3 ideas
2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |
Full Idea: Can sense-data exist unsensed? Can two persons experience numerically identical sense-data? Do sense-data have surfaces which are not sensed? What are sense-data made of? Are they located? | |
From: Michael Tye (Adverbial Theory [1995], p.7) |
9471 | Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine] |
Full Idea: Intensions are creatures of darkness and I shall rejoice with the reader when they are exorcised. | |
From: Willard Quine (Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes [1955], §II) | |
A reaction: Quine seems to be in a diminshing minority with this view. For 'intensions' read 'meanings', presumably. |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
Full Idea: A proposition about an item exists only if that item exists... how could something be the proposition that that dog is barking in circumstances in which that dog does not exist? | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Necessary Existents [2002], p.240), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Propositions | |
A reaction: This is a view of propositions I can't make sense of. If I'm under an illusion that there is a dog barking nearby, when there isn't one, can I not say 'that dog is barking'? If I haven't expressed a proposition, what have I done? |