28 ideas
| 18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 3) |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Certain advances in philosophical standards have been made within analytic philosophy, and there would be a serious loss of integrity involved in abandoning them in the way required to participate in current continental philosophy. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151) | |
| A reaction: The reply might be to concede the point, but say that the precision and rigour achieved are precisely what debar analytical philosophy from thinking about the really interesting problems. One might as well switch to maths and have done with it. |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Fuzzy logic is based on a continuum of degrees of truth, but it is committed to the idea that it is half-true that one identical twin is tall and the other twin is not, even though they are the same height. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.154) | |
| A reaction: Maybe to be shocked by a contradiction is missing the point of fuzzy logic? Half full is the same as half empty. The logic does not say the twins are different, because it is half-true that they are both tall, and half-true that they both aren't. |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: As soon as I started learning formal logic, that struck me as exactly the language that I wanted to think in. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001]) | |
| A reaction: It takes all sorts… It is interesting that formal logic might be seen as having the capacity to live up to such an aspiration. I don't think the dream of an ideal formal language is dead, though it will never encompass all of reality. Poetic truth. |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: If one is very close to a conceptual boundary, then one's judgement will be too unreliable to constitute knowledge, and therefore one will be ignorant. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.156) | |
| A reaction: This is the epistemological rather than ontological interpretation of vagueness. It sounds very persuasive, but I am reluctant to accept that reality is full of very precise boundaries which we cannot quite discriminate. |
| 18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20)) | |
| A reaction: There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted. |
| 18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Diversity is born of the development of the power of unity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 42) | |
| A reaction: I doubt whether even Porphyry understood this, but we might say that once the principle of unification enters into nature, it will inevitably result in diversity. One all-embracing unity would be indiscernible. |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?). | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153) | |
| A reaction: This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't. |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: If one takes a spectrum of colours from yellow to red, it might be that given a series of colour samples along that spectrum, each sample is indiscriminable by the naked eye from the next one, though samples at either end are blatantly different. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151) | |
| A reaction: This seems like a nice variant of the Sorites paradox (Idea 6008). One could demonstrate it with just three samples, where A and C seemed different from each other, but other comparisons didn't. |
| 18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is a faculty of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn6 25(2)) |
| 19000 | Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap] |
| Full Idea: 'All ravens are black' might profitably be read as saying not that being a raven 'implies' being black, but rather something more like 'Consider the ravens: each one is black'. | |
| From: Nuel D. Belnap (Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification [1970], p.7), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 04.5 | |
| A reaction: Belnap is more interested in the logic than in the paradox of confirmation, since he evidently thinks that universal generalisations should not be read as implications. I like Belnap's suggestion. |
| 18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible. |
| 18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
| A reaction: This is the rather bewildering phenomenology of consciousness which persuaded Descartes of dualism. |
| 18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
| A reaction: It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded? |
| 18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The individual soul, which declines towards matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has made her choose. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like the soul is boss over the matter, and yet the soul is 'made' to choose union with matter. The Universal Soul is seen by Porphyr as the controller of the situation. |
| 18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his [authentic and proper] function. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably a direct reference to the theory in Plato's 'Republic'. It makes the connection between virtue and function which I take to be basic to virtue theory, giving it a naturalistic advantaged over other theories. |
| 18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the lights of fancy that occur in dreams. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: Presumably erotic dreams are only tolerated because not much can be done about them. This brings out the puritanism of neo-platonism. |
| 18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The object of the civil virtues is to make us benevolent in our dealings with our fellow-human beings, and are so-called because they unite citizens. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.1) | |
| A reaction: Modern commentators underestimate the close link between ancient virtue and citizenship. It is hard for one person to have much of a notion of virtue if they live on a desert island, beyond caring for personal health. |
| 18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.2) | |
| A reaction: The link with human nature is basic to virtue theory, but this proposal is rather too vague. Are passions not part of the laws of human nature? |
| 18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The object of the 'purificatory' virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: This is an aspect of virtue theory which doesn't appear in Aristotle. He is in favour of rational control of the passions, but not of totally abandoning them. The neo-platonists are much more puritanical. They seem to go against human nature. |
| 18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues make man divine....; the contemplative virtues defiy; while the exemplary virtues make a man the parent of divinities. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
| A reaction: I like the idea of the 'exemplary' virtues. I think an entire theory of morality could be built on the notion that we are all role-models for one another. |
| 18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5)) | |
| A reaction: Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it. |
| 18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: It is the circular movement of the soul that constitutes time, just as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes eternity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: Plato loved circles. If you think time is subjective, this is trying to express your intuition. Personally I think it is nonsense |
| 18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Some have believed that time manifested in rest as well as in movement. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
| A reaction: If you like this idea, you should see Shoemaker's lovely three-worlds thought experiment. |
| 18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: The divinity is everywhere because it is nowhere. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) |
| 18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: All things that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are within divinity. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
| A reaction: Nice to see Porphyry endorsing Meinongian objects. I doubt whether he counts as a pantheist, but this is a very pantheistic remark. |
| 18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2) | |
| A reaction: Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree? |
| 18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused. | |
| From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism. |