6 ideas
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Many things that seem to be abstract also seem to have a beginning (and ending) in time, such as a language like Urdu. It may be tempting to say that such things exist in time but not in space, but where exactly? | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A few distinctions might be needed. Urdu-speaking is an ability of certain people. We abstract from that their 'language'. There is nothing there apart from that ability. It has no more abstract existence than the 'weather'. |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Four things philosophers often want to know about a given sort of entity are: its existence conditions, its identity conditions, its modal status, and its epistemic status. | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: I prefer 'modal profile' to 'modal status'. The 'existence conditions' sound rather epistemic. Why does the existence of anything require 'conditions' other than just existing? I suspect identity is irrelevant if humans aren't around. |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Can properties themselves exemplify properties? | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: Since I espouse a rather strict causal view of true properties, and lump the rest into the category of 'predicates', I am inclined to answer 'no' to this. Most people would disagree. 'Bright red' seems to be an example. But it isn't. |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
Full Idea: Quantum field theory strongly suggests that there are (at the fundamental level) no individual, particular things. | |
From: Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 2.1) | |
A reaction: When people introduce quantum theory into ontological discussions I reach for my shotgun, but it does rather look as if things turn to mush at the bottom level. |
9471 | Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine] |
Full Idea: Intensions are creatures of darkness and I shall rejoice with the reader when they are exorcised. | |
From: Willard Quine (Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes [1955], §II) | |
A reaction: Quine seems to be in a diminshing minority with this view. For 'intensions' read 'meanings', presumably. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |