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All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'Events' and 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

8979	Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons]
	Full Idea: Some changes are slow and continuous and are called 'processes' rather than events; the growth of a tree or the greying of John's hair.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 3.2)
	A reaction: So making a loaf of bread is an event rather than a process, and World War I was a process rather than an event? If you slow down a dramatic event (on film), you see that it is really a process. I take 'process' to be a much more illuminating word.

8981	Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons]
	Full Idea: There is arguably a parallel between the mass-count distinction among meanings of nouns and the process-event distinction among meanings of verbs. Processes, like stuff, do not connote criteria for counting, whereas events, like things, do.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 6.2)
	A reaction: Hm. You can have several processes, and a process can come to an end - but then you can have several ingredients of a cake, and you can run out of one of them. This may be quite a helpful distinction.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

8973	Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
	Full Idea: The ontology of events rose in philosophy with the rise of relativity theory in physics. Einstein postulated the relativity of simultaneity to an observer's state of motion. The terms of the relation of simultaneity must be events or their parts.
	From: Peter Simons (Events [2003], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: Intriguing. Philosophers no doubt think they are way ahead of physicists in such a metaphysical area. Personally I regard the parentage of the concept as good grounds for scepticism about it. See Idea 7621 for my reason.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities

7401	Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
	Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world.
	From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
	A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it?

5454	Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
	Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
	From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3
	A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism

16560	Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
	Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'.
	From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2
	A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

19216	Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
	Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
	From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
	A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature

3645	To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]
	Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics.
	From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232)
	A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically.