72 ideas
15447 | We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato] |
Full Idea: There comes a time not to go on following where the argument leads! | |
From: comment on Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667b) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Variant' | |
A reaction: Lewis is a fine one to talk, since he follows argument that take him past innumerable incredulous stares of onlookers. |
243 | It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles, you have there what I call 'folly'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 689b) |
241 | We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato] |
Full Idea: We ought to follow where the argument leads us. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667a) |
21264 | Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato] |
Full Idea: We mustn't assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897d) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of the rational control of the whole Cosmos. I presume Plato would be flabbergasted by the findings of recent physics and cosmology. Did Kant believe that he was being completely rational about ethics? |
251 | Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato] |
Full Idea: Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 730c) |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A ground does not merely necessitate its truth. A ground is also what its truth is appropriately about. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.II) |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is not always obvious what (if anything) a truth is about, in the sense of 'about' relevant to Truthmaker and truth-supervenient-on-being. Prior says 'Queen Anne is dead' is not about Queen Anne, and may be about the Earth. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.III) | |
A reaction: A very nice and rather subtle objection to the Truthmaker thesis. Specifying the truthmaker for a given truth looks like a doddle in simple cases, but clearly it can become extremely elusive in other cases. |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If a single ball goes from being red to being white, Truthmaker implies that something exists which makes it true that the second thing follows the first. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V) |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Truthmaker makes it impossible simply to remove an entity. One must always replace it with something else; namely, a truthmaker for the claim that that entity does not exist. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.I-3) | |
A reaction: This is a particularly strong and persuasive argument from Merricks against the truthmaker view. Clearly the truthmaker for non-existence can't be there when it exists, and the destruction bringing the negative truthmaker into existence sounds odd. |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Truthmaker says that, for each truth, there is something that, by its mere existence, makes that truth true, …so Truthmaker has de re modality at its core. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 5.III) | |
A reaction: I have no problem with de re modality, so this doesn't bother me. Merricks brings out nicely the baggage which you must carry if you are a Truthmaker. |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The claim 'that Fido is brown' seems to demand only a brown Fido, but Truthmaker demands more. It demands both that a state of affairs along the lines of 'Fido's being brown' exists, and also that this state has its constituents essentially. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.I) | |
A reaction: One would need to reread Merricks to get this clear, but my instinct is that the two scenarios are not very different. 'A brown Fido' would require Fido to be necessarily brown to do the job. |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
Full Idea: 'Truth supervenes on being' says that any two possible worlds alike with respect to what entities exist and which properties (and relations) each of those entities exemplifies are thereby alike with respect to what is true. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: Merricks says this view is found in early Wittgenstein, as well as in David Lewis. He suggests that this is a weaker and more plausible thesis than the full commitment to truthmakers. It still allows some truths to lack truthmakers. Sounds plausible. |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If 'truth supervenes on being' aims to articulate the idea that truth depends on being, it must say more than that truth supervenes on being. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 4.VI) | |
A reaction: This is a perennial problem with supervenience accounts, such as the supervenience of beauty on the object, or of mind on brain. |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is implausible that a claim asserting that a thing fails to exist is made true by - and so is appropriately about - some other, existing thing. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V) |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Because Truthmaker offers no analysis of being true, Truthmaker is not the correspondence theory of truth. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 1.IV) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that the correspondence theory offers an 'analysis' of truth. It doesn't seem to do much more than offer a word which suggests an analogy with some relation in the world. |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
Full Idea: That 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' is true, but not appropriately about any existing entities or their properties. Since Truthmaker says that all truths are about existing entities, it must be false. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: Since I don't necessarily agree that 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' (see Scientific Essentialism), and I take the disagreement to have some basis, I doubt this idea. What stops 'there could be circular squares' from being true? |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but it is not obvious that that proposition is thus about me. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.I) | |
A reaction: This is part of the general rather good objection that it is often unclear what a truth is 'about' (Idea 14408). The original Gettier examples about justification illustrate this problem. They make things true, in a surprising way. |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Being true is not a relation. …Being true is a monadic property. …Being true is a primitive property. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.IV) | |
A reaction: Even after reading Merricks on this, I am not sure I understand it. If a single sentence floats in the void, it is hard to see how the 'monadic' property of truth could accrue to it. |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Suppose for the sake of argument that the correspondence theory is correct. Then it is analytic that each necessary truth, in virtue of being true, corresponds to something. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 2.II) | |
A reaction: The sort of nice simple observation for which I admire Merricks. You don't have to give up on the correspondence theory at this point, but you will have to go through with some substantial metaphysics to keep it afloat. |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I take 'deflationism' to be nothing other than the claim that there is no property of being true. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.V) |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
Full Idea: The claim that the totality state is the sole truthmaker for negative existential truths emerges as the best position for a truthmaker theorist. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.III) |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Some properties (perhaps negative charge, or the relation of identity) admit of no analysis, and so are primitive. But others are analysable, and so not primitive | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.I) |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
Full Idea: It is possible for an object to have a disposition even though the relevant conditional is false. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.III) | |
A reaction: This is the now standard observation that finks (killing the disposition) and antidotes (blocking the effect of the disposition) can intervene, as in safety mechanisms in electrical gadgets. There may be replies available here. |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A Fregean about existence claims would say that 'that hobbits do not exist' is nothing other than the claim that 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.II) | |
A reaction: 'My passport has ceased to exist' seems to be a bit more dramatic than a relationship with a concept. |
21259 | To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are three elements in any given thing: the first is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895d) | |
A reaction: I take the importance of this to be its distinction between what it is, and the definition of what it is. Aristotle maintains this distinction, but some modern Aristotelians seem to get the confused. Plato worried a lot more about names than we do. |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Your belief that you existed in the year 2000 is true; the belief of a segment of you that it then existed is false; so, by the indiscernibility of identicals, there must be two beliefs here. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.IV n20) | |
A reaction: Merricks may be begging the question here. But in the segment view there is nothing which can truly believe it existed a year ago, so therefore nothing here has continued existence, so the segments cannot be part of a single thing. |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is not appropriately about the way anything is, …but about how something would be, had other things differed from how they actually are. As a result, true counterfactuals have neither truthmakers nor a superveniece base. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.IV) | |
A reaction: Might not the truthmakers for counterfactuals reside in the dispositional facts about actuality? We assess the truth of counterfactuals in degrees, so something must determine our views. |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
Full Idea: If Fido's being possibly black reduces (in Lewis's account) to the existence of black counterparts of Fido, then 'Fido is possibly black' is actually true, but it has no actually existing truthmaker. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 5.I) | |
A reaction: This problem is increasingly the target of my views about dispositions and powers. Fido is not possibly a prize-winning novelist, but is possibly dead or in good health, because of the actual nature and dispositions of Fido. |
21260 | Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato] |
Full Idea: The entity which we call 'soul' is precisely that which is defined by the expression 'self-generating motion'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896a) | |
A reaction: We may suspect that he defines soul in this way for a particular context, aimed at proving the existence of a First Mover. He must think there is more to soul than the generation of movement. |
276 | My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato] |
Full Idea: While I am alive I have nothing to thank for my individuality except my soul, whereas my body is just the likeness that I carry around with me. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 959a) |
249 | People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato] |
Full Idea: When a man values beauty above virtue, the disrespect he shows his soul is total and fundamental, because he argues that the body is more to be honoured than the soul. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 727e) |
265 | An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato] |
Full Idea: The description 'just' is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 862b) | |
A reaction: How should we describe the occasional administering of good justice by a generally wicked judge. Greeks focus on character, but moderns focus on actions. |
269 | Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato] |
Full Idea: An attempted murder should be treated like a successful one, but with respect shown for the luck which saved him from total ruin. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 877a) | |
A reaction: The earliest reference to moral luck, I think. 'Repect' sounds vague, but it is asking judges to 'take it into consideration', which is quite practical. Attempted murderers are just as dangerous. |
240 | It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be strange if the gods gave the greatest rewards in heaven to those who led the most pleasant life, rather than the most just. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 662c) | |
A reaction: All of philosophy is just footnotes to Plato.... See Idea 1454. |
264 | The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato] |
Full Idea: The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 840c) | |
A reaction: Plato's puritanical streak. Even Aristotle doesn't agree with this. Self-control does not imply conquest of pleasure. Has a good professional wine taster conquered pleasure? |
4332 | Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the general concord of reason and emotion, but there is one key element, which is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate, and love what we ought to love. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653c) | |
A reaction: An important truth, taken up by Aristotle. To see another person humiliated gives some people pleasure and other people pain. |
248 | A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato] |
Full Idea: People who are anxious to attain moral excellence with all possible speed are pretty thin on the ground. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 718e) |
253 | Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato] |
Full Idea: The cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 731e) |
263 | The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato] |
Full Idea: A life devoted to every physical perfection and every moral virtue is the only life worth the name. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 807c) |
235 | Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue is the aim of the laws the legislator lays down. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631a) |
20957 | We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Nobody has chosen their character; and yet this does not stop anybody attributing the action which follows from his character to themself as a free action. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (The Ages of the World [1810], I.93) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a very nice ambivalence about our attitudes to our own characters. We all have some pride and shame about who we are, without having chosed who we are. At least when we are young. But we make the bed we lie in. |
277 | The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato] |
Full Idea: The guardians of the state should aim to get an exact idea of the common element in all the four virtues. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 965d) |
254 | Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato] |
Full Idea: Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 732c) |
266 | Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato] |
Full Idea: My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to actual damage or not. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 863e) |
242 | The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato] |
Full Idea: The community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will produce the finest characters. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 679b) |
256 | Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Virtue and great wealth are quite incompatible. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 742e) |
245 | Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato] |
Full Idea: Excessively authoritarian government destroys all friendship and community of spirit in the state. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 697d) |
239 | Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato] |
Full Idea: Education in virtue produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643e) |
1402 | Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato] |
Full Idea: Even if you proclaim that a master and a slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757a) |
262 | Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato] |
Full Idea: Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all honours without distinction of sex. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 802a) |
236 | Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631b) |
259 | Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato] |
Full Idea: Justice consists of granting the 'equality' which unequals deserve to get. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757d) | |
A reaction: Beautifully simple, and hard to improve on. It shows the close link between equality and justice, but shows why they are not the same. The main debate about justice concerns the criteria for 'deserving'. |
238 | Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato] |
Full Idea: We should use children's games to channel their pleasures and desires towards activities in which they will have to engage when they are adult. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643c) |
260 | Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato] |
Full Idea: The Minister of Education is by far the most important of all the supreme offices of the state; the best all-round citizen in the state should be appointed. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 765e) |
257 | Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato] |
Full Idea: For domestic and public purposes, and all professional skills, no branch of a child's education has as big a range of applications as mathematics. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 747a) |
4331 | Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato] |
Full Idea: I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, are channelled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653b) | |
A reaction: A precursor of Aristotle's view (Ethics 1104b11). A profound, simple and important insight. |
250 | The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato] |
Full Idea: The best way to educate the younger generation (as well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practise all your life what you preach to others. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 729c) |
275 | Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Creation is not for your benefit; you exist for the sake of the universe. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 903c) |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I think presentists should deny that there is anything at all that is the present time, just as they should deny that there are past times or future times. They should say that existing at the present time is just 'existing'. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.I) | |
A reaction: The whole context is needed to understand Merrick's interesting claim. If there is no present, when can events happen? |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Maybe presentism alone allows for genuine change, by permitting the direct having of a property by something and then, later, the absolute lacking of that property by that same thing. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.IV n23) | |
A reaction: Four-dimensionalism (perdurantism) is the view which is most often charged with not explaining change, and that tends to be associated with eternalism. Are there just two coherent packages of views here? |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Presentists deny that everything is instantaneous; they think that many objects not only exist, but also have existed and will exist. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.I) | |
A reaction: The second half is because presentists are committed to the truth of tensed existence claims (despite a lack of any theory as to how they work). Does anyone hold a theory of Instantaneousism? |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |
Full Idea: I am not sure what account presentists should give of an object's having existed. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.I) | |
A reaction: Personally I am pretty puzzled by the eternalist and growing-block accounts of an object having existed, so we are all up a gum tree here. The best bet is to pull truth and existence apart, but heaven knows what that implies. See Idea 14399. |
273 | Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Motion is transmitted to innumerable things, and this must spring from some initial principle, which must be the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) |
8004 | In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The divine is important in 'The Laws' because it is identified with law; to be obedient before the law is to be obedient before god. | |
From: report of Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Christian conservativism in a nutshell. Plato is rejecting his view in Euthyphro that piety (etc.) must precede the will of the gods. The obvious problem is bad laws, made by corrupt rulers. |
21261 | Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896b) | |
A reaction: Plato seems to assume that the First Mover must still exist, which doesn't follow from anything in the argument. The First Pusher could be dead before the last domino falls. Why can't activity be the default state of everything? |
21258 | The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato] |
Full Idea: When the motion in reality is transmitted to thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) | |
A reaction: This gives a domino picture of reality, with all of reality responding inertly to a first kick. Much better is to see self-generated motion in the active qualities of all matter, as seen in the sea of virtual subatomic particles at the smallest level. |
21257 | Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: We can't resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate itself is infinitely superior, and all the others are inferior to it. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 894d) | |
A reaction: Who said you can't get values from facts! Not that the argument depends on superiority. There could be an inferior First Mover, as a bus driver is subservient to the passengers, or (my favourite) a head teacher is inferior to the pupils. |
274 | Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato] |
Full Idea: Soul must be cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, and all the opposites. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896d) |
21263 | If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflects the motion and revolution and calculation of reason ...then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897c) | |
A reaction: Most of this passage reflects the cosmological argument - that without some initiating source natural events could not occur - but this slides into the design argument. So who designed mud (which is too inferior to have a Form)? |
278 | If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a man studying astronomy sees events apparently happening by necessity rather than being directed by the intention of a benevolent will, he will turn into an atheist. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 967a) |
21265 | The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato] |
Full Idea: A soul or souls have been shown to be cause of all the phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we insist that these souls are gods. So 'everything is full of gods'. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 899b) | |
A reaction: This seems to have little to do with the pagan gods on Olympus. It is also notably not monotheistic. It is somewhere between animism and panpsychism. Does he think the rivers and woods contain gods? Probably not. Just the orderly heavens. |
21262 | There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be more than one soul (not fewer than two) controlling movement and the heavens: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity. | |
From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896e) | |
A reaction: [Wording compressed - as often with the dialogues] This idea of controlling opposites is found in Empedocles. Presumably this good soul defers to the Form of the Good, as implied by the Euthyphro Question. |