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All the ideas for 'Gilles Deleuze', 'works' and 'Does Consciousness Exist?'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy

21900	Deleuze relies on Spinoza (immanence), Bergson (duration), and difference (Nietzsche) [May]
	Full Idea: The three tripods on which the philosophy of Deleuze stands are immanence (Spinoza), duration (Bergson), and the affirmation of difference (Nietzsche).
	From: Todd May (Gilles Deleuze [2006], 2.12)
	A reaction: [Just to begin sketching how continental philosophy sees its tradition].

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic

11022	Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934 [Gentzen, by Read]
	Full Idea: Gentzen introduced a natural deduction calculus (NK) in 1934.
	From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives

11065	The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna]
	Full Idea: Gentzen argued that the inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning.
	From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3
	A reaction: Possibly inspired by Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use? This idea was the target of Prior's famous connective 'tonk', which has the role of implying anything you like, proving sentences which are not logical consequences.

11023	The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen]
	Full Idea: The introduction rules represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and the elimination rules are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these definitions.
	From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8
	A reaction: If an introduction-rule (or a truth table) were taken as fixed and beyond dispute, then it would have the status of a definition, since there would be nothing else to appeal to. So is there anything else to appeal to here?

11213	Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen]
	Full Idea: To every logical symbol there belongs precisely one inference figure which 'introduces' the symbol ..and one which 'eliminates' it. The introductions represent the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned, and eliminations are consequences of these.
	From: Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938], II.5.13), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - "Yes" and "No" III
	A reaction: [1935 paper] This passage is famous, in laying down the basics of natural deduction systems of logic (ones using only rules, and avoiding axioms). Rumfitt questions whether Gentzen's account gives the sense of the connectives.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic

10067	Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions beyond arithmetic [Gentzen, by Musgrave]
	Full Idea: Gentzen proved the consistency of arithmetic from assumptions which transcend arithmetic.
	From: report of Gerhard Gentzen (works [1938]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5
	A reaction: This does not contradict Gödel's famous result, but reinforces it. The interesting question is what assumptions Gentzen felt he had to make.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9286	Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
	Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
	From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
	A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism

9285	'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
	Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
	From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
	A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism

21898	For existentialists the present is empty without the pull of the future and weight of the past [May]
	Full Idea: For the existential view of lived time, the present would be empty if it were not for the pull of the future and the weight of the past that give it its character.
	From: Todd May (Gilles Deleuze [2006], 2.05)
	A reaction: Bergson seems to be important in developing this idea, though I suspect that Kierkegaard is a source.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics

21905	Liberal theory starts from the governed, not from the governor [May]
	Full Idea: For liberal theory, it is the individual to be governed, not the governor, who is the starting point.
	From: Todd May (Gilles Deleuze [2006], 4.02)
	A reaction: I'm inclined to see this as the single-handed achievement of Thomas Hobbes, who starts from the need of citizens to secure their contracts. Plato's society starts from entrepreneurs, but their need for a ruler seems a priori.