10 ideas
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |
12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
Full Idea: We must discover the meanings that emerge when works of literature are experience in relation to each other. ...The importance of tradition is that it denotes - ideally, at least - the class of relevant comparisons. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.27) | |
A reaction: This is a nice attempt to explain why we all agree that a thorough education in an art is an essential prerequisite for good taste. Some people (e.g. among the young) seem to have natural good taste. How does that happen? |
12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
Full Idea: In literary contexts semantically equivalent words cannot replace each other without loss of literary meaning. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.25) | |
A reaction: The notion of 'literary meaning' is not a standard one, and is questionable whether 'meaning' is the right word, given that a shift in word in a poem is as much to do with sound as with connotations. |
12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
Full Idea: A person for whom it made no difference whether a sculpture was carved by wind and rain or by human hand would be unable to interpret or perceive sculptures - even though the interpretation of sculpture is not the reading of an intention. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.15) | |
A reaction: Scruton compares it to the role of intention in language, where there is objective meaning, even though intention is basic to speech. |
12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
Full Idea: In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.18) | |
A reaction: A nice aphorism. I always feel uncomfortable reading novels about real people, although the historical Macbeth doesn't bother me much. Novels are too close to reality. Macbeth didn't speak blank verse. |
12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: An historian can elucidate convention while having no feeling for the art that exploits it; whereas an understanding of tradition is reserved for those with the critical insight which comes from the love of art, both past and present. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Public Text and Common Reader [1982], p.24) | |
A reaction: This aesthetic observation is obviously close to Scruton's well-known conservatism in politics. I am doubtful whether the notion of 'tradition' can stand up to close examination, though we all know roughly what he means. |
23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
Full Idea: Our character appears to us as a limit by which we do not want to be imprisoned, …but also as a support that we want to believe is unshakable. | |
From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.100) | |
A reaction: A nice perception. It is fairly easy to criticise, or even laugh at, one's own actions, but extremely hard to criticise our own character. Maybe we all wish we were more determined in our projects, but not much else. |
23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
Full Idea: We cannot pose a moral problem without putting the concept of character at its centre. | |
From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98) | |
A reaction: The question for Aristotle (which I derive from Philippa Foot) is whether moral goodness simply is good character, or whether it is the actions (or even the consequences). Weil is close to modern virtue theory here. |
23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
Full Idea: Character is constant over a period of time; the way a person is at a single moment does not at all reflect the character of this person. We do, however, concede that character changes. | |
From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98) | |
A reaction: I do think, though, that there are moments in behaviour which are hugely revealing of character, even in a single remark. But I agree that most single moments do not show much. |
23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |
Full Idea: We can modify our character, by putting ourselves in circumstances that will act on us from the outside, …or by the orientation of our attention in the moments that appear most insignificant or indifferent in our lives. | |
From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.99) | |
A reaction: I've never seen anyone address this question (apart from Aristotle's emphasis on training habits). Choosing your source for current affairs information strikes me as very important. What you read, what you watch, who you spend time with… |