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8375
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'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
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Full Idea:
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, meaning that it is true for all possible values of its argument or arguments. Thus 'If x is a man, x is mortal' is necessary, because it is true for any possible value of x.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.175)
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A reaction:
This is presumably the intermediate definition of necessity, prior to modern talk of possible worlds. Since it is a predicate about functions, it is presumably a metalinguistic concept, like the semantic concept of truth.
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23896
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We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
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Full Idea:
Our character appears to us as a limit by which we do not want to be imprisoned, …but also as a support that we want to believe is unshakable.
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From:
Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.100)
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A reaction:
A nice perception. It is fairly easy to criticise, or even laugh at, one's own actions, but extremely hard to criticise our own character. Maybe we all wish we were more determined in our projects, but not much else.
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23893
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We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
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Full Idea:
Character is constant over a period of time; the way a person is at a single moment does not at all reflect the character of this person. We do, however, concede that character changes.
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From:
Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98)
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A reaction:
I do think, though, that there are moments in behaviour which are hugely revealing of character, even in a single remark. But I agree that most single moments do not show much.
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23895
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We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
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Full Idea:
We can modify our character, by putting ourselves in circumstances that will act on us from the outside, …or by the orientation of our attention in the moments that appear most insignificant or indifferent in our lives.
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From:
Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.99)
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A reaction:
I've never seen anyone address this question (apart from Aristotle's emphasis on training habits). Choosing your source for current affairs information strikes me as very important. What you read, what you watch, who you spend time with…
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4396
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The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.173)
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A reaction:
A bold proposal which should be taken seriously. However, if we drop it from scientific explanation, we may well find ourselves permanently stuck with it in 'folk' explanation. What is the alternative?
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8379
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In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
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Full Idea:
An 'event' (in a statement of the 'law of causation') is intended to be something that is likely to recur, since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that an 'event' is not some particular, but a universal of which there may be many instances.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.179)
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A reaction:
I am very struck by this. It may be a key insight into understanding what a law of nature actually is. It doesn't follow that we must be realists about universals, but the process of abstraction from particulars is at the heart of generalisation.
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