves by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1254a09-), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 099 | |
| A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle trying to derive what ought to be from the 'nature' of each thing. Clearly, though, this was not the best that can be achieved. And why are labourers slaves, but not computer programmers or economists? |
| 20092 | One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One sort of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1317b1) | |
| A reaction: This is a lovely challenge to our modern idea of liberty, which largely consists of being left alone. |
| 2833 | Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In an oligarchy or a democracy it pays to give equality, or even preference, to those who participate in the constitution less, to the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an oligarchy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a27) | |
| A reaction: A very nice idea. Every constitution will give priority to some group, even if it is all of the adults. So it should therefore have clauses supporting the others (e.g. children). |
| 2834 | It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality; the strong reck nothing of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1318b05) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be merely an observation of the facts. He certainly doesn't want to deny them justice and equality, merely because that motivates them. |
| 2830 | We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the definitive principle of aristocracy, as wealth is of oligarchy, and freedom of democracy. …each of these is grounds for claiming equality. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1294a11) | |
| A reaction: By 'aristocratic' Aristotle means living at a high level of virtue (unlike oligarchs, who are just rich). Hence we can all aspire to be aristocrats. |
| 22569 | The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The people of Heraea replaced election with selection by lot because those who electioneered were getting elected. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1303a14) | |
| A reaction: Maybe electioneering can distort sensible choices, but good choices need good knowledge of the candidates. It is much harder in large communities. |
| 22550 | It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Neither to give a share nor to receive a share is a fearful thing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1281b28) | |
| A reaction: It is striking that he includes equality in giving, as well as in receiving. Paying taxes is a privilege, because it shows your equality as a citizen. |
| 22568 | Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Inferiors engage in faction in order to be equal, while equals do so in order to be superior. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1302a30) | |
| A reaction: In Britain that seems to trade unions in the first case, and the Conservative Party in the second case. Aristotle dislikes faction, but he's stuck with it because he insists on freedom. |
| 2814 | Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Phaleas of Chalcedon was the first to propose that the property of the citizens should be equal. … but there should also be equality of education. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266a38) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how you achieve full equality in education, if some of the blighters work harder. A useful reminder that achieving 'equality' is far from a simple matter. |
| 22540 | Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A leveling could be very quickly achieved by the rich giving but not receiving dowries, and the poor receiving but not giving them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1266b02) | |
| A reaction: Consequence: the daughters of the rich are never again allowed to marry (or even speak to) poor people. The modern approach is graduated income tax, presumably because there are reasonably accurate records of income. |
| 2828 | Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Law is intelligence without appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a31) | |
| A reaction: Neat, but no laws would be needed if there were no appetites. The idea has a nice Kantian feeling to it, though - of rising into the space of pure reason. |
| 22537 | Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263a38) | |
| A reaction: This is because people take more care of what is private. Modern large land owners usually allow hikers, but not gardeners. |
| 22573 | The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If what is just is not the same in all constitutions, there must be differences in the virtue of justice as well. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1309a37) | |
| A reaction: This problem has recently arisen when the state of China took full control of the westernised colony of Hong Kong. Liberals look for a more absolute concept of justice. What is justice in a slave colony? |
| 22527 | Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice is a political community's order. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a36) | |
| A reaction: This seems to agree with Plato, who identifies justice with harmony (in individuals as well as in communities). Fascism, however, tries to impose order without justice. Maybe justice is the health of the community. |
| 22547 | Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Justice seems to be equality - not for everyone, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality - not for everyone, but for unequals. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1280a11) | |
| A reaction: He is specific that slaves, women and children are unequals, but I'm not sure how much inequality there is among the free men. In virtue theory, some men are clearly greatly superior to others. Is there a cut off point for equality? |
| 2825 | The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In a state the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community; and all men believe that justice means equality in some sense. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b17) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's idea of justice seems closer to finding what is appropriate than it does to mere equality of treatment. |
| 2816 | If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1269a23) | |
| A reaction: This is a reasonable justification for sometimes insisting on the letter of the law, even though some degree of injustice results. |
| 2806 | Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a31) | |
| A reaction: Sounds true, but it is extraordinary that the virtues of mankind only emerge when we are artificially contrained. Rousseau disagreed with this. |
| 22556 | Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Laws that are in accord with habits have more control and deal with things that have more control than do written laws. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b05) | |
| A reaction: This is the problem of bringing the law into disrepute, by insisting on behaviour that goes against the grain. But there are laws, such as those against racism, which are designed to break bad habits. |
| 2827 | It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287a19) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that the law is sensible. An exception would be when a wise ruler takes over a very corrupted state, which has passed evil laws. Nelson Mandela. |
| 22551 | Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The laws, when correctly laid down, should be in control, and the ruler, whether one or many, should have control only of those matters on which the laws cannot pronounce with exactness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1282b01) | |
| A reaction: It is obvious that general laws cannot cover each individual cases. Aristotle doesn't yet have the concept of an independent judiciary to handle this problem, so this is not true separation of powers. |
| 22554 | It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is said that laws speak only of the universal, and do not prescribe with a view to particular circumstances, so that it is foolish to rule in any craft in accord with what is written down. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286a10) | |
| A reaction: To say we shouldn't follow laws because they are all vague would be crazy. A vague border is still a border. Laws need interpretation, and judgement of appropriate application. |
| 2840 | The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Another thing that should be a common charge on the whole state is the worship of the gods. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1330a08) | |
| A reaction: If religion ceases to be a priority, is there some equivalent which should replace it? National sports teams? National theatre, or orchestras? National parks? |
| 2811 | A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A state is a plurality which must depend on education to bring about its common unity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b33) | |
| A reaction: He also says that diversity is an essential aspect of a city, so I don't think he expects education to achieve perfect unity. |
| 22588 | A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Since the end of the whole city is a single end, it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all, and that its supervision must be communal, not private as it is at present. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1337a21) | |
| A reaction: But the end of the city is for all individual citizens to flourish, not for the group to flourish. So presumably education must be tuned to individual capacities and needs, and not just focus on some communal good. |
| 2847 | The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might perhaps suppose that serious activity in childhood may have for its aim the amusement of the complete and adult man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1339a30) | |
| A reaction: It is very Aristotelian to have a concept of 'serious' childhood play. I doubt whether Nichomachus had much fun. Aristotle thinks the good amusement of adults is very important. |
| 2842 | Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men learn partly by habituation and partly by listening. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1332b10) | |
| A reaction: Habit is almost an education of the body rather than of the mind, like a pianist making their fingers learn to play a piece. |
| 2844 | Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If an unwanted child is conceived, abortion should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1335b24) | |
| A reaction: A salient reminder that ancient people also had to think about the question of abortion. Some cultures seem unbothered by concerns, but not Arfistotle. |
| 2809 | If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made plants and animals for the sake of man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1256b20) | |
| A reaction: That was a rather fast move! If a tiger eats a man, how do we explain that? Why are some plants poisonous? Pebbles on a beach seem to have no purpose. |
| 2800 | The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every instrument will be made best if it serves not many purposes but one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b03) | |
| A reaction: Sound like a good general truth, but not a universal truth. Swiss army knife. Ship in a bottle. Pins. Wrapping paper. |
| 16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |
| Full Idea: The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects. | |
| From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause') | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient? |
| 2836 | God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: God himself is not blessed and happy on account of any of the external goods but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1323b24) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle was famous for saying that external goods are important for the virtuous human life, so this idea is his corrective, which shows that they are of limited importance. |
| 2802 | Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as men imagine gods in human shape, so they imagine their way of life to be like that of men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1252b26) | |
| A reaction: A common Greek observation. It is more significant that we anthropomorphise the thinking of the gods, as well as their physiques and banquets. |