Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Necessary Existents', 'On the Concept of Character' and 'Killing and Letting Die'

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8 ideas

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

19216	Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
	Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist?
	From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions
	A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done?

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions

4692	It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
	Full Idea: Many philosophers (e.g. Rachels) have argued that there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and allowing to die (or the related 'acts and omissions'),..as in not sending food, or sending poisoned food. I disagree.
	From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.78)
	A reaction: It appears that some omissions are worse than acts. It is more honest to just shoot an injured person, than to walk away and leave them to die. A range of cases.

4694	Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
	Full Idea: If a runaway tram is heading towards a track on which five people are standing, and there is someone who can switch the points, diverting it onto a track where there is one person,...this is diverting a fatal sequence, not starting a new one.
	From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.85)
	A reaction: Suppose the one person was of immense community value, or someone you personally hated? Clearly she is interested in the agent's virtue, rather than the actual consequences.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character

23896	We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
	Full Idea: Our character appears to us as a limit by which we do not want to be imprisoned, …but also as a support that we want to believe is unshakable.
	From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.100)
	A reaction: A nice perception. It is fairly easy to criticise, or even laugh at, one's own actions, but extremely hard to criticise our own character. Maybe we all wish we were more determined in our projects, but not much else.

23894	The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
	Full Idea: We cannot pose a moral problem without putting the concept of character at its centre.
	From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98)
	A reaction: The question for Aristotle (which I derive from Philippa Foot) is whether moral goodness simply is good character, or whether it is the actions (or even the consequences). Weil is close to modern virtue theory here.

23893	We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
	Full Idea: Character is constant over a period of time; the way a person is at a single moment does not at all reflect the character of this person. We do, however, concede that character changes.
	From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98)
	A reaction: I do think, though, that there are moments in behaviour which are hugely revealing of character, even in a single remark. But I agree that most single moments do not show much.

23895	We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
	Full Idea: We can modify our character, by putting ourselves in circumstances that will act on us from the outside, …or by the orientation of our attention in the moments that appear most insignificant or indifferent in our lives.
	From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.99)
	A reaction: I've never seen anyone address this question (apart from Aristotle's emphasis on training habits). Choosing your source for current affairs information strikes me as very important. What you read, what you watch, who you spend time with…

25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights

4693	The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
	Full Idea: There are rights to non-interference (and their corresponding "negative duties"), and the rights to goods and services (with corresponding "positive duties"). Interference usually needs more justification than withholding goods.
	From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.82)
	A reaction: This invites the question of which is the stronger, and whether paternalism can overrule non-interference, or an expectation of self-sufficiency overrule the positive rights.